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Abstract

The Internet has become an indispensable tool in our life, rather than merely used
as a means of communication channel. Accessing the Internet services such as
web pages and emails nowadays is as easy as dialling a telephone number. With
the advent of the wireless network, a growth of telecommunication technology, and
a massive reduction of the computer’s size, a need to access the Internet service
anytime, anywhere without interruption, is prominent. Nonetheless, allowing the
device to move anytime and anywhere means that the location of the device must
be reachable by the network all the time. Hence, the location information is always
revealed to an entity who is in charge, such as the service provider. In addition,
the IP protocol itself reveals the communication information through both packets’
header and payload and header cannot be disclosed, since it is required for routing.
Therefore, it is a challenging topic to provide a mobility system that equipped with
a location privacy property.
In this thesis, we aim at providing some solutions to the security threats that
are caused by the mobility requirement in the IP-based network, particularly the
location privacy problem. In the first part of the thesis, we focus on the existing
protocol that is commonly used, namely the Mobile IPv4. We select this protocol
since this protocol has been widely adopted by many people and this will make
our work more applicable in practice. We will not only present the security issues
specific to location privacy, but we will also study another threat that is caused by
the use of Mobile IPv4, namely in our stolen laptop scenario.
In the second part of the thesis, we focus on the location privacy problem and
aim to provide a formal approach to study this problem. The results from the Mobile
IPv4 in the first part show that to provide location privacy, the scheme needs to be
based on the over-lay network concept. This is similar to low-latency anonymous
communication networks and so we use the low-latency anonymous communication
system as a building block in our framework. We introduce the notions of mobility,
v

anonymity and location privacy in this framework.
We show that when mobility, anonymity and location privacy are required concurrently, existing low-latency systems can be enhanced with the mobility property
to construct a mobility system. Nonetheless, a mobility system that provides location privacy does not provide anonymity. Similarly, an enhanced mobility system
that is built on top of the low-latency anonymous communication system does not
provide location privacy.
Since our solution heavily relies on the low-latency anonymous system, we also
study one particular type of attack on low-latency systems, namely a low cost attack.
The attack is considered very harmful since it can be performed in the low-latency
anonymous system without being a global adversary. Our aim is to derive some
restrictions so that when we incorporate any low-latency anonymous system as our
building block, these cautions need to be exercised to avoid this particular type of
attack.
Our work will contribute to the design of mobility systems that provide location
privacy and will enable users to use the Internet without the need to sacrifice their
privacy.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the last few decades, computing technology has grown from a terminal with a
big mainframe to a seven-inch sub-notebook (EEEPC) or a pocket size PDA. It has
grown from a stand alone host to a host in a local area network and eventually becomes a host in the Internet. With the advent of wireless technology, users demand
more. They want to be able to access the Internet service while they are on the
move with no interruption. Wireless technology such as 802.11b, 802.11g definitely
can fulfil some of these requirements but access is only limited within the coverage
area, i.e. the range of access point (within the same subnet). The specific feature of
the Internet protocol, namely IP, which ties an IP connection with an IP address, an
identifier that each node is assigned by its network, results in the application’s termination when a user moves his device from one network to another. The connection’s
reconnection requires the user’s interaction to restart all halted applications. This
situation is unpleasant since every time the user has moved, the user has to restart
his applications entirely. More importantly, some applications, such as downloading
streaming content, cannot be performed if this interaction is required. Hence, there
is clearly a need for a system that can enable the user to access the Internet service
as if he has not moved. A system that provides this particular property is referred
to as a system that provides mobility, namely Internet Mobility. Roughly speaking,
the Internet mobility is an ability that allows Internet users to enjoy the Internet
service whilst on the move. That is, the users may want to download files, browse
the web, listen to the iPod cast, or watch youtube while they are walking or they
are in the bus or train.
Internet mobility can be handled at any layer from the network layer up to the
application layer in the OSI model. Therefore, there are also mobility terms such as
IP mobility, TCP-IP mobility and application mobility [Sal04, Jam03]. These particular terms refer to the layers which mobility mechanism is deployed or provided.
1
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From the user’s perspective, Internet mobility and application mobility seem to
be equivalent. This is because the user accesses services through his applications.
When he is able to access his Internet applications anywhere without any interruption such as restarting his applications, he accomplishes his goal. The user is not
interested in knowing which layer mobility management is deployed and invoked, as
long as his goal is accomplished.
In this thesis, we are interested in a mobility system that equips applications with
the ability to move from one network to another, namely a system with application
mobility. We note that our mobility definition is closely related, but different, to
the concept of roaming [AZ04]. In the roaming situation, a mobile host obtains the
Internet access via other networks so the user must know that he will move. On the
contrary, the user is not aware that the network’s point of attachment has changed
in the Internet mobility situation.
Mobile IP is one of the most prominent proposals to provide Internet mobility.
It is a protocol in the network layer aims at enhancing the original IP protocol for
mobility sake. Since the IP protocol was not designed with the security in mind, the
enhancement protocol also faces the same security problems such as the integrity
and the confidentiality of data packets. Furthermore, the mobility requirement
itself brings new security problems. The problem can come from a deployment of a
particular mobility solution or it can be a common problem that can happen in any
IP-based mobility system due to the mobility requirement.
The existing protocol, namely Mobile IPV4 [Per02] is the mobility proposal that
we will first use as our case study. Rather than trying to propose a new solution
for known security problems such as a new secure registration protocol or a secure
mechanism to exchange packets between the Mobile IP nodes, we are more interested
in security issues that emerge after the protocol is deployed with other entities in
the network and the problem regarding to the disclosure of the Mobile IP user’s
location, namely location privacy.
In the former case, losing the mobile device outside its home domain does not
only result in the loss of both the property and the data stored on that device, but
also may endanger the user’s home network by allowing an adversary (e.g. a thief)
access to it. The thief can use this device; pretends to be a user; collects some
information about the user and eventually can damage the system.
In the latter case, the fact that Mobile IP deals with a mechanism to route a
message to a mobile node while the user who carries the mobile node is on the move
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anytime anywhere implies that at anytime the home agent must know where the
mobile node is. When this location information is accumulated, it can be used to
track the user’s movement, his whereabouts at each time of the day and eventually
can predict his daily life’s activities. The ISP (who controls the home agent) may sell
this information to marketing companies so that they can choose a correct product
to advertise to their users. We note that being able to access the service anytime
anywhere is by no mean equivalent to sacrificing the user privacy.
We have observed that location privacy is a generic problem in any IP-based
mobility system. Moreover, there exists no single definition that clearly defines this
notion. Henceforth, we start the second part of our thesis by providing a formal
approach for an IP-based mobility system that requires location privacy.
Due to the fact that an IP address can be used as both an identifier and a locator1 , providing location privacy to the IP-based mobility system has a very similar
approach with the anonymous communication system proposed by Chaum [Cha81]
in 1981. This is because a direct connection between the mobile node at its new
location and its communication partner must not be allowed2 . Anonymous communication systems over the Internet can be classified into two categories: systems
for high-latency applications and systems for low-latency applications. High latency
applications are applications that do not demand quick responses, such as email
systems. On the other hand, low latency applications are applications that do need
real-time or near real-time responses. Examples include web applications, secure
shell (SSH) and instant messenger. Updating the new location to fulfil the mobility’s
need must also be done in real-time or nearly realtime. Hence, in this thesis, only
low-latency anonymous communication such as Tor [DMS04], Tarzan [FSCM, FM02]
and MorphMix [RP02, RP04] are taken into consideration.
The next issue that we are interested in is a system that requires both mobility
and anonymity. As mobility and anonymity are two essential properties in the IPbased networks, systems that require both properties to co-exist are also important.
To illustrate, a user that wants to access the Internet anonymously and continuously
may also want to conceal his location from his ISP when he is moving around. To
achieve mobility and anonymity concurrently is quite a challenging problem. On the
one hand, these two properties seem to be contradictory; whether the loss of location
1

An IP address is uniquely assigned to a device and it also contains information on the device’s
location via the network prefix field (see Obtaining an IP Location in Section 2.1.4).
2
Otherwise according to the IP-connection, a communication partner can easily derive the
location of its peer through the peer’s IP address.
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information can reduce the anonymity. On the other hand, either a mobility system
which the location privacy is needed or an anonymous system where anonymity is
required seem to employ a similar mechanism that is low-latency mix network; hence,
it should be trivial to merge. Also achieving both properties can be done in two
opposite directions: either adding anonymity into a system that already provides
mobility and location privacy or adding mobility and location privacy to the existing
anonymous communication system.
It is important to clarify that adding total location privacy to the existing mobility system, the low latency anonymous communication is placed between the
point-of-attachment and the IP address that is used as the mobile device’s location
i.e. a care of address in Mobile IPv4, where adding anonymous communication, the
low latency anonymous communication is placed between the mobile device and its
communication partner.
Our work is heavily involved with a low-latency anonymous communication system. Therefore, any attack to the low latency anonymous communication system
may possibly be used to attack our location privacy system. The attack that interests us is a recent timing attack by Murdoch and Danezis [MD05]. This is because
their attack can be done in an inexpensive way under the threat model that most of
low latency systems currently rely on. That is the model excluding a global passive
adversary. The implication is quite severe if this attack is applicable with all other
systems since this timing attacks can be performed by a non-powerful adversary,
namely being one of the network’s nodes. Hence, the knowledge of the necessary
conditions to prevent this attack is important to us.

1.1

Aims and Objectives

This thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part of this thesis, we elaborate the
security problems in the existing mobility protocol in detail, that is Mobile IPv4.
We select to address two problems: a stolen mobile device issue and location privacy
in Mobile IP.
In the second part of this thesis, our aim is to provide a formal approach for
defining a location privacy property, since we observe that location privacy is the
common problem with any IP-based mobility system and there exists no formal
approach in the literature.
Then, we will show that when a total location privacy is required, the system
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can be built on top of the low-latency anonymous communication networks. We will
define these notions: mobility, location privacy and anonymity since there exists no
single definition that clearly defines them.
Though location privacy can be built on top of an anonymity system, they expose
different properties and security problems. Our next goal is to provide such a system
that can achieve both anonymity and location privacy at the same time. Finally,
we provide a remark on some concerns with a side channel attack, namely a timing
attack that may affect our location privacy system.

1.2

Structure of Thesis and its Contributions

The structure of the thesis is described as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the topic,
gives a short description of each Chapter and its main contribution. Chapter 2
provides background knowledge of significant properties, cryptographic tools, and
the existing systems including the related works.
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 aim at addressing security issues with the existing
mobility system, that is Mobile IP. Chapter 3, based on [WSnS03], considers the
scenario where a laptop that is enabled with secure Mobile IPv4 connection to the
firewall using SKIP, is stolen and the aim is to protect the private key stored in the
laptop without the use of the smart card. We propose a method of protecting the
private key in which the secret stored in the laptop cannot be used to determine
the private key. We also introduce a method of disabling the stored secret such that
even when the laptop is stolen, there is no need for changing the private key. Based
on [WSnS05], in Chapter 4, we propose a method to provide location privacy for
Mobile IP users. We present two protocols that use an overlay network approach,
and designed particularly for Mobile IP. We employ universal re-encryption and
extend it to n-out-of-n universal re-encryption to achieve our goal. In contrast
to other overlay network approaches, where at least n public key encryptions are
required, our scheme requires only two public key encryption operations. Therefore,
it is applicable to Mobile IP systems, where in most cases the mobile nodes are small
devices and have computational limitations.
In Chapter 5, we aim at producing a formal approach for any IP-based mobility
system that requires a location privacy property as its added on feature. We note
that there exists no single definition that clearly defines application mobility and
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location privacy in the literature yet. We will classify location privacy into three
levels: generic location privacy, semantic location privacy and total location privacy.
We will also propose a new framework for a system that provides total location
privacy. We note that due to the fact that low latency anonymous communication
systems can be used as a building block to provide total location privacy, its notion
is also given in this Chapter. Our work can be seen as the first attempt towards
formalising the notions of mobility, location privacy and anonymous communication.
In Chapter 6, we aim to address the issue on how to achieve mobility and
anonymity concurrently. We follow the notions in Chapter 5 and proceed with
a concrete construction based on an existing IP-based anonymous communication
network, Tor. We will highlight the difficulty of achieving mobility and anonymity
concurrently although it seems trivial to merge these two properties together. Finally, we will evaluate our proposed construction based on the definition that we
have developed. Note that Chapter 5 and 6 are the extended result of our work
in [WSSN07a].
Based on [WSSN07b], in Chapter 7 we aim to address some design principles to
build a secure low latency anonymous systems that do not suffer from the low cost
timing attacks proposed by Murdoch and Danezis [MD05]. To achieve our goal, we
will review the attack for the necessary properties behind its success and proceed
by investigating this attack against other low latency networks, namely Tarzan and
MorphMix. Based on this investigation, we will derive some principles that the low
latency anonymous systems’ designers should consider to prevent this attack. We
also provide some related discussions to highlight our results.
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis and suggests future extensions.

Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This Chapter introduces the mobility and anonymity concepts that will be used
throughout this thesis. In particular, we describe the subtleties of Mobile IP protocol and low latency anonymous systems. We also provide the background of the
cryptographic tools that will be used throughout this thesis. A brief summary of
some IP-based location privacy systems are also provide in this Chapter.

2.1
2.1.1

Essential Properties
Mobility

In general, the term Mobility refers to movement or change. According to the Oxford
dictionary, the main definition of mobility is “the ability to move or to be moved;
capacity for movement or change of place; movableness, portability”. It also means
“the ease or freedom of movement; capacity for rapid or comfortable locomotion or
travel ” [Oxf].
In IP-based network systems, there are many terms that are related to the meaning of mobility. Mobile Internet is a term that is frequently used in literature. It covers both an extension of the standard Internet applications and services to a mobile
environment and the integration of the Internet and the telecommunication technologies as a whole to fulfil all the communication needs of human beings [Sal04, Jam03].
Several papers [CB96, Sno03, Dow04, PADea05, KJM04, Dan03] also use the term
Internet Mobility. Intuitively, Internet Mobility is referred to as an ability that allows the Internet user to use the Internet services when he is on the move similarly
to how the user uses his mobile phone’s service. That is, the user can use his mobile
phone to talk with his communication partner anytime and anywhere. Others can
reach him by dialing his mobile phone number without the need to know where he
7
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is.
Since Internet mobility can be handled at any layer, namely from the network
layer to the application layer in the OSI model, there are also terms like IP-mobility,
TCP-IP mobility and application mobility. Each term represents a layer at which
mobility management is deployed or provided. Due to the protocol stack’s nature,
when mobility is provided in the lower layer, the upper layers automatically inherit
this property. From the user perspective, Internet mobility, application mobility and
user mobility are used interchangeably. This is because the user accesses services
through his applications and his goal is to access these applications anywhere without
any interruption such as restarting the application. The user is not interested in
knowing which layer the mobility management is deployed1 .
To achieve mobility in IP-based networks, essentially there are two mechanisms
that can be deployed [DS04]. The first mechanism is to establish a special route
throughout the communication path between the mobile host and its correspondent
node (recipient). For example, the IP protocol provides a source routing mechanism
to direct routers along the path to route. Nevertheless, this approach is not scalable
since the special route is always required throughout the entire communication path
when the host changes its location [DS04]. The second approach is to assign specific
nodes that are responsible to maintain the mobile host’s location. A tunneling
mechanism is employed to forward packets destined to the mobile host that is away,
which are “channeled” via these specific nodes [DS04].
There are two categories in the mobility management schemes, namely one that
handles micromobility and the other that handles macromobility [DS04]. The micromobility protocol focuses on the mobility of the mobile host within a small region.
Examples of this protocol include Cellular IP [Cel, Val99], HAWAII [RVS+ 02], Regional Mobile IPv4 [FJP07] and Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) [MB05]. The
macromobility protocol is more focused on a broader term, that is mobility across
the regions. Examples of the latter approach include Mobile IPv4 [Per02] and Mobile IPv6 [JPA04]. In this thesis we are interested in the macromobility protocol
only.
1

Since user mobility means that the user can access the service at anytime and anywhere,
this term is also used with the scenario that user can access his service at any legitimate host
simply by using his login and password [Jam03]. In that scenario, there is no concern about the
uninterrupted connection. It merely concerns with the ability of the user to be able to access the
service at different location. We note that our thesis will not take this scenario into consideration.
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Privacy

In 1890, Warren and Brandies, the two American lawyers, gave a definition to privacy
as “the right of the individual to be let alone” [WB90]. Over the years, this meaning
covers a variety of aspects ranging from the right that individuals can go anywhere
without being watched by a paparazzi to the right that they give away or sell their
personal data. Recently, privacy is often referred to as the individuals’ right to
control their personal information and the right to control who has knowledge about
them [Can05, Gri04]. More specifically, it is the right of individuals to determine,
if, when, how and to what extent information about themselves will be collected,
stored, transmitted, used and shared with others [Can05]2 .
Personal data or personal information is defined by the EU Data Protection
Directive [Dir95] as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural
person (data subject); an identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or
indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification number or to one or more
factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity”.
When talking about privacy, two types of exposures are concerned by the individuals (or users in the system): the exposure of their identities and the exposure of
their other personal information [AZ04]. In the former, they do not want to reveal
their names or other identifiers that allow others to identify them. In the latter,
they are not willing to reveal their other personal information such as their address,
sex, job, salary, and age since it can be used to link to them.

2.1.3

Internet Privacy

The advances in computing technology and the Internet not only enhances the existing privacy threats but it also brings new threats to personal privacy [Tav99]. If
every computer was self-contained and isolated, then the threat to privacy would
be manageable. Unlike the traditional scenario that each individual knows he is
watched, it is not so straightforward that Internet users are able to realise that their
privacy is being invaded. New Internet users are not aware that every post they
make to a web board, every email they send, every web page they visit, and every
2

This definition is indeed adopted from a privacy definition created by Westin, a professor from
Columbia University, in 1967 [Gar02]. He defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others” [Wes67].
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item they purchase on E-bay could be monitored and logged [GWB97]. Either from
their Internet Service Providers (ISPs) which claim to log their Internet traffic for
tuning, performance monitoring or their communication partners which they send
e-mails to or browse their web sites.
Generally speaking, Internet privacy can be referred to as the individuals’ right
to browse the Internet or use applications without being tracked unless permission
is granted in advance [Can05]. More formally, it is their ability to control what
information they reveal about themselves over the Internet, and to control who can
access that information [Wikc]. Some authors such as Cranor uses the term Internet
privacy to refer to privacy concerns involving activities on the Internet [Cra99].
How the Personal Information is Revealed in the Internet
When a user accesses the Internet through a subscribed ISP, he needs to give them
his information so that he can use the service. This allows the service provider
to have his information, for example, his name, his age, and his home address.
Otherwise, the Internet protocol itself can also reveal the user’s personal information
to other entities in the network as follows:
Identifiers: There are several identifiers which can be used to identify a user or a
device in the network that employs the IP protocol. These identifiers can be grouped
as device identifiers, host identifiers and application-layer identifiers depending on
which communication layer is considered [AZ04]. Examples include the network
interface MAC address, the IP address, and the HTTP cookies, etc. The host
identifier receives more interest than others. This is because it uniquely identifies
the user or the device across the Internet, whereas two other types of identifiers have
some limitations. Device identifiers can only be seen in the link layer, thus limited
to only the link-layer network, where application layer identifiers such as the HTTP
cookies may be encrypted (since it is considered as the IP packet’s payload), thus
only the host who can decrypt this connection can have this knowledge.
Other personal information: The Internet protocol allows any machine on the
network to monitor the IP packet transmitted. Hence, each entity that can capture a
packet can learn the information from the packet’s payload and its header. Examples
of this information are the protocols and the applications that the user uses, the
web sites the user visits, the online services the user contacts, the location of the
user etc.
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Location Privacy

Prior to discussing location privacy, we will first provide a definition of the ‘location’
and a brief description of how IP location is revealed.
Types of Location
Kupper [Kup05] classifies location into two classes: a class of physical locations and
a class of virtual locations. Locations that denote the place of an object in the real
world such as a university or a train station belong to the physical location class,
where the virtual location involves places in the cyberspace such as a web board or
a chat room.
Physical locations are also categorised into three main types, namely descriptive
locations, spatial locations and network locations [Kup05].
A descriptive location is a location which people use in their everyday life. It is
always related to natural geographic objects like territories, mountains, and lakes, or
to man-made geographical objects like cities, countries, roads, buildings and rooms
within a building.
A spatial location, or in other words “position”, refers to a single point in a
well-defined reference system which subdivides a geographic area, mostly the entire
Earth, into units of a common shape and size. It is usually represented by means
of two or three dimensional coordinates such as specific pairing of latitude and
longitude. Since people prefer to use location in terms of geographical object to
location in terms of using coordinates, this method of positioning is unlikely to be
used in their everyday life. It is used by professional applications such as aviation
or shipping.
A network location refers to a location that associates with the topology of a
communication network, such as the Internet or cellular systems. The network location does not pinpoint the exact physical position of the object (user). Rather, it
provides a location with respect to the network topology. That is, a local network in
the Internet or a cell in the cellular system. To be more specific, the Internet user’s
network location refers to the Internet’s local network that the user device is currently connected with. This network can be obtained from the device’s IP address.
Similarly, a network location of the user in the cellular system is referred to a base
station’s location where his mobile phone is currently attached to. There is a directory service to map numbers, identifiers, or names onto the network location. For the
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location management in a mobility system, network location is sufficient [Kup05].
Spatial location becomes significant because there is a need for location-based services (LBS). Location-based services are application services which make use of the
position of the mobile device to add value to the service [Kup05]. Examples are
emergency services3 such as the E911 service [Bur] in North America, navigation
systems and location based mobile advertising. Spatial locations can be obtained
independently either from a position-enabled device such as a GPS4 enabled device;
or from an extension of the existing communication network with positioning techniques, such as using the GSM network with the Cell-ID in combination with timing
advance5 ; or from a hybrid of both approaches such as equipping the mobile device
with GPS receiver [Kup05, Buc04].
In this thesis, we are interested in a geographical location, which is the location
of an object in the real world, not a virtual meeting place like a chat room or a
web site. In particular, we focus on the network location that is obtained from an
IP-enabled device’s, namely IP location. We are not interested in a spatial location.
Obtaining an IP Location
An IP address can be referred to as either the identity of an Internet user’s IP host
or its point of attachment to the Internet [DP03]. In other words, it is not only
used as the host’s identifier but it is also used as the host’s interface locator. This
is because the IP address comprises of two main parts, namely a network prefix and
a host number [Bid04]. The network prefix specifies a network location where the
host is attached to, such as the university campus or the ISP area, and is used for
routing purposes. The host number is used to uniquely identify the host in that
particular network [Bid04]. The Internet users can be located through their devices’
IP addresses by using services such as the whois service [Fad02]. Figure 2.1 shows
the result obtained from querying the http://www.find-ip-address.org/ web site for
the location information of the IP address 130.130.37.12, which is the IP address
of one of the desktops in the University of Wollongong campus. We note that
3

Services that route emergency calls to an emergency response agency that is the closest to the
caller’s current location.
4
GPS stands for “Global Positioning System”. This system uses a constellation of between
twenty four and thirty two satellites that transmit precise microwave signal to position a target on
a whole continent [Wikb].
5
In the Cell-ID technique, the position of the target device is derived from the coordinates of
the serving base station. Timing advance roughly estimates the signal between the base station
and the device so that the range between them can be derived [Buc04].
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http://www.find-ip-address.org/ claims to provide IP location look up service and
the latitude and longitude shown by this web site, are the latitude and longitude of
the University of Wollongong not the latitude and longitude of the desktop’s location
[LoC].
Location Privacy
Danezis et al. [DLA05] described location information as “a set of data describing
an individual’s location over a period of time”, where the resolution of time and
location relies on the technology used to collect the data. Since location can be
regarded as one piece of personal information, location privacy can be defined as
privacy that is related to this location information.
When the network becomes mobile, location information becomes more important as it increases the chance that an individual could reveal his personal information. Location data can be simply used to specify the user’s movement, for example,
where he is at a particular point in time. The collection of this location information
can be analysed for the individual’s behaviour or even his interactions with others.
To illustrate, the amount of data about a person’s past and present locations can be
used to derive that person’s behaviour or even his intention. Location data of multiple people allows the intersections of many different kinds of information, hence,
interactions can be inferred and finally group behaviour, attitudes and intentions
can be derived [Cla]. This information may be used for a variety of users’ unfriendly
purposes. For example, the ISPs can use location information collected from the
users’ mobile devices to vary prices depending on the device’s location - i.e., they
charge more at the popular areas [AZ04].
The disclosure of location information results in two types of location privacy
problems: the direct location privacy problem which discloses the whereabouts of
each individual at a specific time and the location profiling problem which uses a
collection of an individual or a group of individuals’ location to derive further useful
personal information such as daily activities [KDFP05].

2.1.5

Anonymity and Anonymous Communication

Anonymity is the state of being anonymous or virtually invisible [Can05]. Pfitzmann
and Kohntoop [PK01] defined anonymity as “the state of being not identifiable within
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a set of subjects, the anonymity set”6 . It is used as an effective goal to provide
privacy. Inituitively, Internet privacy can be provided by allowing Internet users
to be anonymous when they interact with the Internet. More specifically, it is
to provide them with an appropriate degree of anonymity so that it is extremely
difficult to identify them by linking their Internet activities with their IP addresses.
Diaz et al. [DSCP02] classified anonymity in the Internet into two types: data
anonymity and connection anonymity. The term data anonymity aims at protecting
any identifying information that can be extracted from the data exchanged in a
particular application [DSCP02]. This information can be protected by encryption.
The term connection anonymity aims to hide identities of sender and receiver during
data transfer.
Anonymous communication is used as one of the most powerful tools to guarantee
privacy through connection anonymity [KLTF99]. The ultimate goal of anonymous
communication systems is to ensure that an adversary gains no information about
the communication that is happening in the communication channel [Jon04]. Being more specific, it is to hide correspondences between senders and the messages
they sent, namely sender anonymity, or receivers and the messages they receive,
namely recipient anonymity [Dan04a]. This also includes a disclosure of the relationship between the sender and the receiver, namely sender-receiver unlinkability
or relationship unlinkability [Ano, Jon04].
The earlier works that claimed to offer anonymity to the Internet user tends to
rely on a single trusted node. The type-0 remailers, namely, anon.penet.fi [Wika],
stored a table that mapped between real email address and pseudonymous email
addresses and acted as a proxy between the sender and the recipient of that email7 .
The Anonymizer.com [Inc] employs a similar concept to the type-0 remailers, that
is the Anonymizer acts as a proxy to relay the request from a web browser to the
intended web server in a way that the web server thinks that the Anonymizer is
the request’s sender. The problem with this type of system is that it only protects
the user identity from his communication partner but it does not protect the user
privacy from the proxy nodes. Also, since there is no mechanism to prevent a passive
6

They developed their terminologies under the usual setting that senders send messages to
recipients using a communication network. Their first proposal is released in 2000 for anonymity
together with other related properties such as pseudonymity, unlinkability and unobservability.
They have continued to propose their terminologies in regard to this area i.e., extended to identity
management. Their latest terminology can be found at [Ano].
7
This service is shut down in August 1996 due to the legal issue that it cannot guarantee its
user anonymity [Hel97].
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attacker from observing the service, anyone who can watch the communication is
able to link to the real users.
The most powerful approach used in the field of of anonymous communications is a Mix network [Dan04a]. It was first introduced in the seminal paper of
Chaum [Cha81]. Conceptually, a message to be anonymised is relayed through a
series of nodes called mix nodes. Each mix node performs operations that have
two main objectives. The first one is to provide bitwise unlinkability and is aimed
at message content, and the second one is mixing that is aimed at message flow,
namely flow unlinkability. To provide bitwise unlinkability messages are padded
and encrypted so that the adversary cannot see the content of data packets and so
cannot link the content. To provide flow unlinkability, each node incoming message
is batched, reordered and relayed in a way that is difficult for the adversary to discover its corresponding outgoing message through the message arrival and departure
times. Also, to make the attack more difficult, dummy traffic is introduced.
High and Low Latency Anonymous Systems
Anonymous communication systems over the Internet can be categorised into two
types of systems: systems for high-latency applications and systems for low-latency
applications. High latency applications are application that do not demand quick
responses, such as email systems. On the other hand, low latency applications are
applications that do need real-time or near real-time responses. Examples include
web applications, secure shell (SSH) and instant messenger. Mix-network introduced
by Chaum [Cha81] is widely deployed as both types’ fundamental concept. That
is, a message to be anonymised is relayed through a series of mix nodes, in which
each mix node performs its bitwise-unlinkability and flow-unlinkability functions.
The major difference is high-latency systems are message-based systems where lowlatency systems are connection-based. A message-based system is a system where
one path is dedicated to only one message, and for a new message a new path is
required. A connection based system is a system that uses a path for a period of
time and sends data as a stream of packets over the same path. Another difference
between the two is due to the time restriction.Anonymous systems for low latency
applications, i.e. Tor [DMS04] and MorphMix [RP02, RP04], may ignore the mixing
process that includes batching and reordering for the sake of the system’s practicality. However, this would be more susceptible to traffic analysis attacks in particular
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timing attacks.
Examples for high latency anonymous systems are all email anonymity systems
such as Chaum’s Mix [Cha81] and all types of remailers as classified by Goldberg
in [Gol07], namely anon.penet.fi (type-0), CyperPunk remailers [Par96] (type-I),
Mixmaster [SM] (type-II), and Mixminion [DDM03] (type-III).
Examples for low latency anonymous systems are Anonymizer.com [Inc], Onion
Routing [GRS99], Crowds [RR98], Tor [DMS04], Tarzan [FSCM, FM02] and MorphMix [RP02, RP04].
In this thesis, we are interested in the second type, that is the low-latency systems.

2.2

Cryptographic Tools and Property

In the following, we will briefly discuss the cryptographic tools and properties that
will be used throughout this thesis.

2.2.1

Key Agreement Schemes

Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement
The first key agreement was proposed by Diffie and Hellman [DM76] in 1976. The
protocol allows two parties to establish a shared secret over the insecure channel
without having met or shared key in advance. The protocol is illustrated as follows.
Suppose Alice and Bob want to send message to each other. Firstly, Alice and Bob
agree on a prime p and its primitive element g ∈R Zp∗ . Each participant selects
his/her own secret a and b, a, b ∈ Zp−1 . Then, Alice sends Wa to Bob and Bob sends
Wb to Alice via an authenticated channel, where Wa = g a (mod p) and Wb = g b
(mod p). Given Wa , it is hard to find a ∈ Zp−1 . This is known as the discrete
logarithm assumption [MvOV97a]. Finally, Alice computes the shared key KAB =
Wb a = (g b )a (mod p). Bob can also compute the same key KAB = Wa b = (g a )b
(mod p).
This protocol is vulnerable to a “man in the middle” attack [Sti02]. To protect
against this attack, the shared key must be authenticated. This can be achieved by
incorporating either a public key or secret key cryptography [Sti02].
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IPsec (Internet Protocol Security)

IPsec is a suite of protocols aims for secure Internet communications. To be more
specific, IPsec is “designed to provide interoperable, high quality, cryptographicallybased security for IPv4 and IPv6 ” [KA05]. That is, to provide confidentiality, data
integrity, access control, and data source authentication to IP datagrams. It operates
at the network layer (layer 3 in OSI model). Where IPsec is an integral part of IPv6,
it is not mandatory in IPv4.
AH and ESP Protocols
IPsec is based on two protocols: Authentication Header protocol (AH) [KA98a]
and the Encapsulating Security Payload protocol (ESP) [KA98b]. The AH protocol
provides connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, and an optional antireplay service, while the ESP protocol provides mainly confidentiality, as well as all
the functionality provided by the AH8 .
These two protocols can be used alone or in combination.
Transport and Tunnel Modes
There are two modes of operation: tunnel mode and transport mode. In transport
mode, only the payload is encrypted or authenticated. The IP header is not involved.
The encrypted or authenticated information is inserted between the IP header and
the remainder of the packet. The transport mode can be used for only host-to-host
communication.
In the tunnel mode, the whole packet is encrypted or authenticated. Then,
it is encapsulated or tunneled as a payload in a new packet. Hence, a new IP
header is required. The tunnel mode can be used in all circumstances: host-tohost communication, gateway-to-gateway communication (network-to-network) or
host-to-gateway (host-to-network) communication. Examples are a communication
between two firewalls or a communication between an endnode and the firewall.
Security Association
A security association (SA) is a unidirectional secure channel that offers security
services (either confidentiality or authenticity) to the traffic the channel carries.
8
The AH’s property is provided in the ESP as an optional option. However, it is strongly
recommended to include it.
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An SA is uniquely identify by a triple of destination IP address in a packet header,
security parameter index (SPI), and a security protocol (either AH or ESP). SPI is an
index to the security association database (SADB), in which stores algorithms, keys
and other information that correspond to the particular SA. As SA is unidirectional,
two SAs are needed for one pair of communication.
To establish an SA from one end to the other requires a protocol like ISAKMP
[MSST98]9 , OAKLEY [Orm98]10 , SKEME [Kra96]11 or a combination of them, that
is IKE [HC98].

2.2.3

Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

Internet Key Exchange (IKE) [HC98] is a protocol that IPsec uses to establish
its security association between two parties to protect the traffic that they carry.
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is used to set up a shared session secret, from which
cryptographic keys are derived. The design of IKE is influenced from ISAKMP,
Oakley and SKEME. The protocol has two phases.
In the first phase, two parties negotiate a common secure channel, namely an
ISAKMP Security Association (ISAKMP SA). The ISAKMP SA’s attributes include
encryption algorithm, hashing function, authentication method, and the algebraic
group for exponentiation (Diffie-Hellman key exchange). A pseudorandom bit generator can also be negotiated.
In the second phase, the ISAKMP SA from the first phase is used to establish IPsec’s SAs, or SAs of any services that needs key material and/or parameter
negotiation.
The first phase consists of two modes, namely a main node and an aggressive
mode. Their basic difference is that the main mode provides identity protection
where the aggressive mode does not. The authentication in both modes can be
achieved by any of the four following methods: digital signature, public key encryption, revised mode of public key encryption and pre-shared key.
Main mode consists of the exchange of three pairs of messages: the first pair
negotiates the security attributed used to form the SA; the second pair deal with
the exchange of the DH public parameters and identities; the last pair authenticates
the DH exchange. There are four messages in the Aggressive mode. The first two
9

A protocol to establish a framework authentication and key exchange.
A protocol describes a series of key exchange defining in detail the services provided by them.
11
A key exchange technique that provides anonymity, reputability, and quick key refreshment.
10
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Reserved

Source NSID Destination NSID Next Header
counter n
Kij Algorithm Crypt Algorithm MAC Algorithm Comp Algorithm
Kp encrypted in Kijn
Source Master Key ID (If source NSID is non-zero)
Destination Master-Key ID (If destination NSID is non-zero)

Figure 2.2: SKIP Header

messages deal with both the SA’s negotiation and the exchange of DH public values
and entity. The responder is also authenticated in the second message. The last
message not only authenticates the sender but also provides proof of participation.
There is only one mode, namely quick mode in the second phase. It is a three
message protocol to negotiate the IPsec SA. All packets in this phase are encrypted
and authenticated with the first phase’s SA’s encryption key and the SA’s integrity
key respectively.

2.2.4

Simple Key Management for Internet Protocol (SKIP)

We note that SKIP will be the main key management technique used in Chapter 3.
Simple Key Management for Internet Protocol (or SKIP, for short) [AMP96] is
a key management protocol that was developed by Sun Microsystems [Fun04]. It
incorporates the public key cryptography based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Users’ public keys are authenticated via a public key certified system (PKI), which
is a system that comprises of the components necessary to securely distribute the
public key [KPS02] such as SecureDNS [EK97] or X.509 directory lookup [pwg].
Unlike IKE, which requires a number of message exchanges to establish a session
key, SKIP uses only one exchange. A SKIP-equipped node can send an encrypted
message to another SKIP-equipped node without the need of any prior message to
negotiate security parameters. Cryptographic information, such as algorithms used
for a payload’s encryption and authentication, are included as part of the SKIP
header (the Kij Algorithm, Crypt Algorithm and MAC Algorithm fields in Figure
2.2), and sent along with the encrypted payload. SKIP also allows the sender to
specify an alternative IP address that his receiver can use to look up the sender’s
public key (the source master key ID field in Figure 2.2).
Procedures in SKIP, as shown in Figure 2.3, can be described as follows [Mon03]:
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Sender node
1. compute a master key Kij
2. randomly generate a traffic key Kp
3. choose cryptographic algorithms
Crypt Alg for encryption
Mac Alg for authentication
4. derive CryptKp and M ACKp from Kp
using algorithms in 3
5. generate authenticated or/and encrypted
payload using the keys in step 4
6. derive Kijn from Kij and a counter n
7. encrypt Kp with Kijn
8. if the sender identity is his IP address
set source NSID to zero
else
set source NSID to non-zero
set source master key ID value to
the alternate identity
8. if the receiver identity is her IP address
set dest NSID to zero
else
set dest NSID to non-zero
set dest master key ID value to
the alternate identity
10. insert values into the SKIP header
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Receiver node

11. < SKIP header, SKIP payloada >
12. extract info. from the SKIP header
13. obtain the sender’s identity
if source NSID is zero
it is the sender’s IP address
else
it is source master key ID’s value
14. obtain her identity
if dest NSID is zero
it is the her IP address
else
it is the dest master key ID’s value
15. compute Kij
16. compute Kijn
17. decrypt the encrypted value of Kp
18. derive CryptKp and M ACKp from Kp
19. use these keys to decrypt/authenticate
the payload
a

This payload means a message’s payload after authentication or encryption operations using
SKIP are already performed on the message (from step 5).

Figure 2.3: SKIP operations from the sender to the receiver
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• A sender computes a master key (Kij ) by using his private key and a receiver’s
public key obtained from the PKI system. Algorithms used to derive this key
are placed in the Kij algorithm in SKIP header. It is noted that the sender
has to decide whether the receiver’s identity is her IP address or an alternate
value. Then, he uses this value to look up her public key. The same principle is
applied with his identity. That is, he can choose his IP address or an alternate
value. His decision is indicated in the source NSID (Name Space ID) and the
source master key ID fields for the sender in the SKIP header. Similarly, the
destination NSID and the destination master ID key fields are used for the
receiver’s identity.
• The sender randomly generates a traffic key (Kp ). Then, he uses this key to
derive two separated keys: one for encryption purpose (CryptKp ) and another
one for authentication purpose (M ACKp ). Likewise, algorithms that are used
to generated these keys are specified in Crypt Algorithm and MAC Algorithm
fields in the SKIP header.
• The sender uses the master key (Kij ) together with a counter (n) to encrypt
Kp . This encrypted value together the counter n are inserted into the SKIP
header.
• The sender sends the encrypted message along with the SKIP header. The
SKIP header contains necessary information for extracting the encryption and
authentication keys.
• The receiver node determines the sender’s identity and her identity from the
SKIP header. The sender’s identity (source) is the sender’s IP address if the
value in source NSID field is zero. Otherwise, it is the value in source master
key-id field. This value is used to look up the sender’s public key. Similarly,
if the destination NSID is zero, the receiver uses her IP address as her own
identity. Otherwise, she uses the value in the destination master key-id for
her identity. Then, the receiver computes a master key by using the sender’s
public key together with her identity’s private key.
• By using information in the SKIP header together with the master key, the
receiver node derive encryption and authentication keys.
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• Finally, the receiver can decrypt and check for validity of the sent message
using the above keys.
SKIP is a stateless key management scheme. That is, there is no need for pseudosession state management between two ends to acquire and change packet encrypting
keys as in IKE [Fun04]. Hence, it is commonly used as a low-overhead public-key
authentication system in several IP network environments [Fun04].

2.2.5

Schnorr Identification Protocol

Note that the Schnorr identification protocol will be used in Chapter 3 as one of the
proof of knowledge techniques.
This protocol was introduced by Schnorr in [Sch89] for proof of knowledge,
namely a prover A proves his identity to a verifier B. It is one of the simplest
and frequently used proofs of knowledge protocol [Wikd]. The security of the protocol is based on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem. The protocol is
initially intended to be used with a smart card which has both limited memory and
computing power. Hence, the protocol design allows pre-computation which reduces
the real-time computation at the prover to one multiplication modulo a prime q; it
also allows the use of subgroup of order q of the multiplicative groups of integers
modulo p, where q|(p − 1) to reduce the required number of transmitted bits; and
the protocol requires only three-pass.
Due to the above features, the Schnorr identification protocol is very suitable to
be used by a prover/claimant that has a limited computational ability. The Schnorr
scheme is provably secure against passive attacks under the discrete logarithm assumption [PHS03].
The following demonstrates how the protocol works [MvOV97b]. Note that we
change β to g due to a consistency with the scheme in our work.
Aim: A proves its identity to B in a 3-pass protocol.
1. Selection of system parameters
• A suitable prime p is selected such that p−1 is divisible by another prime
q. (Discrete logarithms modulo p must be computationally infeasible e.g.,
p ≈ 21024 , q ≥ 2160 ).
• An element g is chosen, 1 ≤ g ≤ p − 1, having multiplicative order q e.g.,
for g a generator mod p, g = α(p−1)/q (mod p).
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• Each party obtains an authentic copy of the system parameters (p, q, g)
and the verification function (public key) of the trusted party T , allowing verification of T ’s signature ST (m) on message m. (ST involves a
suitable known hash function prior to signing, and may be any signature
mechanism.)
• A parameter t (e.g., t ≥ 40), 2t < q, is chosen (defining a security level
2t ).
2. Selection of per-user parameters
• Each claimant A is given a unique identity IA .
• A chooses a private key a, 0 ≤ a ≤ q − 1, and computes υ = g −a (mod p).
• A identifies itself by conventional means (e.g., passport) to T , transfer υ
to T , and obtains a certificate certA = (IA , υ, ST (IA , υ)) from T binding
IA with υ.
3. Protocol Messages: The protocol involves three messages.
• 1. A → B : certA , x = g r (mod p)
• 2. A ← B : e (where 1 ≤ e ≤ 2t < q)
• 3. A → B : y = ae + r (mod q)
4. Protocol actions: A identifies itself to verifier B as follows:
• A chooses a random r (the commitment), 1 ≤ r ≤ q − 1, computes (the
witness) x = g r (mod p) and sends (1) to B.
• B authenticates A’s public key υ by vefifying T ’s signature on certA , then
sends to A a (never previously used) random e (the challenge), 1 ≤ e ≤ 2t .
• A checks 1 ≤ e ≤ 2t and sends B (the response) y = ae + r (mod q).
• B computes z = g y υ e (mod p), and accepts A’s identity provided z = r.

2.2.6

The Diffie-Hellman Problem and the Discrete Logarithm Problem

These problems will be used as underlying assumptions in our proof in Chapter 3.

2.2. Cryptographic Tools and Property

25

Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH Problem)
The problem of computing g ab (mod p) given g a and g b as in the Diffie-Hellman
key exchange protocol is called computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH
problem).
That is, consider a cyclic group G of order q. The CDH assumption states that,
given (g, g a , g b ) for a randomly-chosen generator g and random number a, b where
a, b, in [1, |G|] , there is no efficient algorithm that can compute the value g ab in G .
Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDH Problem)
DDH assumes stronger assumption than CDH but is also based on the discrete
logarithm problem. It was proposed by Boneh in [Bon98]. Its informal notion can
be defined as follows [Bon98].
Consider a (multiplicative) cyclic group G of order q, and with a generator g. The
DDH assumption states that there is no efficient algorithm to distinguish between
the two distributions (g a , g b , g ab ) and (g a , g b , g c ), where a, b, c are chosen at random
and a, b, c in [1, |G|].

2.2.7

Universal Re-Encryption

Universal re-encryption and its extension will appear as the keyed solutions for the
encryption schemes in Chapter 4.
Universal re-encryption is a public-key cryptosystem where re-encryption can be
done without knowledge of the public key that the ciphertext was computed [GJJS].
Re-encryption is the process that transforms a ciphertext C into a new ciphertext
C 0 with the same corresponding plaintext. There is indeed a general framework of
universal re-encryption; to apply with our protocol, we are interested in the scheme
based on the ElGamal cryptosystem presented in [GJJS], which will be reviewed as
follows.
Let G denote the underlying group for the ElGamal cryptosystem; let q denote
the order of G, the security parameter k is implicit in the choice of G . Let g be a
published generator for G. The universal cryptosystem is defined as follows.
• Key generation: Output (P K, SK) = (y = g x , x) for x ∈U Zq .
• Encryption: The input comprises a message m, a public key y, and a
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random encryption factor r = (k0 , k1 ) ∈ Zq 2 . The output is a ciphertext
C = [(α0 , β0 ); (α1 , β1 )] = [(my k0 , g k0 ); (y k1 , g k1 )].
• Decryption: The input is a ciphertext C = [(α0 , β0 ); (α1 , β1 )] under the
public key y. Verify α0 , β0 , α1 , β1 ∈ G; if not, the decryption fails, and a
special symbol ⊥ is output. Compute m0 = α0 /β0 x and m1 = 1, then the
output is m = m0 . Otherwise, the decryption fails, and a special symbol ⊥ is
output.
• Re-encryption: Input is a ciphertext C = [(α0 , β0 ); (α1 , β1 )] with a random re-encryption factor r0 = (k00 , k1 ) ∈ Zq 2 . Output is a ciphertext C 0 =
0

0

0

0

[(α00 , β00 ); (α10 , β1 )0 ] = [(α0 α1 k0 , β0 β1 k1 ); (α1 k1 , β1 )k1 ], where k0 0 , k1 0 ∈U Zq .
To define G, such that the universal semantic security under re-encryption may
be shown unambiguously to be reducible to the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
assumption [Bon98] over the group G, in much the same way as the semantic security
of ElGamal is shown in [TY98], there are two alternatives [GJJS]. Either G is a
subgroup of order q of Zp , where p and q are primes such that q|p − 1, or G is
a group order q defined over an appropriately selected elliptic curve such that the
DDH assumption is believed to be hard. Without losing generality, we follow the
first alternative. Note that random selection of encryption and re-encryption factors
is assumed in this description.

2.2.8

Honest-But-Curious Model

Note that this model will be used in Chapter 4,5,6, and 7 as the basic property of
nodes in the proposed networks.
Honest-But-Curious model was introduced by Goldreich et al. [GMW87] as ‘the
semi honest model’ [BMM99]. In the honest-but-curious model, “the parties are
guaranteed to properly follow a prescribed protocol, but, at the end of it, each
of them can use his own view of the execution to infer all he can about other
inputs” [BMM99]. In other words, despite following the protocol, all parties are
curious so they try to find out as much as possible about the other parties inputs.

2.3. Mobility Systems
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Mobility Systems

Mobile IP [Per02, JPA04] is a network layer protocol designed over or in collaboration with the Internet Protocol (IP) to enable mobility, that is allowing a node
to change its point of attachment to the network while maintaining its connection.
In other words, it allows a mobile host to use the same IP address while moving
between networks and hence Internet mobility is provided. There are three entities
involved, a mobile node 12 , mobility agents and a corresponding node. A corresponding node is a node that wants to communicate with the mobile node and can be a
fixed node or a mobile node or a mobility agent.
Mobile IP address has two parts: a home address (HoA) that is used as the
permanent IP address of the node for identification purposes, and a care-of-address
(CoA) that changes according to the mobile node location. The latter is used for
routing purposes. The association between the two addresses is called binding.
Binding is assisted by mobility agents.
Similar to the IP protocol, there are two different versions of Mobile IP, namely
Mobile IPv4 [Per02] and Mobile IPv6 [JPA04].

2.3.1

Mobile IPv4

We note that Mobile IPv4 will be used as the main mobility system throughout this
thesis, in particular, in Chapter 3,4,5 and 6, as it forms the basis of our proposed
solutions.
In Mobile IPv4, two mobility agents, called home agent (HA) and foreign agent
(FA), are used to establish the association between the mobile node and a correspondent node. The two agents are routers on the home network, and foreign network,
respectively. The home network is a network that has the same network prefix as
a mobile nodes’ home address. This network can possibly be virtual. The foreign
network is a network other than the mobile node’s home network. See Figure 2.4
for the illustration of Mobile IPv4 entities.
The mobile node that employs Mobile IP functions will behave the same way as
a normal fixed node when it resides in its home network.
To use the Mobile IP outside the home network, the mobile node obtains a careof-address from the network that it is visiting and registers this address with its
12

Mobile IP refers to the mobile host as the mobile node. Hence, the mobile host and the mobile
node will be used interchangably throughout this thesis.
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Figure 2.4: Mobile IPv4 Functional Entities.

home agent. A care-of-address can be either the IP address of the foreign agent, or
a temporary address assigned to the mobile node in the foreign network, for example
through DHCP [Dro97] or PPP [Sim94]. The two care-of-addresses are called foreign
agent and collocated care-of-addresses, respectively. The home agent updates the
care-of-address of the mobile node along with the lifetime of this address in its
binding table. Packets from a correspondent node are received by the home agent
and tunnelled to the registered care-of-address. The foreign agent then de-tunnels
packets and sends them to the mobile node. Tunnelling is a mechanism that Mobile
IP uses to encapsulate Mobile IP’s packets. For example, in IP-within-IP [Per96] the
original Mobile IP packet is treated as the payload, while the home agent and the
care-of-address are used as the source and destination of the encapsulated packet.
Similarly, de-tunnel is a mechanism to decapsulate these packets.
There are three main processes in Mobile IPv4, namely Agent Discovery, Registration and Routing. Agent Discovery deals with a process which the mobile host
discovers the mobility agent so that its current location and a CoA can be obtained;
Registration deals with a process which the mobile host registers a new location to
its home agent; Routing deals with mechanisms that data packets are routed to and
from a mobile host that is in a foreign network.
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Agent Discovery
MIPv4 uses and extends the ICMP router discovery message and ICMP router solicitation message [Dee91] to achieve its agent discovery goal and refers to them as
an Agent Advertisement message and an Agent Solicitation message. Agent advertisement messages are transmitted periodically by mobility agents (home, foreign or
both) to advertise their capabilities so that the mobile node can detect its movement whether or not it has moved to a new point-of-attachment and acquires a new
CoA. An agent solicitation message is a message that the mobile node sends to its
mobility agents to enforce them to immediately transmit their advertisement messages. The agent solicitation message is sent when the mobile node does not receive
advertisement messages or when it cannot wait for the new ones.
The mobile node uses information obtained from these two messages to detect
its movement. Lifetime field in an agent advertisement message specifies a period in
which the mobile node should receive a new advertisement from the same mobility
agent so when the mobile node fails to receive a new one, it assumes that it has
moved to a new link and registers with another foreign agent whom it receives the
advertisement message. Otherwise, an agent solicitation message is sent if the mobile
node has not received a new advertisement message from another agent. When the
prefix-length extension is available in the advertisement message, network prefixes
can be used by a mobile node to compare two consecutive agent advertisement
messages (one that it currently uses). To be more specific, it compares the prefix
advertised by the agent it just received the message from and the prefix of the
current CoA. If they are the same, the mobile node concludes that it is still on the
same link otherwise it assumes that it has moved. Then, the mobile node either
registers to the new mobility agent or sends a solicitation message.
Note that the mobility agents also advertises other information for the agent’s
services such as the type of encapsulation, the type of CoA.
Registration
Registration is responsible for notifying the mobile’s node current location to the
home agent so that the home agent is able to forward messages to the mobile node
that is away. As shown in Figure 2.5, two messages are involved: a Registration
Request Message (RRQ) and a Registration Reply Message (RRP). A RRQ is a
message which the mobile node sends to inform the HA of its new location, in
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Figure 2.5: Registration procedure in Mobile IPv4

particular, its CoA. The RRQ is sent on two occasions: when the lifetime of the
previous RRQ is nearly expired or when the mobile node has moved to a new pointof-attachment. Since there are two modes of CoA either using collocated CoA or
the FA-CoA, the FA is only involved in this procedure when the FA-CoA is used.
Only a case when the R bit in agent advertisement is set that FA is also involved in
registering collocated CoA. Note that we will assume the FA-CoA unless stated for
the later details. Important fields in the RRQ are a lifetime field, a home address
field, a home agent field, a care-of-address and flags’ fields. Lifetime value indicates
the lifetime of this registration which is set by the FA in the agent advertisement
(which the HA may not accept and reset to another value). A home address field
and a home agent field refer to the mobile’s node home address and its home agent’s
IP address respectively. A CoA field is set with the FA-CoA (or else co-located
CoA as a case mention earlier). Flags are used to indicate special requests from the
mobile node to the home agent. For example, S bit flag is used to indicate whether
or not the HA will maintain bindings for more than one CoA. B bit flag indicates a
request to forward broadcast packets in the host’s home link to its current location.
Upon receiving a RRQ from a mobile node, the FA extracts information such as
the host’s link layer address and the IP source address of the packet and maintains
this information in its visitor list. This information is used later when there is data
to send to the mobile node.
The FA then relays the RRQ to the HA. The HA updates its binding table. In
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Figure 2.6: Routing in Mobile IPv4

the case that there is no entry before, the new binding entry is created. Depending
on the S flag, the HA can add a new entry and either removes the existing ones or
maintains them. The HA replies the FA with a RRP. Note that the HA can specify
the lifetime value in the RRP to be smaller than one requested by the mobile node
and the host has to follow. The FA relays the messages to the mobile node, updates
its visitor list (the FA has not updated its list yet until it received the RRP) and
resets the timer of this particular registration lifetime to the value set in the RRP.
Data Packets
As illustrated in Figure 2.6, there are two directions: a direction from a CN to an
away mobile node and from the away mobile node to its CN.
In the former direction, namely forward tunneling, packets from the CN are
interrupted by the home agent and then tunnelled to the mobile node using IPwithin-IP encapsulation. That is, packets from the corresponding node are treated
as a payload of a tunnel packet with the home agent and the CoA as the source
and the destination addresses respectively. This tunnel sometimes is referred to as
a forward tunnelling direction.
In the reverse direction, Mobile IPv4 allows the away mobile node to send its
packets to its corrresponding node directly from its new location with the CoA as
the packet source address. However, there is a problem with the existing networking
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Figure 2.7: Routing in Mobile IPv4 with Reverse Tunneling

concept as explained later in the Reverse Tunnelling.
Reverse Tunnelling
The standard Mobile IP operation allows the mobile node to send its packet directly
from the foreign network to its corresponding nodes. The mobile node uses its home
address (we note that the CN has no knowledge about the move) as the source
address. This is against security policies applied in most of the networks regarding
to the topological incorrectness, for example, ingress filtering and egress filtering.
Firewalls use Ingress Filtering [Fer00] to filter inbound packets based on their source
addresses and so will discard packets whose network addresses are the same as the
home network. Hence, packets sent by the away mobile node to its CN that resides in
the mobile node’s home network will appear as inbound traffic and will be discarded.
Similarly, when the foreign network employs Egress Filtering [Fer00], packets from
the mobile node with its home network as their sources address will be discarded as
they do not appear to come from the nodes in that network.
To overcome this problem Reverse Tunnelling [Mon98] is proposed. As illustrated in Figure 2.7, mobile nodes’ packets are sent to the home agent before being
forwarded to the correspondent node. The same tunnelling mechanism as in the
typical Mobile IP [Per02] is used. However, it is used in a reverse direction. That is
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from the foreign agent to the home agent. There are two tunnelling styles, namely
the Direct Delivery Style and the Encapsulation style. In the former style, there is
no change to outgoing packets from the mobile node, i.e. the CN is still a destination
address. The mobile node simply specifies the FA as its default router. The FA,
however, is responsible for detecting these packets and tunnels them to the home
agent. In the latter style, the mobile node has to encapsulate all outgoing packets
to the FA before sending to it. Then, the FA decapsulates and retunnels them to
the home agent.
Each delivery style has its pros and cons. The direct delivery style requires no
extra processing at the mobile node, and less bandwidth on the link between the
mobile node and the FA due to packets’ size (there is no encapsulation). However,
there is no flexibility at runtime. Packets are always tunneled to the home agent even
if the CN is in the local foreign network where this is allowed in the encapsulating
delivery style. Note that when co-located CoA is deployed, the mobile node is the
one who performs the tunneling to the home agent.
Route Optimisation
In the basic Mobile IP protocol, the CN has no knowledge about the mobile node’s
location. It simply sends a packet through the HA. Then, the HA forwards packets
to the away-mobile node. This indirect path, namely a triangular route may result
in an unnecessary burden on the networks and routers along the path, in particular,
when the mobile node’s location is close to the CN but far away from its home
agent. Route optimisation [PJ00] is proposed as an extension to the basic Mobile
IPv4 protocol to solve this problem by allowing the CN to send packets directly
to the mobile node rather than traversing through the home agent, as shown in
Figure 2.8. This may reduce the required bandwidth and is particularly efficient
when the away-mobile node is close to the correspondent node. Therefore, the CN
requires the similar knowledge as the home agent, namely the binding information.
This information is stored in the CN’s binding cache.
Processes in route optimisation works as following. First, the CN sends a packet
destined to the away-mobile node with the mobile node’s home address. The home
agent interrupts this packet and checks if the the mobile node allows route optimisation. If route optimisation is allowed, the home agent sends the Binding Update
message to the CN. A binding update (BU) is a message sent by the home agent to
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Figure 2.8: Route Optimisation in Mobile IPv4

notify the CN for the current location of the away-mobile node. After receiving the
BU, the CN inserts a new binding entry into its binding cache since it does not exist
before and starts sending the packets directly to the mobile node’s current location.
Updating the CN’s binding cache can be done by two possible ways: either the
CN asks for the new BU itself or the mobile node or the FA forces the HA to send
the new BU. In the former, the CN sends the HA the Binding Request message.
In the latter, a Binding Warning message is either inserted into the RRQ by the
mobile node or sent by the FA when the FA detects that the mobile node has moved
to a new network. Note that the binding warning message is a message sent by the
FA to the HA when the mobile node has already moved from that FA to a new FA
but the CN still sends the packets to the old foreign network. A binding warning
message can also be included as an extension in the registration request message
sent by the mobile node to the HA so that the CN has the updated information
during the registration procedure.
Route optimisation in Mobile IPv4 also provides a mechanism to deal with packet
loss during hand-off, namely Smooth Handover. To be more specific, smooth handover is deployed when data is sent from an out-of-date CN binding cache or when
data is sent during the mobile node has not completed its registration process. When
there is no smooth handover, data packets are sent to the mobile node’s previous

2.4. Mobile IPv6

35

CoA and never reaches the new CoA. Hence, a new BU (of the mobile node’s new
CoA) is also needed at the old FA so that the old FA can forward these missing
packets to the new FA. Mobile IPv4 route optimisation uses the new FA to sends
this BU.
Systems with route optimisation are more prone to security attacks as more nodes
are allowed for the mobile node’s location and routing information so that they can
communicate with the mobile node directly. The authenticity of the BU is provided
through the Route Optimisation Authentication Extension. That is, the mobility
security association among the entities exchanging the BU message is established in
advance, i.e. by using any registration key establishment methods.
Route optimisation has several significant benefits to the mobile node’s home
network, i.e., minimising network load and eliminating the congestion there, such
as at the home agent. Also, direct communication is more likable with any delaysensitive application such as voice application. However, this method has some
disadvantages [Sal04, Jam03]. Even though smooth handover is proposed, it is no
certainty that all FAs are included this function, hence, inconsistency of the binding
cache is likely to occur. The update required at all CNs causes additional traffic
load, for example, loads from more numbers of messages being exchanged and loads
from authentication and key distribution. There is a doubt whether this is worth
comparing the loads caused from triangular routing problem which seems to become
significant only when the MN is far from the HA and near the CN [Jam03].

2.4

Mobile IPv6

Note that we do not employ Mobile IPv6 in our proposed systems. We include this
system in this Chapter since we believe that it is necessary to have other IP mobility
system’s knowledge for a better understanding to the IP mobility concept.
Mobile IPv6 shares many features with Mobile IPv4, i.e. the concept of two
addresses and the use of a home agent. However, unlike Mobile IPv4 that is designed to be used on top of IPv4, Mobile IPv6 together with some improvements
are integrated into IPv6 [JPA04] as a mobility header. Also, there are quite a
few differences from Mobile IPv4. The main differences are the need for a foreign
agent, the support of route optimisation, the use of routing header, and the use of
neighbour discovery. To illustrate, the foreign agent is not required since the number of IP addresses is numerous in IPv6; route optimisation becomes fundamental
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Figure 2.9: Mobile IPv6 Operation

in the protocol instead of an extension like in Mobile IPv4; routing header is used
instead of IP-within-IP encapsulation to reduce the overhead; and a home agent
uses neighbour discovery to multicast its link-layer address instead of using proxy
and gratuitous ARP as in Mobile IPv4.
Since there is no foreign agent, the mobile node acquires its CoA from either a
stateless or stateful autoconfiguration mechanisms. In the stateless case, the mobile
node simply combines the network prefix with its interface identifier. In the stateful
case, it adopts the mechanism used in MIPv4 co-located COA by using a DHCP
server, however, it is the DHCPv6 this time. Duplicate address Detection is also
required for the uniqueness of the CoA before using it.
As route optimisation becomes fundamental, there are two modes of communication between the mobile node and its correspondent node: a bidirectional tunnelling
mode and a route optimisation mode, as illustrated in Figure 2.9. The bidirectional
tunneling mode functions the same as in Mobile IPv4. That is, the CN is unaware
of a host’s mobility so tunnelling is used in both forward and reverse directions
where route optimisation allows the CN to know the CoA so that it can communicate with the mobile node directly. In the bidirectional mode, Mobile IPv6’s home
agent uses neighbour discovery to associate the mobile node’s home address with
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the home agent link layer address on the home link. To illustrate, a neighbour advertisement message is multicasted from the home agent to all-nodes on the home
network link for a new match13 . The home agent then intercepts packets destined
to the away mobile node and tunnels to the node’s care-of-address using IPv6 encapsulation [CD98]. The packets of the mobile nodes to the CN are tunneled to the
home agent in a reverse direction and then routed normally to the CN.
Route optimisation mode uses headers like destination option header and routing
header in IPv6 to facilitate mobility in Mobile IPv6. IPv6 usually uses the destination header option to carry information for a destination node to process and uses
the routing extension’s header to allow source routing. For source routing, IPv6
nodes lists one or more intermediate node(s) that its packets must visit before they
reach their destination. Therefore, Mobile IPv6 uses the destination header option
to allow the away mobile node to notify its recipient about its home address. This
option is called Home address option. That is, the CoA is set as the source address,
where the mobile node’s home address is put in the home address option.
In a reverse direction, Mobile IPv6 uses the routing header to allow the CN’s
packets to route directly to the mobile node’s CoA by defining a new type of routing
header: the routing header type 2. To do this, the mobile node’s home address is
placed in the routing header and the CoA is set as the packet’s destination. It is
noted that encapsulating between the CN and CoA as in Mobile IPv4 is no longer
required. The restriction is that, unlike the routing header type 0, only one address
is allowed in the routing header, that is the home address.
Binding Management
Two modes of operation results in two types of Binding Update procedure: Binding
Update to the home agent and Binding Update to the CN. Four messages are defined
in MIPv6 mobility header in regards of the binding management, in addition with
another four messages of return routability. Return Routability is a procedure to
assist binding update at the CN.
Binding Update to the Home Agent
This process is similar to a registration process in Mobile IPv4. When the mobile
node is away from its home network, it first notifies its home agent for its new CoA
13

The home agent also needs to reply to any neighbour solicitation messages addressing to the
mobile nodes that the home agent currently takes care of its binding information.
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through the BU message instead of RRQ message as in MIPv4. The home agent
acquires the CoA from the source address of the BU message and knows which
mobile node this address is associated with from the IP address in the home address
destination option. The home agent either creates a new binding cache entry for the
mobile node or updates the existing one depending on whether this entry is existed.
It then sends a binding acknowledgement message as a reply to indicate the binding
procedure failure or success. When the mobile node returns home, it sends a BU in
which the lifetime is set to zero and the CoA is set to its home address. The home
agent then deletes entry before sending the binding acknowledgement.
Note that Mobile IPv6 allows the mobile node to specify the alternate CoA
through the Altername Care-of-Address option when it does not want to use the
primary CoA. For example, when a topological incorrect CoA is required for registration or when the same SA is required to establish the IPsec connection [Sal04].
Binding Update to the CN
Binding Update to the CN cannot be done without processing the return routability first. The return routability procedure is required to assure the authenticity of
the mobile node, since the BU messages sent to the CN does not require the configuration of security associations or the existence of an authentication infrastructure
between the mobile nodes and correspondent nodes. More specifically, it is unlikely
to establish security parameters with CNs in the same way that the mobile node
does with the home agent such as using pre-established security association or IKE,
since CNs are expected to be distributed all over the entire network.
The mobile node knows which CNs are using route optimisation from a BU list
of the CNs that it maintains or from encapsulated packets it receives from the home
agent (it should receive the Type 2 routing header packets if the CN is using route
optimisation).
Mobile IPv6 allows the CN to request a refresh of the binding, i.e., before the
binding entry of this mobile node is expired, through a Binding Refresh Request sent
to the mobile node. A Binding Error is sent from the CN to the mobile node when
there is a problem detected in the Mobile IPv6 operation, for example, an invalid
address is set in home address destination option. Note that the CoA in the BU
destined to the CN may not necessarily be the same as one in the BU to the home
agent. When the CN receives the BU message, it updates its binding cache of that
mobile node, or creates a new one if it has not yet existed. It also sends the Binding
acknowledgement message to the mobile node.
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Figure 2.10: Return Routability Procedure

Return Routability Procedure
The return routability (RR) is designed to assure the CN that the mobile node is
addressable by both its claimed CoA and its home address.
Intuitively, the mobile node sends two messages to the CN aimed at testing if the
two messages arrives at the CN. If so, security mechanism is established. The first
message is sent through the home agent where the second message is sent directly
from the CoA.
As shown in Figure 2.10, the return routability procedure consists of four messages: the Home Test Init (HoTI) message, the Care-of Test Init (CoTI) message,
the Home Test (HoT) message and the Care-of Test (CoT) message. The HoTI
message is a message sent to notify the CN for the home address of the mobile node.
It consists of the the mobile node’s home address, the CN’s address, the home init
cookie, as the source address, the destination address, and a parameter of the message, respectively. Likewise, the CoTI message is a message set to notify the CN
for the CoA of the mobile node, which consists of the mobile node’s CoA, the CN’s
address, the care-of init cookie, as the source address, the destination address, and
a parameter of the message, respectively.
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The HoT and CoT messages are replied messages of the HoTI and CoTI messages. Each message includes three parameters that will be used later to generate
the binding management key. They are home init cookie, home keygen token and
home nouce index for HoT message and care-of init cookie, care-of keygen token and
care-of nonce index for CoT message. The mobile node first sends a HoTI and a
CoTI at the same time to the CN, however with different routes. HoTI is tunnelled
to the HA while CoTI is sent directly to the CN. Hence, if the mobile node receives
HoT and CoT as replied messages of those two messages above from CN, it has assured the CN that its CoA is what it claims. Note that similar to a HoTI message,
the mobile node receives HoT message as a tunnel message from the home agent.
The binding key management Kbm is generated by concatenating the home token
with the care-of token, then hashes it.
Routing
As mentioned earlier that there are two modes of operation. In tunnelling mode,
the mobile node’s home agent and its CoA are used as the tunneling entry and exit
points to encapsulate the inner normal packet, which the IPv6 encapsulation is used.
In the route optimisation mode from the mobile node to the CN, the mobile
node’s CoA and the CN’s are set as the source and destination addresses of packets together with the mobile node’s home address in the home address destination
option. When packets arrive at the CN, it replaces the CoA with the one in the
home address destination option, hence, the upper layer can proceed transparently
not knowing the packet’s actual source address. Note that a binding entry of this
mobile node must be maintained by the CN otherwise packets are dropped and a
binding error message is sent.
Type 2 routing header is used when the CN wants to send a message to the
mobile node. That is, a packet consisting of the CN’s address, the mobile node’s
CoA as the source and destination addresses respectively together with the mobile
node’s home address in the routing header option.
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Security Mechanisms in Mobile IP

Security Mechanisms in Mobile IPv4
Mobile IPv4 provides authentication by including a cryptographic field in each registration packet. The default authentication algorithm is HMAC-MD5 [KBC97].
There are three kinds of authentication extensions: a mandatory extension between the mobile node and the home agents, and optional extensions between the
mobile node and the foreign agent, and between the home agent and the foreign
agent [Per02]. Authentication is also required in route optimisation and without it
an adversary can create fraudulent binding update packets to redirect the traffic.
Security Mechanisms in Mobile IPv6
A number of security mechanisms are provided by Mobile IPv6: the protection
of Binding Updates both to home agents, the protection of Binding Updates to
correspondent nodes, the protection of mobile prefix discovery, and the protection
of the mechanisms that Mobile IPv6 uses to transport data packets.
Mobile IPv6 uses an IPsec security association to protect integrity and authenticity of the Binding Updates and Acknowledgements between the mobile node and
the home agent. It is stated in the specification [JPA04] that “they must support
and should use the encapsulation security payload (ESP) [KA98b] header in transport mode and must use a non-NULL payload authentication algorithm to provide
data origin authentication, connectionless integrity and optional anti-replay protections”14 .
The protection of Binding Update to the corresponding node is provided through
return routability procedure. That is, return routability is used to ensure that
messages are sent from the valid mobile node. A keyed-hash algorithm together with
the Binding Management key Kbm (as previously described in the return routability
part) are used to protect the integrity and authenticity of the Binding Updates
messages to corresponding nodes. The specification gives a remark that return
routability does not protect against attackers who are on the path between the
home network and the correspondent node. However, the authors also dispute that
such an attacker can perform the same attack without Mobile IPv6.
The leakage of information in the Mobile Prefix Solicitations and Advertisements,
14

Interesting readers are referred to RFC3776 [ADD04] for more detail about the use of IPsec
to protect the Binding Updates between the mobile node and the home agent.
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which are two new messages introduced by Mobile IPv6, may bring vulnerability to
Mobile IPv6. Mobile Prefix Solicitations and Advertisements are messages between
an away mobile node and its home agent. Their purpose is to update the away
mobile node relevant prefix information (from its home agent) that may be used in
mobile node’s home address configuration and in network renumbering. Examples
of such information are the home network topology and the prefix lifetime. Hence,
the Mobile IPv6 specification proposes to use IPsec for integrity and authenticity’s
protection of these message.
Mobile IPv6 uses IPsec to deal with threats that are occurred to the regular IPv6
traffic. However, due to the introduction of the home address destination option, a
new router header type (type2), and tunnelling headers used in the payload packets,
new threats may arise. An attacker may set its IP address in the home address
destination option, hence, the reply packets from a corresponding node would be
sent to it. To avoid this threat, Mobile IPv6 limits the use of this option to the
situation where the correspondent node already has a Binding Cache entry for the
given home address.
Similarly, an attacker may forge a tunnel packet between the mobile node and
the home agent and makes it appear as though it came from the mobile node when
it did not. To protect this tunnel’s vulnerability between the mobile node and its
home agent, Mobile IPv6 ensures a proper use of a source address and optional
cryptographic protection. That is, when the mobile node receives the tunnel packet,
it has to verify that the outer IP address must corresponds to its home agent. Vice
versa, the home agent, when receives the tunnel packet from the mobile node, has
to verify that the outer IP address corresponds to the current location of the mobile
node (the source address of the inner packet is used to identify the mobile node).
Additional IPsec ESP may be supported and used for traffic tunnelled via the home
agent.

2.4.2

Mobile IPv4 and Firewall

When Mobile IP is deployed in a wide area network such as the Internet. There is
a problem with the existing entity, that is the firewall. Firstly, reverse tunneling is
only used to overcome the problem of Ingress filtering, when there are tunnel packets
that have unknown addresses for their care-of-address, the firewall cannot be sure
that the tunneled packets are from legitimate mobile nodes and so it might discard
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these packets due to the filtering restriction [ZCC00]. Secondly, the deployment of
Mobile IP has problems with a network that employs the private address space. A
packet destined to nodes in the home network or the tunnels packets to the home
agent cannot be processed due to the routing restriction i.e. the home agent address
in the reverse tunneling is the internal address. Hence, to allow outside packets to
enter a private network, the firewall must be used as the destination node in the
packets [MG98]. In addition, Mobile IP packets, although containing the IP address
of the internal network, might come from a mobile node in a foreign network and
traverse through the Internet, hence we cannot assume the same level of protection
as packets inside the internal network. Instead, there is a need to authenticate and
verify that these packets are indeed from its legitimate internal nodes that are away.
Due to the requirements given above, a firewall is also used as the end-point of
the secure tunnel between a remote mobile node and the internal network similar to
the secure connection provided by the VPN architecture. Generally, IPsec is used
to establish this secure connection (tunnel) [MG98, GM98, BD01].
Montenegro and Gupta [MG98] assume the co-located care of address and propose to split the connection between the away-mobile node and the home agent into
two tunnels: a tunnel between the home agent and the firewall and a tunnel between
the firewall and the away-mobile node. A secure connection may not necessarily be
required in the former tunnel as the network behind firewall is trusted where IPsec is
a must for the latter tunnel. IPsec requires a scalable key management system. They
incorporate SKIP as their method for providing secure keys. They claim that an
important advantage of using SKIP is that key establishment does not require extra
packets and the key information can be communicated in-line, that is as part of the
IP packet. Braun and Danzeisen [BD01] used the same architecture as Gupta and
Montenegro but they chose ISAKMP/Oakley as their key establishment method.

2.5

MicroMobility

MicroMobility handles mobility in the small regions. It focuses on local mobility,
fast handoff and optimum system operations. Using macromobility protocol is not
suitable for movement in a small region as registering to the home network all
the time, even when the movements occurs in the smaller region, results in large
connection establishment delay [Sal04]. Also, the mobile device is small and has
limited power and resources, it may not be able to afford these operations.
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Hence, micromobility protocols are proposed to fill this gap. That is, micromobility protocols mainly deal with mobility in small areas, such as the access
network, with emphasis on fast connection establishment while macromobility protocols deal with mobility between micromobility networks or different regions, such
as core network15 . A combination of these two are necessary to cover all mobility
scenarios [Sal04]. More detail on micromobility can be found in Appendix A.

2.6

Existing Systems: Low Latency Anonymous
Communication

2.6.1

Tor

Tor, the second-generation Onion Routing, is a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service [DMS04]. It is an improvement of the Onion Routing [GRS99]. Onion Routing (OR) is an overlay system that aims to provide anonymous communication to applications such as web browsing, instant messenger and
secure shell. As the OR’s design has several flaws and limitations when being deployed, Tor has included several additional features that OR does not provide. Some
of them are perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory services, integrity
checking, configurable exit policies, and rendezvous point and hidden service. Tor
also removes features that are considered by its authors as being unnecessary. These
features are mixing, padding and traffic shaping.
We note that Tor plays a very significant role in this thesis. Our proposed
architectures in Chapter 6 will employ Tor as their building blocks. Moreover, the
attack on Tor by Murdoch and Danezis [MD05] will be used as our low cost timing
attack’s model in Chapter 7.
Entities in A Tor Network. As shown in Figure 2.11, there are three main entities
in a Tor connection, which are 1) a Tor client, 2) a Tor-enabled application server16 ,
and 3) a group of Tor servers. When a user (or a sender, respectively) would like to
establish a Tor connection to access any Tor-enabled application servers, the user
15

The network in a wireless communication system can be divided into two main parts: access
network and core network. Access network is responsible with the communication between an end
user to the first serving entity in the network, for example, the communication between the mobile
station and the base station. Core network deals with the communication establishment among a
variety of networks [Jam03].
16
A Tor-enabled application server is an application server that runs TCP protocols Tor supports.
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is required to install a Tor client software. Then, the user’s host has become one of
the Tor clients in the network. The Tor client is responsible for fetching directories
(of all Tor servers), establishing circuits17 and handling connections from the user’s
application. The user would like to access the services provided by one of the
application servers. This particular application server is known to be the recipient
of the Tor connection. In order to allow the Tor client to reach the application
server, there are several relay nodes that will be involved to establish a connection.
These relay nodes are known as the Tor servers. The first node (i.e. a Tor server) in
this connection is also known as the entry node, whilst the last node is known as the
exit node. Currently, according to the Tor specification, the size of each circuit is
set to involve three Tor servers. The Tor-enabled application server is not required
to be a member of the Tor network since the exit node acts as a guardian between
the open world (recipients) and the Tor network.
How Tor Works. Firstly, a Tor client selects a number of Tor servers as members of
the Tor circuit. Circuits in Tor are established preemptively. When an anonymous
connection is required, the Tor client can simply select one of the already-established
circuits. In contrast to the Onion routing that restricts one circuit per one TCP
stream, Tor allows many TCP streams to share a single circuit. When the Tor client
would like to send some data (e.g. when a user uses his browser to connect to a
website), the streams of packets are divided into fixed-size cells and these cells are
sent to the selected circuit. During the transmission, these packets are wrapped in a
layer-by-layer fashion using session keys derived from pre-negotiated common keys.
The intended purpose of this mechanism is to allow a Tor server, which will unwrap
the packets, only to know merely its predecessor and successor nodes. There is no
mixing process involved. The incoming cells to any Tor nodes are simply placed into
queues, processed and sent out in the first come first served fashion.

2.6.2

Tarzan

Tarzan [FSCM, FM02] is another low latency anonymous system, which is also based
on the Chaum’s mix concept. Similar to other low latency anonymous systems, it
is aimed at providing anonymity for applications such as web-application or instant
messenger. Unlike Tor, Tarzan is based on peer-to-peer architecture. Each Tarzan
17

Tor system calls a path as a circuit.
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Figure 2.11: Tor architecture

node can be both a Tarzan client (the sender) or a Tarzan relay. This is done to
avoid end-to-end timing analysis of an entry and exit nodes.
That is, any one can join and leave the network and all nodes can be potential
initiators. Tarzan provides peer discovery by using a protocol based on the gossipbased mechanism similar to the one in [HBLL99]. More details about Tarzan will
be given in Chapter 7.

2.6.3

MorphMix

MorphMix [RP02, RP04] is another low latency anonymous system. Its main objective is to provide a practical anonymous communication to the masses. It is based
on a peer-to-peer architecture. Similar to Tor, MorphMix is a circuit-based mix system that makes use of fix-length cells and layered encryption to establish a circuit
through other nodes. Cover traffic is removed unless really required. The circuit,
the first node, the last node and the nodes in between are called the anonymous
tunnel, the initiator, the final node and the intermediate nodes, respectively. Unlike
Tor or Tarzan, the intermediate nodes in MorphMix are not entirely chosen by the
initiator. Rather, MorphMix allows each intermediate node to select its successor.
More details of MorphMix will be elaborated in Chapter 7.

2.7. Other Systems Related to Location Privacy in IP Network
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Crowds

Note that Crowds is one of the related works in Chapter 4.
Crowds [RR98] is proposed to protect user’s anonymity on the world-wide-web.
Crowds can be thought as a collection of users. Users are grouped into a large
and geographically diverse group that collectively issues requests on behalf of its
member. A user is represented in Crowds through a process called a jondo on her
computer. When there is a request from the user to the web server, the request is
sent to her jondo. All jondos including the first one perform the same process that
is determining whether to forward the request to another jondo or sends it directly
to the web server using the pre-defined probability. Thus, the path is created. The
nice property of Crowds is that Crowd members cannot distinguish the originator of
the request from other members; all members receive equal chance of generating the
request, therefore, web servers are unable to find out the originator of the request.
Note that the on-the-fly path establishment schemes in Chapter 4’s protocols are
influenced from Crowds.

2.7

Other Systems Related to Location Privacy
in IP Network

Note that these three systems will appear in Chapter 4 as related works.

2.7.1

Information Translating Proxy (ITP)

Choi et al. [CKK03] proposed a protocol based on the proxy-based approach, that
is using an Information translating proxy (ITP) node as an anonymous proxy. Information that could relate the home agent and the eavesdroppers for the current
location of the mobile node is modified in a way that with outsiders’ point of view,
it is sent from or to the ITP node. Selected location fields in payload are encrypted,
that only the ITP node and the relevant entities can decrypt; for instance, when
sending packet from a mobile node (MN) to the ITP node, to hide the MN’s IP
address from foreign network and eavesdroppers, the home agent’s IP address is
encrypted with a symmetric key shared between the ITP node and the mobile node.
In terms of performance, ITP is claimed by its author to be suitable in practice [CKK03] because the system is not complex and key setup can be preset since
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the mobile node first starts connecting to the network. However, there are some
disadvantages. Indeed, ITP is perceptibly the solution to move trust away from the
home agent and the foreign agent to another node; therefore, the first drawback is
that the ITP node must be trusted. Also, similar to other proxy-based techniques,
it is a single point of failure. That is, if the ITP node is hijacked or fails, the system
also fails. Besides, it does not provide unlinkability, observers can monitor the proxy
node’s outgoing and incoming messages and obtain some location information.

2.7.2

Non-Disclosure Method (NDM)

Non-Disclosure Method (NDM) is proposed by Fasbender et al. [FKK96]. Unlike ITP, NDM does not work in the Mobile IP protocol level. Its operations are
processed above the network layer. The way it works is similar to Mix-network [Cha81]
which is based on the public key cryptosystem; however, there is no collecting, discarding, repeating and re-ordering packet processes. In NDM, the mobile node
creates a list of the security agents from 1 to n (SA1 to SAn ) that is assumed to
be distributed over the network. It then encrypts an entire packet and the home
agent’s address with the last security agent (SAn )’s public key. Next it re-encrypts
this packet including the IP address of the SAn with the public key of the SAn−1 .
It repeats this process until reaching the first SA. The author claims that NDM
achieves comparable security to the Mix-method; however, it gives better performance in terms of increased packet delay, that is more appropriate than Mix-network
for real time communication [FKK96]. Nevertheless, NDM is not aimed at providing
location privacy from the home agent, that is the home agent still has knowledge of
the whereabout of the mobile node from its care-of-address.

2.7.3

Flying Freedom (FF)

Flying Freedom was proposed by Escudero et al. [EHH01]. They extend Goldberg’s
PIP system [Gol00] by adding mobility to it. PIP is a pseudonymous IP network
that later became a freedom network, an anonymous web browsing and private
encrypted e-mail service by Zero Knowledge company18 . The service was shut down
in 2001 due to the lack of paying customers [Gol07].
Similar to NDM, which has security agents, freedom network has freedom routers
18

which is now RadialPoint [Rad].
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or Anonymous Internet Proxies(AIPs) globally distributed over the network, which
act as network servers. The first AIP and the last AIP are called AIPentry and AIPexit
respectively. There are two main processing steps at the mobile node: route creation,
and data exchange. The client creates a set of AIPs, used as a path between the
mobile node and its server, that is AIPentry → AIP1 → AIP2 → ... → AIPexit →
server. Then, it sends the information required by each AIPi to them in the similar
way that NDM sends the information by using nested ElGamal as its cryptographic
techniques. When the path is created, two layers of encryption are employed, namely
link encryption and telescope encryption. Link encryption is used for encrypting
the packet between two consecutive AIPi aimed to protect correlation attack from
incoming and outgoing packet on each node. Where the telescope encryption is used
to guarantee that the packet’s content’s plaintext can be recovered only when the
packet has already visited all nodes in the preselected path.
Existing PIP works as described above with fixed hosts. To extend to mobile
hosts, three approaches depending on the creation of new routes when clients change
networks are proposed. In the first approach, the mobile node simply changes its IP
address and port with the AIPentry where a set of AIPi nodes on the path remains
the same. In the second approach, the mobile node chooses one AIPi in the path as
its switching point, then it establishes a new subpath from its new location to the
chosen AIPi where the rest of the path to the server remains the same. In the last
approach, the mobile node establishes a new path up to the AIPexit node. Escudero
et al. also proposed a mechanism to allow the mobile node to be a mobile server.
In this case, the AIPexit is allowed to have knowledge about the mobile node’s real
IP address and port and will behave similarly to the home agent in Mobile IP.

Chapter 3
Mobility and its Security Deployment
Issues
Mobile IP may be deployed over Intranets, or over wide area networks and the Internet. If Mobile IP is used over an unprotected Intranet, data packets may pass
through insecure links, where packet content might be eavesdropped or modified.
When Mobile IP is used over wide area networks, not only do the previous problems
exist but new problems arise. In particular, traversal of packets through the firewall
requires tunnelling of packets at the mobile nodes and de-tunnelling them at the
home agent or the firewall. Security of these tunnels and ensuring that they are
established between authenticated parties and their contacts are authentic is an important security issue. To provide security in Mobile IP, cryptographic mechanisms
such as IPsec [KA98a, KA98b] are used. One of the methods used for providing
secure keys is SKIP (Simple Key-Management for Internet Protocol [AMP96]). An
important advantage of using SKIP is that key information can be communicated
in-line, that is, as part of the IP packet. Under SKIP, a mobile node requires a
pair of private and public keys. The private key is known only to the node, while
the public key is public. A node uses its private key together with the public key
of another node to calculate a common key with that node. The problem is that a
mobile node must be able to securely access its private key. One simple alternative
as proposed by Montenegro and Gupta [GM98] is to use a tamper-proof storage
medium, such as a smart card, to store the key and allow the device that implements the Mobile IP node to access the key through a secure reader. This method
has the inconvenience and expense of requiring the user to have a reader device.
A commonly used alternative is to store the key information on the device encrypted with a key which is derived from a password known to the user. This allows
a legitimate user who knows the password to access the key. However, encrypting the key with a secret password leaves the system open to an off-line dictionary
50
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attack.
In this Chapter, we consider a stolen laptop that implements Mobile IP node and
aims at protecting the user’s private key when the device is captured. We assume the
laptop uses IPsec to provide communication security and SKIP is used to establish
a session key. We will show a method of securing the SKIP private key such that
the loss of the device does not compromise the key. A very important aspect of our
system is that this added security does not need extra communication and all the
required information can be included in the SKIP header.
Furthermore, we will also show how to ‘disable’ the secret stored on the laptop
such that without changing the private key, the stolen laptop and its stored secret
cannot give any advantage to the adversary. Parts of this Chapter have appeared
in [WSnS03].
The rest of this Chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.1, we introduce
a problem when a Mobile IP enabled laptop is stolen and show that the available
solutions are not adequate to cope with this problem. In Section 3.2, we describe our
proposed solution to protect against the problem mentioned earlier as in [WSnS03].
Section 3.3 proposes an extension of our scheme which provides stronger security.
The security analysis and proof of the new scheme is presented in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes the Chapter.

3.1
3.1.1

The risk of losing a laptop
Notations

The notations used toward this Chapter are shown in Figure 3.1.

3.1.2

Motivation

A mobile node is typically a laptop or a handheld device which can be easily stolen
and therefore the secret key of the device must be carefully protected. For example,
if a laptop connection to the home network is naively automated such that upon
switching on, the authentication protocol is automatically executed, this access by
a malicious user will completely compromise the home network.
SKIP requires the mobile node to have a pair of public and private keys to
perform cryptographic operations. A common way of protecting the private key
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FW
MN
KM N −F W or Kij
Kp
M
n ∈R Zp
i, ηi
j, ηFW
E()
D()
Epk ()
Dsk ()
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a firewall
a mobile node
a master key between the firewall and the mobile node
a traffic key (the key used to encrypt the message)
Message
a counter n value, only increment once generated
a mobile node’s private key and a mobile node’s public key
a firewall’s private key and a firewall’s public key
Symmetric key encryption algorithm
Symmetric key decryption algorithm
Public key encryption algorithm using the pubic key pk
Public key decryption algorithm using the private key sk

Figure 3.1: Notations
is to use a password to encrypt it. However, because the public key is known by
everyone, an attacker can launch an off-line password guessing attack to find the
private key. The attack can be described as follows.
In an off-line password guessing attack, the attacker has access to X = Ek (sk)
and his aim is to find sk. For this, the attacker goes through all possible passwords,
k, one at a time, and for each password k, (i) finds u = Dk (X); (ii) for a random
?

text x, checks x = Du (Epk (x)). If the equality holds, the attacker has found the
private key, or else will try the next password. The attack works because of the
‘verifiable texts’ that is generated through the decryption process.
We assume SKIP protocol is used for IPsec and propose a solution that allows
storage of a secret in a laptop such that the secret allows the laptop to access the
private key, but if the device is stolen the private key remains safe. The proposed
scheme can also be used for handheld devices. The framework is similar to [GM98,
MG98].

3.1.3

Other Related Works

Perlman and Kaufman [PK99] proposed to download the private key from a protected server. Their protocol needs the server to be fully trusted and at least two
messages to be exchanged.
To reduce trust on the server and also protect against possible server compromise,
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multiple servers [Jab01, FJ00] have been proposed. The private key is divided
into shares and each share is stored in one of the servers. The adversary has to
compromise all servers to be able to retrieve the private key. The increased security
is at the cost of more computation and communication with servers and so is not
acceptable in many applications.
Mackenzie and Reiter [MR01] proposed a method of protecting private keys in
network enabled devices. Their system does not require a trusted server and has
provable security. Their construction can be used with any public key encryption and
signature scheme. They also proposed a second protocol that is specific to the RSA
signature and El Gamal encryption and allows key disabling which is particularly
useful if the secret key has already been downloaded onto the device and the only
way to protect against the misuse of the key when the laptop is stolen, is to disable
the key. The main drawback of the scheme is the extra messages that it requires.

3.1.4

Deploying SKIP in Mobile IP

Normally, the receiver uses the sender’s IP address to look up the sender’s public key.
The nice feature of SKIP is that it allows the receiver to use other IP addresses for
this look up. This is very useful for mobile nodes to specify their care-of-address.
To compute the long term secret (the master key), the mobile node must obtain
its own private key together with the public key of the firewall. The firewall will
calculate the same master key in a similar way (by using the mobile node’s public
key). It is noted that SKIP does not derive a packet’s key from the master key.
Rather, it generates the packet encrytion key, namely a traffic key, randomly and
uses the master key to encrypt this key.
Protocol 1 in Figure 3.2 shows the diagram of the deployment of SKIP in Mobile
IP. Since SKIP uses PKI infrastructure, first key initialisation is required. Each
mobile node and the firewall select their private keys and compute their public keys
and send to PKI directory.
When the mobile node wants to connect to its home network from outside, it
first computes the master key Kij (or KM N −F W ) from its own private key and the
firewall public key. It then takes the Kij together with a counter n to compute
Kijn , where Kijn ← f (Kij , n), where f () is a pseudorandom one way hash function.
SKIP does not use Kijn to encrypt or authenticate the message. It instead uses a
randomly generated key referred to as the traffic key Kp to do these tasks. Kp is
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Initialisation
1. the system selects g ∈ Zp where g is a generator
Mobile Node
2. select i ∈R Zq ,
3. compute the MN’s public key:
ηi = g i
4. send ηi to store in PKI
5. store i in the smart card

Firewall
2. select j ∈R Zq ,
3. compute the FW’s public key:
η FW = g j
4. send ηFW to store in PKI

When the mobile node wants to connect to its home network.
Mobile Node
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

derive its private key from smart card
obtain FW’s public key ηFW from PKI
compute: Kij ← KM N −F W ← (ηFW )i
obtain n
compute: Kijn ← f (Kij , n)
randomly generate Kp : Kp ∈R Zp
encrypt M with Kp : C ← EKp (M )
encrypt Kp with Kijn : υ ← EKijn (Kp )
9.< Skip header, n, υ, C >a
−→

Firewall

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

derive its private key j
obtain the MN’s public key ηi from PKI
compute: Kij ← (ηi )j
obtain n from the message header
compute: Kijn ← f (Kij , n)
decrypt υ with Kijn : K̂p ← DKijn (υ)
decrypt Ĉ with K̂p : M̂ ← DKˆp (Ĉ)
obtain the message M̂ b

a

n and υ are explicitly written for clarity. In a packet, they are parts of the SKIP header.
There is no verification in SKIP if M = M̂ , however if both sides use different keys, it results
in different value.
b

Figure 3.2: Deploying SKIP in Mobile IP (Protocol 1)
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then encrypted using Kijn and sent along the message in SKIP header.

3.2

Our Contributions

We propose an extension of SKIP to provide security against the compromise of the
mobile device, and to allow secure connection from outside and inside of the home
network. There are two scenarios: the mobile node is stolen inside the internal
network and the mobile node is stolen outside the internal network. Hence, there
are two protocols: the external IPsec protocol which is used when the laptop1 is
outside the home network and the internal IPsec protocol which is used when the
laptop is located inside the home network (see the proposed solution section for
more detail). The internal protocol has the following properties: the server does
not need to be trusted, no initialisation per user is required and public keys are
truly public (this is in contrast with [HK99] with similar functionalities in which the
public key cannot be made public). The external protocol provides key disabling
property whilst preserving confidentiality of the private key even if the laptop is
stolen. The main advantage of our scheme is that no extra messages are required and
the added security is obtained by extending the SKIP header. These two protocols
are described as follow.

3.2.1

First Scenario: The External IPsec Connection

The purpose of this IPsec connection is to authenticate packets at the firewall while
preserving their confidentiality.
A Simple but Insecure Scheme
Let i and π denote a laptop’s private key and the user’s password, respectively. If
θ ← Eπ (i) is stored in the laptop, an adversary can perform an off-line dictionary
attack. That is, the adversary randomly selects a password π̂ from his dictionary
list and uses it to decrypt θ, î = Dπ̂ (θ). He can then verify whether his guess is
?

correct by verifying whether g î = g i (mod p) holds, where g i is publicly available in
the PKI directory.
Our Scheme
The basic idea of our scheme is to divide the private key into two pieces of information, namely i = β + δ (mod q), where θ ← Eπ (β) is stored in the laptop and δ
1

For the rest of the Chapter, we will use the term “laptop’ to represent the mobile node.
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p, q are prime
g ∈ Zp∗ , where g is a primitive element
1. receive password π from user
2. select i ∈R Zq , where i denotes a laptop’s private key
3. select β ∈R Zq
4. compute δ, where β + δ = i (mod q)
5. compute: θ ← Eπ (β)
Laptop stores
θ

Firewall stores
δ

Figure 3.3: External IPsec Connection: Initialisation Phase (Protocol 2A)
is stored at the firewall. The master key (KM N −F W or Kij ) is computed from the
partial secret information of the private key (β) together with the firewall’s public
key (ηF W ).
The firewall needs to be assured that the owner knows the correct password π.
We incorporate the Schnorr’s indirect proof of knowledge techniques [Sch89] to show
this knowledge. The protocol has two phases, namely the initialisation phase and
the key generation phase.
1. Initialisation Phase
Firstly, the laptop’s private key i and the user’s password π are generated. Then,
the public key of the laptop, ηi , is computed and stored at the PKI directory. Next,
the private key i is split into two pieces of information, β and δ, where β + δ = i
(mod q) and β is randomly selected from Zq . The value of δ is stored at the firewall,
and the encrypted value of β, θ ← Eπ (β), is stored in the laptop’s hard disk. The
user password’s π and the components of the private key (i, β, δ) must be erased
from the volatile memory. This phase is illustrated in Protocol 2A (Figure 3.3).
2. Key Generation Phase
Firstly, the user needs to enter his password π to obtain β̂. The firewall needs to
verify the authenticity of π, and this is achieved by incorporating Schnorr’s indirect
proof of knowledge. To illustrate this mechanism, the laptop sends α to the firewall
where α ← (< γ, g r , s >)2 and γ is computed from r + β · s (mod q), r and s are
?
random numbers. The firewall indirectly verifies by comparing if g γ = gˆr · (g β̂ )ŝ
2

We have changed from our original paper [WSnS03] that α ← (< g γ , r, s >) to properly follow
Schnorr identification protocol convention and notations.
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Laptop
1. receive password π̂ from user
2. select r and s, where r, s ∈R Zq
3. compute: β̂ ← Dπ̂ (θ)
4. compute: γ = r + β̂s (mod q)
5. compute: α = (< γ, g r , s >)
6. obtain ηF W from PKI
7. KM N −F W ← (ηF W )β̂ (mod p)
8. continue SKIP process
(step 4-8 in Figure 3.2)

Firewall
Store δ

9. < α, SKIP header, SKIP payload >
−→
receive α̂ = (< γ̂, gˆr , ŝ >)
obtain ηi from PKI
compute: gˆβ = gηδi (mod p)
abort if gˆγ 6= gˆr .(gˆβ )ŝ (mod p)
KM N −F W ← (gˆβ )j (mod p),
j - the firewall’s private key
15. continue SKIP process
(step 13-17 in Figure 3.2)
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Figure 3.4: External SKIP-IPsec Connection: Key Generation Phase (Protocol 2B)
(mod p). Once the firewall is convinced that the user is genuine, it computes the
session key. If the firewall is not convinced of the identity of the user, then it will
send a message to inform the user that the authentication fails. If the firewall detects
that there are several malfunctions from the same laptop within a short time, it may
suspend the connection request from this laptop. The firewall might also setup the
threshold of the number of times that each laptop can try. This is important to
prevent an online dictionary attack. We will show how to incorporate our protocol
in the current Mobile IP and SKIP operation in Protocol 2B (Figure 3.4).
Key Disabling Features
The laptop’s private key is not revealed during the execution of the protocol and
remains inaccessible to even the laptop’s hard disk. We also note that the private
key i is not disclosed even though it is accessed by a valid user. As a result, we
can obtain the key disabling feature (as defined in [MR01]) i.e. to allow the laptop’s
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owner to reuse the same private and public key pair for a new device. To disable
the private key by the laptop, we redefine new components of the private key (β̂, δ̂)
where β̂ 6= β, δ̂ 6= δ and β̂ + δ̂ = i (mod q). Hence, new components of the private
key (β̂, δ̂) result in valid operations using the same public key g i .

3.2.2

Second Scenario: The Internal IPsec Connection

When the Mobile IP enabled laptop is used inside the home network, it can communicate with the other mobile nodes directly without going through the firewall.
However, we also need to preserve the confidentiality of the communication. To
enable this feature, we use the secure IPsec communication with the same private
key as in the previous protocol. Nonetheless, we need to modify the protocol since
the environment is different when the laptop is used inside and outside the network.
When the laptop uses the external IPsec connection, it communicates directly
with the firewall which stores δ. Therefore, the session key can be computed with
the partial secret key β only, without the need to reveal δ. This is because the
firewall has the knowledge of δ. The situation is different when the laptop is used
within the home network and uses the internal IPsec connection to communicate to
the other mobile node. Since the other mobile node MNn does not know δlaptop , it
cannot compute the session key between MNn and the laptop. The same problem
will arise when the laptop does not know δMNn . To solve this problem, a “server” is
introduced. We note that the function of this entity is similar to the firewall, but
the firewall interacts with an outside network. The server will allow each node MNn
to download its own δMNn . This method is used instead of allowing the mobile node
MNn to download δlaptop , to avoid a collusion attack between MNn and the adversary
which will later enable the adversary to perform an off-line attack when the laptop
is stolen and taken outside the network.
The approach that we use is by allowing every laptop to download its own δ from
the server. However, we need to ensure that the server is trusted, or else the server
could expose the knowledge of δ to an adversary. If we allow an untrusted server to
be employed, instead of storing δ in the server, we can encrypt it to form a ticket
which will be stored in the laptop’s hard drive. This ticket is encrypted with the
server’s public key, and hence, only the server can decrypt this ticket.
We note that the private key i is revealed in the internal IPsec connection, and
hence we cannot reuse the key. If the stolen laptop is detected, both of the laptop’s
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p, q are prime
g ∈ Zp∗ , where g is a primitive element
1. receive password π from user
2. select i ∈R Zq , where i denotes a laptop’s private key
3. select β ∈R Zq
4. compute δ, where β + δ = i (mod q)
5. compute: θ ← Eπ (β)
6. compute: τsvr = Epksvr (δ)a
Laptop stores
Server stores
θ
nothing or
τsvr
δMN b
a
b

when the server is untrusted
when the server is trusted

Figure 3.5: Internal IPsec connection: Initialisation Phase (Protocol 3A)
public and private key pair must be changed before the new initialisation. Similar to
the first scenario, the protocol is divided into two phases, namely the initialisation
phase and the key generation phase. Each phase is illustrated as follows.
1. Initialisation Phase
We consider two different scenarios: when the server is trusted and when the server
is untrusted. If the server is trusted, the initialisation values for the laptop follow
the same procedure as in the external protocol. The additional task is to store δ at
the server as well as the firewall.
In the case of an untrusted server, the laptop is required to store δ. However, we
cannot allow this information to be stored in a plain form, and this value should not
be accessible to the laptop’s user without any interaction with the server. Therefore,
we encrypt this value with the server’s public key, that is τsvr ← Epksvr (δ), and
store this value in the laptop. This value, which is known as the “ticket”, can
only be decrypted by the server which knows the appropriate decryption key sksvr .
Moreover, we can use the same approach to avoid storing δ at the firewall, by
encrypting δ with the firewall’s public key and store it in the laptop’s hard disk.
That is, τF W ← EpkF W (δ). The complete initialisation protocol is illustrated in
Protocol 3A (Figure 3.5).
2. Key Generation Phase
Firstly, the laptop needs to request the server to decrypt the ticket to obtain δ. The

3.2. Our Contributions

60

server needs to verify this request to make sure that this request comes from the
proper user. Once the verification is confirmed, δ is sent back to the laptop in an
encrypted form. Upon receiving δ, the laptop can combine this information with its
own secret information β to enable the communication with another mobile node.
This phase is illustrated in Protocol 3B (Figure 3.6).
Laptop
1. receive password π̂ from user
2. select r, s and y where r, s, y ∈R Zq
3. compute: β̂ ← Dπ̂ (θ)
4. compute: γ = r + β̂s (mod q)
5. compute: α = (< γ, g r , s >)
6. compute: ξ ← Epksvr (y)

Server

7. < α, τsvr , ξ >
−→
8. receive α̂, τsvr
ˆ , ξˆ
9. decrypt: δ̂ ← Dsksvr (τsvr
ˆ )
10. obtain ηi from PKI
11. compute gˆβ = gηδ̂i (mod p)
12. abort if g γ̂ 6= gˆr .(gˆβ )ŝ (mod p)
ˆ
13. decrypt ξˆ for ŷ: ŷ ← Dsksvr (ξ)
14. λ ← ŷ ⊕ δ̂ (mod q)
15. λ
←−
16.
17.
18.
19.

receive λ̂
compute: δ́ ← λ̂ ⊕ y (mod q)
abort if Epksvr (δ́) 6= τsvr
compute private key î = β̂ + δ́ (mod q)

Establish the IPsec connection with mobile node MN
20. request public key of MN from PKI ← ηMN
21. compute Klaptop−MN ← (ηMN )î (mod p)
22. start processing SKIP-IPsec connection
(from step 2 in Figure 3.2)
Figure 3.6: Internal IPsec connection: Key Generation Phase (Protocol 3B)
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Protocols Summary

Table 3.1 shows the summary of the two protocols: the external and the internal
IPsec connection where Table 3.2 shows the main differences between our scheme
and Gupta’s [GM98].

Peer

External IPsec

Internal IPsec

the firewall

any node
either fixed or mobile

Location
Server

outside the organisation

inside the organisation

network

network

not required (δ is

required

stored at the firewall)
User Authentication

at the firewall

at the server

No. of message

≥1

≥2

Ticket

not compulsory

compulsory

Private key

only part of the private

complete private key

key is required

is required

Key disabling feature provided

N/A

Table 3.1: Main differences between the external and internal IPsec connection

3.3

New Protocol

The following section is an extension from our work in [WSnS03]. Initially, our
protocol’s aim is to prevent a thief who acquired a laptop to gain access to the
home network by incorporating the information that is stored in the laptop. We
have not considered a case that the malicious adversary (e.g. a thief who has acquired the laptop) also observes the connections and uses information that he has
observed together with the information stored on the laptop to gain access to the
home network. To illustrate this idea, after acquiring a stolen laptop, the thief can
only extract θ from the laptop’s storage, but he does not know the password or
any information about β. The only chance for him to be able to access the home
network is to perform an online dictionary attack. Meanwhile, although the passive
adversary can observe the connection, the adversary cannot find β from g β due to
the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem.

3.3. New Protocol

62

Property
Security
Auth. scheme
Auth. place
Auth. method
Key disable

Gupta

Our scheme

Use external device
At the smart card reader
PIN No. with a smart card
Not provided

Use password
At the firewall
Use Schnorr’s indirect proof
Provided

General
Extra device
Number of protocol
Server needed

Yes-Smart card reader
1
No

No
2
Yes for the internal protocol

Extra Storage
Laptop

Not required

Firewall

Not required

Store
- partial secret value θ
- ticket (untrusted server case)
Store
- partial secret value δ

Computation
Laptop

1. Verification of Pin No.
at the smart card
reader
2. Continue SKIP process
3. Process SKIP

Firewall

1. Decrypt the stored value
using password
2. Compute verification value
3. Continue SKIP process
4. Find another partial
secret value
5. Perform Schnorr’s
indirect proof
6. Continue SKIP Process

Internal IPsec
Server

N/A

Trust/Untrusted

Extra storage
Laptop

No

Server

N/A

Yes - ticket
for untrusted server
Yes - trusted server δ

Session key
established

since first packet
first round trip

second round trip

Table 3.2: Comparison of the existing SKIP-Mobile IP and our scheme
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However, if this thief has observed the connection between the laptop and the
firewall during their authentication process prior to acquiring the device, the story
becomes different altogether. The thief can perform an offline dictionary attack by
combining the information he observed (α) together with the stored value on the
laptop (θ). Then, he can derive the password π. To illustrate this idea, consider
γ

−1

that the adversary can compute g β from ( ggr )s . Then, he can run the dictionary
attack until g β = g Dπ (θ) . Eventually, he can obtain β and can compute a master key
(Kij ).
To extend our protocol, there are two alternatives: the first alternative is based
on the provable secure public key cryptosystem and the second alternative is based
on the proof of knowledge.

3.3.1

Solution based on the Provable Secure Public Key
Cryptosystem

Since the firewall’s public key is publicly known in our system, we use the encryption scheme to assist a user who carries a laptop to prove that he knows the correct
password by simply encrypting g β with the firewall or the server’s public key. The
encryption scheme used must be provably secure under chosen-ciphertext attack,
such as Cramer-Shoup [CS98]. It is important to note that the encryption scheme
must be secure against chosen-chipertext attack otherwise the adversary can successfully authenticate himself by changing an encrypted value in a way that the
authentication is valid though he does not know β.
To prevent a replay attack, a timestamp is used. To incorporate g β with the
timestamp, we use a collision resistant hash function such that it is computationally
hard (difficult) to find two different pairs which output the same value. The result
from the hash function is encrypted and sent to the firewall. To illustrate, let t be
the timestamp and f be a collision hash function such that it is computationally
hard (difficult) to find two pairs that (x1 , y1 ) 6= (x2 , y2 ) and f (x1 , y1 ) = f (x2 , y2 ), an
encrypted value that incorporates g β and the timestamp is denoted by EηF W (Mβ ),
where Mβ ← f (g β , t). The detail of the protocol with SKIP is demonstrated in
Protocol 4A (Figure 3.7).
The problem of the timestamp is that the laptop’s time and the firewall’s time
must be synchronised. Another alternative is to use a random number (Nonce). In
this alternated solution, the laptop and the firewall must store the Nonce’s tables
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Laptop
1. receive password π̂ from user
2. compute: β ← Dπ̂ (θ)
3. obtain Y = ηF W from PKI, where ηF W = g j
4. obtain t (a timestamp)
5. compute: Mβ ← f (g β , t)
6. compute: α ← EηF W (Mβ )
7. continue SKIP process
(step 4-8 in Figure 3.2)

Firewall
Store δ

8. < α, SKIP header, SKIP payload >
−→
9. receive α̂
10. decrypt M̂β ← DskF W (α̂)
11. obtain ηi from PKI, where ηi = g i
12. compute: g β = gηδi (mod p)
13. obtain t
14. compute: Mβ ← f (g β , t)
15. abort if M̂β 6= Mβ
16. KM N −F W ← (gˆβ )j (mod p),
j is the firewall’s private key
17. continue SKIP process
(step 13-17 in Figure 3.2)
Figure 3.7: External SKIP-IPsec Connection: Key Generation Phase based on Provable Secure Public Key Cryptosystem using timestamp (Protocol 4A)
so that the previous nonce values cannot be reused. The protocol works as follows.
The laptop first randomly selects N that it has never used before. Then, it sends
EηF W (Mβ , N ), where Mβ ← f (g β , N ) to the firewall. The firewall, rather than
obtaining the timestamp from a synchronised place such as the PKI directory, it
checks with its Nonce’s table whether N , which is obtained from the decryption
of EηF W (Mβ , N ), is reused. When the random number is not reused, the firewall
continues the protocol as in the timestamp option. See Protocol 4B (Figure 3.8) for
the protocol detail.
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Laptop
1. receive password π̂ from user
2. compute: β ← Dπ̂ (θ)
3. obtain ηF W from PKI, where ηF W = g j
4. select N ∈R Zp , where N ∈
/ Nlaptop
and Nlaptop stores values of previous N
5. update Nlaptop with N
6. compute: Mβ ← f (g β , N )
7. compute: α ← EηF W (Mβ , N )
8. continue SKIP process
(step 4-8 in Figure 3.2)

Firewall
Store δ

9. < α, SKIP header, SKIP payload >
−→
10. receive α̂
11. decrypt (M̂β , N̂ ) ← DskF W (α̂)
12. abort if N̂ ∈ NF W , where NF W
stores values of laptop’s previous N
13. update NF W with N̂
14. obtain ηi from PKI, where ηi = g i
15. compute: g β = gηδi (mod p)
16. compute: Mβ ← f (g β , N )
17. abort if M̂β 6= Mβ
18. KM N −F W ← (gˆβ )j (mod p),
j is the firewall’s private key
19. continue SKIP process
(step 13-17 in Figure 3.2)
Figure 3.8: External SKIP-IPsec Connection: Key Generation Phase based on Provable Secure Public Key Cryptosystem using Nonce (Protocol 4B)

3.3.2

Solution based on Proof of Knowledge

In this solution, we provide a scheme that the user can prove that he knows β without
revealing g β to the adversary. This scheme is based on the proof of knowledge
technique and is provable secure under the security model that will be presented
later in the security proof section. Due to the SKIP protocol’s restriction that
everything should be done in one message, timestamp is used to prevent replay
attack. The scheme is described below.
1. Initialisation Phase
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Let G = hgi = hhi be a cyclic group of prime order p such that DDH problem is
hard. The public parameter of the firewall F is G, g, h, p, Y = hj for some s ∈ ZZ∗p
which is the secret key of F. Let π ∈ B (from some limited domain) be the password
of the user U. In initialisation phase, the user randomly chooses β ∈R ZZ∗p , compute
θ = Eπ (β)3 and stores θ in his laptop. The firewall stores δ, where δ = i − β and i
is the private key of the laptop that this user carries.
2. Key Generation Phase
The proposed protocol in the key generation phase is described as follows:
1. The laptop’s user U uses his password π to decrypt θ and obtains β from his
laptop. At time t, he randomly generates rx , rβ , x ∈R ZZ∗p , computes X = Y x ,
T = g rβ hrx , c = H(T, X, t), zx = rx − cx, zβ = rβ − cβ and sends T, X, c, zx , zβ
to the firewall F.
2. F accepts if and only if T = U X j

−1

c

g zβ hzx , where U =

gi
.
gδ

We note that the nice feature of this alternative is that we do not have to rely on
the security of the public key cryptosystem. Nevertheless, we cannot replace the
timestamp with the Nonce.
The detail of the protocol with SKIP is demonstrated in Protocol 5 (Figure 3.9).

3.4

Security Analysis and Proof

The main contribution of this Chapter is to propose a mechanism to store a partial
private key that will be used to compute the master key at the laptop in a way that
when the laptop is stolen, the thief cannot guess the correct password to obtain
access. We do not consider a situation when the connection is eavesdropped in the
internal network but the laptop is stolen outside the network. We assume that the
firewall is physically secured, otherwise, the complete system is totally compromised.
We do not consider a case when the adversary captures the laptop and he also
knows a password since he definitely can gain access. Instead, our external protocol
offers a mechanism to disable the use of this laptop once the user realises his loss.
3

Encryption of β under secret key π.
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Laptop
1. receives password π̂ from user
2. compute: β ← Dπ̂(θ)
3. obtain Y = hj from PKI
4. obtain t (a timestamp)
5. randomly generate rx , rβ , x ∈R ZZ∗p
5. compute: X = Y x , T = g rβ hrx
6. compute: c = H(T, X, t)
7. compute: zx = rx − cx and zβ = rβ − cβ
8. α =< T, X, zx , zβ >
9. continue SKIP process
(step 4-8 in Figure 3.2)

Firewall
Store δ

10. < α, SKIP header, SKIP payload >
−→
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

receive α̂ =< T̂ , X̂, zˆx , zˆβ >
obtain t
compute: c = H(T̂ , X̂, t)
obtain ηi from PKI, where ηi = g i
compute: g β = gηδi (mod p)
−1 c zˆ
abort if T̂ 6= g β X j
g β hzˆx , where
j is the firewall’s private key
17. KM N −F W ← (g β )j (mod p),
18. continue SKIP process
(step 13-17 in Figure 3.2)

Figure 3.9: External SKIP-IPsec Connection: Key Generation Phase based on Proof
of Knowledge (Protocol 5)

3.4.1

The Security Model

Let a password-based authentication scheme (PBA) be a protocol between two parties, namely, a user U and a firewall F. U’s secret is a password π from a limited
domain while F is in possession of f (β) for some function f . It should be noted
that we assume F is trusted not to carry out an offline dictionary attack. The
following game formally defines the security model of a PBA. Let B be a set of
possible password. Let A be an adversary. A is able to eavesdrop authentication
protocol transcripts. In case the user relies on certain proprietary hardware, we also
assume the hardware is captured by the adversary. After observing a number of
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interactions, A is said to mount a successful attack if he can authenticate himself
successfully.
Definition 3.1 Game Authentication
• (Initialisation.) A is given the public parameter of the system.
• (Learning Phase.) U (using password β) authenticates himself to the firewall
F using the password for a number of times. The resulting transcripts are
given to A.
• (End Game.) A tries to authenticate himself to the firewall. A outputs transcripts that are not the same as in the learning phase. He wins the game if his
attempt is successful.
A PBA is secure against an offline dictionary attack if no PPT adversary can
win in Game Authentication.

3.4.2

The Proof for the Solution based on the Provable Secure Public Key Cryptosystem

Let π be some secret password from some limited domain B. Let E be a provably
secure encryption scheme against chosen ciphertext attack. Let θ = Eπ (β), that
is, θ is the encryption of β under secret key π. Let f be a collision resistant hash
function such that it is computationally hard to find two pairs (x1 , y1 ), (x2 , y2 ), where
(x1 , y1 ) 6= (x2 , y2 ) such that f (x1 , y1 ) = f (x2 , y2 ). We assume no PPT algorithm can
output g β , on input θ, g, Y = g j , p, with probability better than 1/|B|.
Proof Sketch. A wins the game if he can generate a valid transcript. However,
due to the security of the encryption scheme, A cannot obtain any information about
Mβ , and thus he cannot find g β with the dictionary attack. If A does not know g β ,
it is computationally hard for him to generate a valid transcript due to the collision
resistant hash function. Thus, the probability that A can find g β is at most 1/|B|.

3.4.3

The Proof for the Solution based on the Proof of
Knowledge

Let π be some secret password from some limited domain B. Let G = hgi = hhi =
hY i be a cyclic group of prime order p such that DDH problem is hard and β be a
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random number from Zp∗ . Let E be some encryption scheme. Let θ = Eπ (β), that
is, θ is the encryption of β under secret key π. We assume no PPT algorithm can
output g β , on input θ,G, g, h, Y, p, g β hx , Y x , with probability better than 1/|B|.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A which can win in Game Authentication, we show how to construct a PPT challenger C which solves above assumption.
C receives θ, G, g, h, Y = g j , p, g β hx , Y x , and is required to output g β . It sets
the public key of the firewall as G, g, h, Y, p. Note that the secret key, defined as
j = logh (Y ), is unknown to C. To simulate the situation when A captures the
laptop, θ is also given to A.
C generates a transcript of the authentication protocol in the Learning Phase as
follows. Firstly, he randomly chooses x̃ ∈R ZZ∗p and computes X = Y x Y x̃ . Next,
he chooses c, zβ , zx ∈R ZZ∗p . Then, he computes T = (g β hx hx̃ )c g zβ hzx . Next, he sets
c = H(T, X, t). The transcript is (T, X, c, zβ , zx ).
Finally, A is required to authenticate himself to C. Let (T, X, c, zβ , zx ) be the
resulting transcript. C rewinds the adversary to the point when he received T and
X and issues ĉ. The adversary submits two new responses ẑβ and ẑx .
−1 ĉ ẑ
−1 c z
g β hẑx where j
Note that if A wins, T = g β X j
g β hzx and T = g β X j


−1 c z
−1 ĉ ẑ
is defined as logh (Y ). Hence, g β X j
g β hzx = g β X j
g β hẑx . Therefore, C
computes β =

zβ −ẑβ
,
ĉ−c

outputs g β and wins the game, assuming that A cannot find

logh (Y ) and A cannot find logh (g).

3.4.4

Future Work

We only provide a security proof for our external protocol. As the internal protocol
employs the same verification mechanism, its proof should be done in a similar
fashion. However, we note that when the server is impersonated and the laptop is
captured at the same time, the protocol does not prevent this attack. Hence, in our
security proof we only limit to the trusted server scenario.

3.5

Summary

We considered the scenario where a laptop that is enabled with secure Mobile IP
connection using SKIP, is stolen and the aim is to protect the private key stored in
this laptop. A method of protecting the private key in which the secret stored in
the laptop cannot be used to determine the private key is proposed together with
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a ‘disabling’ method in which the stored secret such that even when the laptop
is stolen outside the home network, there is no need for changing the private key.
We proposed a new authentication protocol which the user can use his password
together with a value stored at the laptop to prove that he is a valid user instead of
using a smart card. We then extended our work in [WSnS03] and proposed a new
protocol that is more secure. Two alternatives are proposed: a protocol based on the
provable secure encryption scheme and a protocol based on the proof of knowledge
technique.We also provided the security model and proof of our new protocol. We
believe that our scheme can be applied for use with other protocols which store a
value that associates with a private key at the device and requires the private and
public key pair for key establishment. We note that our scheme provides two-factor
authentication, that is something the user knows (which is password authentication)
and something he has (which is device authentication).

Chapter 4
Location Privacy in Mobile IPv4
Many security issues arise due to the design of Mobile IP protocol and its deployment. Most existing works focused on authentication of the control packet and the
confidentiality of the content in the protocol. There are not many proposals in the
area of location privacy, even though the location of a mobile node can be easily
revealed through Mobile IP packets that are sent across the network. Thus, users
are losing their privacy while employing the protocol. To illustrate this situation,
suppose Alice’s laptop employs Mobile IP. When Alice moves to other networks, her
network administrator can track her location from the home agent. This is due to
the requirement that the laptop must always report to the home agent to notify
her current location (via the care-of-address). Likewise, her laptop must report to
the foreign agent its home address and its home agent according to the protocol
specification. Hence, with some additional information, it is not difficult for the foreign network’s administration to find that the user is indeed Alice which obviously
exposes her identity. Not only is the identity revealed, but anyone obtaining this
information about Alice can use it to acquire Alice daily activities or Alice’s location
at anytime of the day or even tell the relationships between Alice and other users.
For example, from Alice’s care-of-address information, her network administrator
can conclude that Bob is Alice’s boyfriend as her mobile node always appears with
Bob’s mobile node even outside of the office hours, etc.
More severely, as indicated in the original proposal, since all packets are sent
in plaintext, this location information is also revealed to eavesdroppers. Some may
dispute that reverse tunneling and encryption can provide location privacy to Mobile
IP. This is only true under the assumptions that the foreign agent and home agent
are trusted and unlinkability [PK01] is not taken to consideration.
Hence, we see some potential problems when the protocol is deployed widely.
We believe that as mobility is related tightly to the location, when it is adopted
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commercially, the need to prevent location information from being known is critical
as it does not mean that users must trade their own privacy for the ability to access
the service.
There are not many approaches proposed to provide location privacy particularly
to the Mobile IPv4 protocol. The existing proposals can be classified into two
categories: a single trusted entity based approach [CKK03] and an overlay network
based approach [EHH01, FKK96]. Each approach has tradeoffs between the level
of security provided and practicality. According to Choi et al. [CKK03], the first
approach provides weaker security since there is a need for a trusted entity; however,
it is claimed that it is much more practical. The latter approach is claimed to provide
stronger security. Nonetheless, it may have problem with real-time applications; for
example, a number of operations are required to be computed at the mobile node.
As security increasingly becomes a very significant issue, we choose the second
approach as our method. Our contributions are two protocols based on this model
that do not only provide location privacy, but also minimise the processes operated at
the mobile node so that the mobile node does not need to be burdened with expensive
and unnecessary operations. We found that unlike other scenarios, the property that
the mobile node can select the route by itself does not provide any benefit to the
Mobile IP protocol. Instead, it exhausts the nodes with expensive operations since
mobile devices are typically small devices that have limited computational power.
Thus, we remove the path-selection process from the mobile node. The overlay path
in our scheme is generated on-the-fly by intermediate nodes that packets visit. Thus,
there is no need for the mobile node to be aware of the network configuration which
may result in a dead link if the information is not up-to-date. The mobile node is not
required to perform several public key encryptions. Additionally, since our protocol
is designed particularly for the Mobile IPv4 protocol, there is no need for a new
entity; it merely requires additional processes at the mobility agents. To achieve
our goals, we employ the universal re-encryption scheme which allows packets to
arrive at the home agent even though any intermediate node in the path does not
know the home agent’s address; and in the meantime it is part of the path creation.
In the second protocol, we extend the universal re-encryption scheme to n-out-of-n
universal re-encryption so that the minimum number of hops in the overlay path
can be controlled. Hence, it only requires two public key encryption operations.
Beneficially, these two values can be computed at prior (i.e., at initialisation and
stored at the mobile device).
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Parts of this Chapter have appeared in [WSnS05]. The organisation of this
Chapter is as follows. Section 4.1 describes background knowledge of how Mobile
IP reveals its location, details of our motivations, requirements, and scenarios. Then,
our proposed protocols are presented in Section 4.2. The analysis of our protocols
is provided in Section 4.3 followed by a summary in Section 4.4.

4.1

How Mobile IPv4 protocol reveals location

It is necessary to explain the flow of the protocol and packet content in more detail
because we want to provide privacy at the protocol level. As described in Chapter
2, there are three groups of messages in the Mobile IPv4 system, namely agent
discovery messages, registration messages and data messages. For location privacy,
only the last two are taken into consideration. More details of these messages are
elaborated as follows.

4.1.1

Control Messages

As registration messages are aimed at establishing the path between the away mobile
node and its home agent, we refer to these messages as control messages, which
consist of two messages: a registration request message (RRQ) and a registration
reply message (RRP). A RRQ is used by a mobile node (MN) to inform its current
location to the home agent (HA) through the foreign agent (FA); its protocol payload
consists of three main components: a mobile node’s home address’s (MN), its home
agent’s address (HA) and its current care-of-address (CoA). A RRP is the control
message sent from the HA to inform MN whether or not the request is successful.
The RRP consists of MN, HA, and the value indicates the result of the request, either
accept (A) or deny (D). The flow of the control packets in the protocol is illustrated
as follows. Let A → B : A, B, (payload) denote that A sends a message to B where A
is the source IP address, B is the destination IP address and payload is the payload
of the message.
Note that there are also other fields but we select only the ones that are involved
in our analysis and we are interested in the ones that uses a foreign agent (FA)’s
address as care-of-address.
Once the mobile node detects that it is not in the home network, it generates the
RRQ packet then sends to the chosen foreign agent. When the FA receives a RRQ
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2.
3.
4.

MN → FA :
FA → HA :
HA → FA :
FA → MN :

MN, FA, (MN, HA, CoA)
FA, HA, (MN, HA, CoA)
HA, FA, (MN, HA, A/D)
FA, MN, (MN, HA, A/D)
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; RRQ
; RRQ
; RRP
; RRP

Figure 4.1: Control Message flow when the mobile node is away
from new visiting node, it changes the packet header’s source address to its address,
stores necessary routing information; for instance, the MN and HA retrieved from
packets’ content with pending status and then forwards to the HA.
When the HA receives the RRQ, it generates the registration reply packet either
accepting or rejecting the request, depending on the validity of the packet. If the
RRQ is valid, the HA creates or modifies the mobile node entry in its mobility binding
list from the information extracted from the RRQ payload. Then, it generates an
RRP and sends back to the FA.
The FA uses MN’s value in RRP to find the entry in the pending list and updates
status to not pending. Then, it relays the RRP to the MN by substituting destination
address from FA to MN as illustrated in the protocol flow diagram. After the MN
receives the RRP and updates its pending registration, the end-to-end connection
from the MN to the HA is established.

4.1.2

Data Messages

Data messages are messages sent between the mobile node and its corresponding
node after the path is already established. Data messages can be classified into
two groups: forward tunneling messages for any packets from a corresponding node
(CN) to the mobile node, and reverse tunneling [Mon98] messages in the reverse
direction.
1.CN → MN :
2.HA → FA :
3.FA → MN :

CN, MN, (payload)
HA, FA, (CN, MN, (payload))
CN, MN, (payload)

Figure 4.2: Data Message flow from the CN to the MN (reverse tunneling)
Figure 4.2 shows the protocol flow when any CN sends messages to the away MN.
As we focus only in reverse tunneling mechanism, the CN has no knowledge of the
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real location of the MN. Therefore, it simply sends packets to the MN’s network the
same way as the MN is the fixed host. The HA then interrupts this packet, treats
it as a payload of the new packet with its address as the new source address and
the FA’s address (FA) as the new destination address and sends to the FA. When
the FA receives this data packet, it decapsulates the outer IP, obtains MN from the
destination address of the inner IP, then forwards to the MN. When the MN wants
to send packets to the CN, it processes the same way as mentioned above; however,
in the reverse order, the protocol flow is illustrated in Figure 4.3.
1.MN → CN :
2.FA → HA :
3.HA → CN :

MN, CN, (payload)
FA, HA, (MN, CN, (payload))
MN, CN, (payload)

Figure 4.3: Data Message flow from the MN to the CN
It is obvious that the disclosure of location information relies on how each entity
has acquired this information. The FA has knowledge of the mobile node home
address (MN) and its home agent address (HA) from a RRQ’s payload. Besides,
the home address of the mobile node is used as the source address of the RRQ.
Therefore, the location of the mobile node is exposed to the FA through both the
content of the RRQ protocol and its header. In addition, the FA does not only know
where the visiting mobile node is from, but also knows which node it communicates
with through the data packets it receives. The HA, similarly, knows the mobile
node location from the CoA’s value in the RRQ’s payload or from the RRQ’s source
address. Also, the HA knows who mobile nodes communicates with from data
packet. As packets are sent in plaintext, nodes in the home network can acquire
the same knowledge as the HA. Similarly, nodes in the foreign network can have the
same knowledge as the FA.

4.1.3

Adversary

Choi et al. [CKK03] classified the entities in the protocol into two groups: legitimate
entities and illegitimate entities. Legitimate entities are active entities in the protocol that assist the protocol to function properly; they are the foreign agent, the
home agent and the corresponding nodes. These entities are legitimately allowed to
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passively collect the location information from the incoming packets but are not allowed to take other actions. Illegitimate entities, namely attackers, are other nodes
that do not have any role in the protocol. They also divided the attackers into
strong attackers and weak attackers. Strong attackers are attackers that are capable
of compromising arbitrary routers to eavesdrop on the packets at those arbitrary
location so that they can trace the packets traversing path to link the sender and
the recipient of the protocol. Weak attackers are attackers that cannot compromise
the existing system and merely obtain the information from the exposed packets
such as from the wireless network’s packets.
As the goal of our work is to protect the location of a mobile node from every
other entities except itself, no one should have a clue of its real location, that is
its care-of-address and the relationship between the home address and the care-ofaddress. Thus, any other node apart from the mobile node can be considered as
adversaries in our system.
Based on the above definition, we classify our adversaries into legitimate adversaries and illegitimate adversaries. Legitimate adversaries, are valid active entities
in the system, namely the HA, the FA and the CN. The adversaries are allowed
to gather location information in order that the protocol remains valid but real
location are hidden. In addition to Choi et al., we assume that these entities are
honest-but-curious. That is they are allowed to do other actions such as colluding
with other nodes but they have to behave according to the protocol and at the end
of the protocol they would not learn new information apart from what they have
learned from the protocol. The illegitimate adversaries or the passive adversaries are
nodes in the home network, nodes in the foreign networks and any other nodes in
the entire network. They are not part of the protocol but they are able to eavesdrop
the packets. We note that since we employ reverse tunneling, the CN is omitted.

4.1.4

Motivation

Choi et al. classified the existing location privacy provided system into two types: a
Single Trusted Entity based system and Cascading Overlay Network based system 1 .
1

We note that in our original paper [WSnS05], we divided the approaches into a proxy based
approach and a cascading overlay based approach by focusing on the numbers of nodes between
the HA and the FA i.e., if there is merely one node, it is classified as the proxy based. However,
when we revised it, we found that these two approaches indeed are based on the proxy concept.
The difference is that rather than using one node as in the first approach, a chain of multiple nodes
are used instead.
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In a single trusted entity based system, a single trust node is used as a proxy
between the home agent and the foreign agent. One example is Anonymizer [Inc].
In a cascading overlay network based system, a set of n nodes are placed as a chain
of proxies, namely an overlay path, between the home agent and the foreign agent.
Rather than relying on a single trusted node, trust is distributed to all n nodes
in the path and unlinkability is claimed. Examples are systems Crowds [RR98]
and systems which are based on Chaum’s Mix-network idea [Cha81] such as Onion
Routings [RSG98].
There are trade-offs between these two approaches. Even though a centralised
based approach is claimed to be more practical, its security is tightly relied on one
single trusted node and it is vulnerable to traffic analysis attack from an adversary
who can observe the incoming and outgoing links of that node. The cascading overlay
based approach is believed to offer stronger security as trust is distributed to all n
nodes on the path and unlinkability is claimed; but it requires several public-key
operations which results in much higher computational resources, power and time.
This conflicts with the attributes of the mobile nodes, which are typically small
and have restricted computational power. In addition, performing several public
key encryptions every time moving to a new network may cause higher delay and
latency and finally exhaust the mobile node.
Considering all of these drawbacks, we decide that our scheme should be based on
the cascading overlay based approach with the additional property that a minimised
number of operations are processed at the mobile node. That is, we want a strong
security scheme that applicable with small and resource constraint devices. We also
want a scheme which is an extension of the MIPv4 protocol; that should work in
the network layer.
We note that the description of the systems below has already been given in
Chapter 2. In the following section, we will merely give our brief analysis of each
system.
Information Translating Proxy (ITP)
ITP is claimed for providing practical solution [CKK03]. However, there are some
disadvantages. Firstly, the ITP must be trusted. Secondly, it is potentially a single
point of failure. More importantly, it does not provide unlinkability from traffic
analysis; observers can monitor the ITP outgoing and incoming messages and can
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easily correlate them to obtain some relevant location information. Also, ITP is
aimed for Mobile IPv6.
Non-Disclosure Method (NDM)
NDM [FKK96] is not aimed to provide location privacy from the home agent. The
home agent still has knowledge of the mobile node’s whereabout from its CoA. Also,
it does not work in the network layer level.
Flying Freedom (FF)
FF [EHH01] is not a Mobile IP extended scheme. It extends PIP [Gol00] to provide
mobility and location privacy and works in transport layer.

4.1.5

Requirements

To have a concrete result, our protocols are designed based on the requirements
similar to flying freedom in [EHH01] as follow:
• a mechanism which is designed particularly for Mobile IPv4 that works in the
network layer.
• a mechanism which does not require high computation cost at the mobile node.
• the location of the mobile node must be hidden from all other nodes.
– the home network should have no knowledge about which foreign network
the mobile node is currently connected to; that is to hide the home agent
from the real IP addresses of the foreign agent (FA) and the care-ofaddress (CoA).
– the foreign network should have no knowledge about the mobile nodes
home network; that is to conceal the foreign agent from the real IP address
of the mobile node (MN) and the home agent (HA).
– an eavesdropper or man-in-the-middle should not be able to acquire any
location information; unlinkability must be provided.
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Scenario

A mobile node wants to communicate with its corresponding node without allowing
anyone, even its home agent to learn its current location, that is the current network
where the mobile node is visiting but not the exact position. To pinpoint the exact
location of the user, there is a need of other methods in lower network layers which
is beyond the scope of this work. The sender in our scenario is the mobile node and
our focused receiver is the home agent. In fact, the receiver can be correspondent
nodes for data packets. However, we only consider the home agent as our final
destination. In our system, there is a must for packets to travel through the visiting
foreign agent.

4.2

Our Contributions

As our protocol is based on the overlay based approach, that is a chain of nodes are
placed between the HA and the FA. The present locations of the MN and the FA are
hidden from the HA through the path as the HA understands that its predecessor
node is a node that has its IP address as the value of the CoA. The real CoA is
not disclosed unless all n nodes are compromised. Thus, our primary contributions
tend to be the reduction of operations performed at the mobile node; the mechanism to conceal the mobile node’s home network from its visiting foreign agent; the
mechanism to provide unlinkability and the mechanism to incorporate our scheme
into Mobile IP protocol. We minimise the operations processed at the mobile node
by moving the path creation process from the mobile node to the foreign agents. A
path is generated on the fly by each intermediate FAi that is part of the path instead
of being pre-selected by the mobile node. Hence, the mobile node does not need to
execute n public key operations because it does not know the path itself.
Concealing the Home network of the Mobile node. To conceal the MN’s home network from the FA and eavesdroppers, there are two tasks namely how to hide the
MN from the FAi and how to hide the HA from the FAi . This is quite straightforward
for the first task, we blind the FAi from the real value of the MN by employing a
pseudonym (PMN), which can be selected randomly or assigned by DHCP, to replace the MN in the header of the RRQ and the RRP packets. Then, we encrypt the
MN with the HA’s public key and use this value to replace MN in the payload of
these packets.
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Selection of nodes as an overlay network element. Nevertheless, generating a route
on the fly with the condition that the real HA, which is the destination of the packet,
must not disclose to any intermediate FAi is non-trivial. It is unlikely that any FAi
knows where it should forward the packet to and when to stop. Fortunately, there
is a universal re-encryption scheme that we can employ. The property that allows
the node to check whether or not it can decrypt the ciphertext from the second
tuple, grants us permission to convert the unlikely task to a possible task. Also,
the property that re-encryption can be deployed even though the public key of the
destination node is unknown allows the intermediate FAi to perform re-encryption
without knowing the public key of the HA resulting in the protection of traffic
analysis between incoming and outgoing packets appearing at each node.
We propose two solutions; both of which employ universal re-encryption. However, they differ in regard to whose key is used to encrypt HA and how the key
is organised. The first solution employs universal re-encryption scheme together
with Crowds [RR98] concept. The second solution enhances the first solution by
extending the universal re-encryption to n-out-of-n partial decryption.

4.2.1

Additional Definitions

There is no new entity added to our protocol, however, for simplicity, we divide the
foreign agents into two groups, that is, the original foreign agents (OFA) and the
intermediate foreign agents (IFA). An OFA is a foreign agent at the present network
that the mobile node visits; and an IFA is the foreign agent of each intermediate
network that the packet traverses pass before reaching the home agent. The last
IFA, which its next node is the home agent, is referred to as an exit node (EFA).
Let {M }N denote the asymmetric encryption of message M under the public key
of node N and {M }∗N denote the re-encryption of message M by node N under the
universal re-encryption scheme.

4.2.2

First Protocol: Incorporating Re-encryption and Crowds

How to incorporate the first approach to Mobile IPv4
We imitate Crowds [RR98] by randomly generating the path, however, our exit node
is pre-selected from a list of the FAs that the mobile node receives from its visiting
foreign network. We slightly loosen our requirement as we allow the exit node to
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have the knowledge of the home agent. Therefore, the on-the-fly path always ends
at the chosen exit node, which will send a packet to the home agent. Unlike Crowds,
where each intermediate node justifies whether to forward to the next node or to the
destination node depending on the pre-assigned probability, in our protocol, each
intermediate node justifies either to forward to the next node or to stop. It will stop
when the intermediate node is the exit node.
We take advantage of the universal re-encryption scheme, that is when the decryption is successful for the second tuple, the first tuple is the plaintext and the
node performing this decryption is the receiver, to achieve the task of our intermediate nodes. To be more precise, the home agent’s address and the exit node are
treated as plaintext and a recipient in the universal re-encryption scheme. Note that
the RRP and data messages will not be discussed as they will follow the path created
by the RRQ; the path is not re-created in every message but is recreated when the
mobile node re-sends the new RRQ, that occurs when the mobile node moves to a
new network or when the current RRQ is expired.
Figure 4.4 and 4.5 illustrate the first protocol flow when the mobile node wants
to send a RRQ to the home agent. First, the mobile node encrypts its home address
¯ It then selects the exit node (EFA)
with the home agent’s public key to obtain MN.
and uses the public key of the exit node to encrypt the home agent’s address to
¯ Note that any public key cryptosystem can be used for MN
¯ but it must
obtain HA.
¯
be universal re-encryption for HA.
MN
OFA
1. Select the exit node (EFA)
¯ ← {MN}
2. Compute MN
HA
¯ ← {HA}
3. Compute HA
EFA
4. CoA ← OFA
RRQ
−→
¯ ∗
¯
1. Re-encrypt {HA}
OFA ← HA
2. Randomly choose IFA1
3. No change of CoA
¯ IFA
4. Compute {MN}
1
RRQ1
−→

Figure 4.4: First Protocol: From the MN to the OFA (the original foreign agent)
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...
IFAi
RRQi−1
−→
¯ ← {MN}
¯ IFA
1. MN
i
2. If not the exit node
2.1 then go to 3
2.1 else go to 4
3. Not the exit node
¯ ∗
3.1 Compute {HA}
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IFAi+1 ...

HA

¯ ∗
← {HA}
IFAi−1
3.2 Randomly select IFAi+1
¯ IFA ← MN
¯
3.3 Compute {MN}
i+1
3.3 CoA ← IFAi
RRQi
−→
4. It is an exit node
¯
4.1 HA ← HA
4.2 CoA ← EFA
RRQE
−→
¯
1. MN ← MN
2. Perform normal operations
ex. CoA is EFA
IFAi

Figure 4.5: First protocol: RRQ From OFA → IFAi → ... → to HA
For the value of the CoA field in the RRQ sent by the mobile node, it is the OFA
as in the typical protocol. Note that a pseudonym (PMN) is used for the RRQ’s
source IP address.
¯ ∗ from
The original foreign agent (OFA), after receiving RRQ, obtains {HA}
¯ No decryption of {HA}
¯ ∗ is required here as the
processing re-encryption to HA.
OFA definitely is not the exit node. Then, the OFA randomly selects the next for¯ with the public key of the
eign agent node as the IFA1 from the list; encrypts MN
¯ IFA1 ; and forwards the new RRQ denoted by RRQ1 to the IFA1 .
IFA1 to obtain {MN}
There is no change of CoA, it still remains OFA.
Each intermediate foreign agent IFAi , after receiving RRQi , starts its operation
¯ IFA to obtain MN.
¯
by decrypting {MN}
Then, it determines if it is the exit node
i
¯ ∗
by examining the second tuple of a decrypted value of {HA}
. If the result is
IFAi−1

not equal to 1, this node is not the exit node. Then, each IFAi performs all these
¯ ∗ ; randomly selects a new foreign agent node
operations: do re-encryption of {HA}
IFAi

¯ with the public key of the IFAi+1 to obtain {MN}
¯ IFA ; sets the
IFAi+1 ; encrypts MN
i+1
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Type Source Dest. MN
RRQ
RRQ1
RRQi
RRQE

PMN
OFA
IFAi
EFA

OFA
IFA1
IFAi+1
HA

¯
MN
¯ IFA
{MN}
1
¯ IFA
{MN}
i+1
¯
MN

HA

CoA

{HA}EFA
¯ ∗
{HA}
OFA
¯ ∗
{HA}
IFAi
HA

OFA
OFA
IFAi
EFA

Figure 4.6: RRQ content at each entity
new CoA and forwards the new RRQ denoted by RRQi+1 to the IFAi+1 . Otherwise,
¯ to obtain the real address of the home agent (HA) and sends the
it decrypts HA
last RRQ denoted by RRQE to that address; that is the home agent. Note that to
prevent tracing, both the intermediate node and the exit node must change CoA’s
value to its address before the packet is sent out from them. Therefore, it appears
to its successor that the care-of-address is itself.
The home agent, after receiving RRQE, in addition to the normal operation,
attains the real home address of the mobile node by using its private key to decrypt
¯ and accepts EFA as CoA of the mobile node. Also, in RRP, {MN}HA is used
MN
instead of the plain home agent address.
An Analysis of the First Protocol
This solution achieves the requirement in the sense that every FA, either OFAs or
IFAs, does not need to acquire the re-encrypted key which implies that it does not
need to know where the exit node is, which implies that the knowledge of the home
agent is not disclosed to them. Secondly, the re-encryption process of {HA}EFA and
¯ which result in different values in the home
the encryption and decryption of MN,
agent and the mobile node’s home address fields of the incoming and outgoing RRQ,
prevent observers from doing traffic analysis. Thirdly, the mobile node requires
fewer public key operations. To be more precise, the public key operation at the
mobile node which involved in the path creation is reduced from n to 1. Also, as the
path is not pre-selected, the information of intermediate nodes are more up-to-date,
broken link’s problem caused by death intermediate nodes can be avoided.
Although the protocol is more prone to be attacked when the exit node is the
first intermediate node, its security is considerably superior than a single trusty node
based approach. That is, the exit node must not essentially be trusted since there is
no guarantee that its predecessor is the original foreign agent, and secondly as any
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foreign agent is eligible to be chosen, it is not a single point of failure.
Nevertheless, the number of hops that the RRQ has visited before it eventually
arrives at HA are uncertain. Also, there is an issue of an available list of the exit
nodes that the mobile node must have before it selects the exit node.

4.2.3

Second Protocol: Using n-out-of-n Partial Decryption
for the Universal Re-encryption

Because of the disadvantage of the first protocol, in this section we will modify it so
that the minimum number of hops can be controlled. The idea is that the packet
must travel at least n hops before it arrives at the home agent. Thus, rather than
relying on a single node, that is the exit node for the home agent value, n nodes are
required. We first form a network which consists of n foreign agents, which we will
use the network’s private/public keys pair instead of the key pair of the exit node.
Hence, there is no need for the available exit node’s list. We extend the universal
re-encryption scheme in order that to decrypt the encrypted home agent, it requires
the participation of all nodes; that is the private key is computed from the share of
all nodes. We also provide a mechanism to guarantee that even though the packet
has revisited the same node, duplicate decryption which causes the system failure
is not allowed. Note that for other information, such as the mobile node’s home
address, we employ the same mechanism used in the first protocol.
Protocol Algorithms
Like the typical universal re-encryption presented in Chapter 2, our second protocol
deploys the same assumptions and also consists of four algorithms: key generation, encryption, decryption and re-encryption. The details how each algorithm is
extended are described as follows:
Key Generation The key-generation algorithm (P K, SK) ← KG outputs a
random key pair (P K, SK) = y = g x , x for x ∈U Zq . The additional step is
x = x1 + x2 + ... + xn (mod q) where xi is a share of each participant.
Encryption Input comprises of a message m, a public key y, and a random encryption factor r = (k0, k1) ∈ Z 2 q . The output is a ciphertext C = [(α0 , β0 ); (α1 , β1 )] =
[(my k0 , g k0 ); (y k1 , g k1 )].
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Decryption Each participant(i) does the decryption using its private key(xi ) as
follows. Input is a ciphertext C = [(α0 , β0 ); (α1 , β1 )] under public key y. Verify
α0 , β0 , α1 , β1 ∈ G; if not, the decryption fails, and a special symbol ⊥ is output.
Compute α¯0 =

α0
x
β0 i

and α¯1 =

α1
x .
β1 i

If α¯1 = 1, means that this is the last node

to decrypt then the output is m = α¯0 . Otherwise, output a partial-decrypted
ciphertext P DC = [(α¯0 , β0 ); (α¯1 , β1 )]. Note that we assume that all nodes process
all operations correctly. Therefore, at this stage there is no decryption failure.
Re-encryption Input is a partial-decrypted ciphertext P DC = [(α¯0 , β0 ); (α¯1 , β1 )]
with a random re-encryption factor r0 = (k00 , k10 ) ∈ Z 2 q . Output is a ciphertext
0

0

0

0

C 0 = [(α¯0 .α¯1 k0 , β0 .β1 k0 ); (α¯1 k1 , β1 k1 )], where k00 , k10 ∈U Zq .
Duplicate Node An additional field is added into the RRQ protocol, this field
contains the flag value associated with the IFA. At the beginning of the path, all
bits are set to zero, then when the packet first visits each IFAi , the value is changed
to 1.
How to incorporate the (n, n) to Mobile IP
Unlike the first protocol, rather than beginning its process with choosing the exit
node, the mobile node uses the public key of the network system (NS) to encrypt
¯ ← {HA}NS ). The public key of the network (NS) is
the home agent address (HA
computed prior and is stored at the the mobile node’s home agent. The mobile node
can obtain this value through the agent discovery message. Figure 4.7 illustrates
how the NS is computed.

Let N S denote a privacy network system
Let xNS where xNS ∈U Zq , denote a secret value of the system
Let xIFAi denote a secret value of each IFAi
N S = {IFA1 , IFA2 , IFA3 , ..., IFAn }; n is a number of IFA
xNS = xIFA1 + xIFA2 + ... + xIFAn (mod )q
NS = gxNS

Figure 4.7: Second Protocol: The network key generation
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Other values at the mobile node are computed in the same way as the first
protocol. There is also no change at the original foreign agent.
MN
OFA
¯ ← {MN}
1. Compute MN
HA
¯ ← {HA}
2. Compute HA
NS
3. CoA ← OFA
RRQ
−→
¯ ∗
¯
1. Re-encrypt {HA}
OFA ← HA
2. Randomly choose IFA1
3. No change of CoA
¯ IFA
4. Compute {MN}
1
RRQ1
−→

Figure 4.8: Second Protocol: From the MN to the OFA (the first original foreign
agent)
However, since it can happen that a packet may revisit the same node, the
IFAi must check whether the packet has visited it earlier; otherwise the system will
¯ the IFAi
fail as no duplicate decryption is allowed. Therefore, after obtaining MN,
determines if it is re-visited by checking whether the flag value that represents the
node has been set. If so, as it is implicitly not the last node, the IFAi simply selects
¯ ∗
the new node and does re-encryption of {HA}
IFAi−1 straight away; otherwise, it
¯ ∗
in order to determine its status of whether it is the last
needs to decrypt {HA}
IFAi−1

node or not from the second tuple value. Then, if it is not the last node, it selects
the next node IFAi+1 , does re-encryption and forward to IFAi+1 . In the case where
it is the last node, it simply takes the decryption result of the first tuple as the
home agent’s address and forwards packet to the home agent. The second protocol
processes at the IFAi are illustrated in Figure 4.9.
Note that for the IFAi , each node must store the following values: the encrypted
mobile node ({MN}HA ), the predecessor node of this packet, and the next node of
this packet in its table. It probably can extend the binding table or create a new
table dedicating to this task. The choices depend on its implementation. This table
plays a very important role once the path is already created because this information
is used to route the packet.
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...
IFAi
IFAi+1 ...
RRQi−1
−→
¯ ← {MN}
¯ IFA
1. MN
i
2. If node’s revisit bit equals 0
2.1 then set revisited bit to 1, go to 3
2.2 else go to 4

HA

?

3. If α¯1 = 1(not the last node)
3.1 then go to 4
3.2 else go to 5
4. Not the last node
4.1 Randomly select IFAi+1
¯ IFA ← MN
¯
4.2 Compute {MN}
i+1
∗
¯
¯
4.3 Compute {HA} IFAi ← {HA}∗ i−1
4.4 CoA ← IFAi
RRQi
−→
5. It is the last node
¯
5.1 HA ← HA
5.2 CoA ← IFAi
RRQE
−→
¯
1. MN ← MN
2. Perform normal operations

Figure 4.9: Second Protocol: RRQ From OFA → IFAi → to HA

4.3

Analysis

Our protocols have the following extensions to the Mobile IPV4 original protocol.
• The extended protocols require additional fields for flag and all values resulting
from the universal re-encryption. These can be placed in the new additional
extension to the Mobile IPv4, namely the privacy extension.
• The mobile node is required to store two additional values: {MN}HA and
{HA}EFA or {HA}NS depending on the protocol selected.
• The foreign agent has to store an additional table or additional components
in its binding table regarding to the overlay path. It also has to add reencryption and decryption procedures while processeing the RRQ and RRP
that are privacy enabled.
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• The home agent must use the {MN}HA instead of the MN.
Our protocols achieve location privacy properties as follows: the location of the
mobile nodes is concealed by encrypting the HA and the MN and using a pseudonym,
the location of the foreign network is blinded to the mobile node’s home network on
multiple hops that packets visit and traffic analysis is concealed from eavesdroppers
by the use of the universal re-encryption.
Rather than encrypting or decrypting the whole Mobile IP packet using either
symmetric or public key encryption, we encrypt only the fields that we want to
conceal information, that is the extension of the Mobile IPv4 which also provides
location privacy. In addition, almost all additional costs happen at the foreign
agents not the mobile node. To illustrate this, it requires only two public key
operations: one for the MN and another one for the HA. More importantly, these
values can be pre-computed and stored in the mobile node’s memory or hard drive.
Hence, it does not cost the mobile node time and resource usage when location
privacy is required. This approach is very attractive to Mobile IP networks, as
mobile devices are small and have limited CPU capability, memory, storages, etc.,
so that reducing computation where possible is a vital issue. All other overlay
network based approaches require the mobile node’s responsibility to create the
route, which although providing the mobile node more flexibility, it burdens the
mobile node’s resources which is not appropriate for realtime communication since
the node must have the knowledge of the network topology. Our protocols propose a
new alternative for building the route. Furthermore, our protocols provide location
privacy properties as stated in the requirements, that is no other entity apart from
the mobile node knows its whereabouts.
Discussion
The problem of our second protocol is to assure that the decrypted home agent value
finally reaches the last node and does not just bump back and forth between the
already-visited nodes. The best case scenario is that each node is visited only once.
Therefore, the complexity of this routing mechanism is equivalent to the complexity
of the hamiltonian path problem2 , which is an NP complete problem.
The comparison of our second protocol and the previous proposals, namely the
2

The hamitonian path problem is a problem in the mathematic field of graph theory to determine
whether there exists a path which visits every vertex exactly once [CLRS01].
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System
Pseudonym
New Entity(ies)

Key used
Location Privacy
Drawbacks
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NDM [FKK96]
Overlay
No
SAs

ITP [CKK03]
Single trusted node
Yes
ITP

Pub key
RSA
No at HA
No LP to HA

Sym
MN − ITP
All
Single point
of failure

FF [EHH01]
Overlay
Yes
AIPi ,
AIPentry
AIPexit
Both
Both
All
Not designed
for MIP

Ours
Overlay
Yes
No

Pub key
ElGamal
All
Routing
path

Table 4.1: Comparison of each approach related to our protocols
NDM system, the ITP system and the FF system, are illustrated in Table 4.1,
4.2 and 4.3. Table 4.1 summarises five issues associated with each system. The
first issue is the system architecture. Our protocol, the NDM system and the FF
system employ an overlay based approach to hide an away-mobile node location
whereas the ITP system uses a single trusted entity based approach. The second
issue is whether or not the pseudonym concept is employed by these systems for the
location privacy purpose. Only the NDM system does not employ the pseudonym
where other systems do employ this technique. The third issue is whether or not a
new entity is introduced. SAs are introduced in the NDM system; an ITP node is
introduced in the ITP system; and the AIPi , AIPentry , and AIPexit are introduced in
the FF system. Our protocol does not introduce a new entity. Instead, we modify
existing entities, which are the home agent and the foreign agent. The fourth issue
is whether the public key or the symmetric key cryptosystem is deployed. The NDM
system employs the RSA public key cryptosystem; the ITP employs the symmetric
key approach and the FF system employs both techniques. Our protocol employs
universal re-encryption which is based on Elgamal public key cryptosystem. The last
issue is whether the system provides the location privacy property against all other
entities. The table shows that all systems except the NDM provide this property.
The NDM system does not hide the mobile node location from its home agent.
Finally, the table concludes each system’s drawback as follows: the NDM system
does not provide the location privacy against the home agent, the ITP node in the
ITP system is a single point of failure, the FF system is not designed for the Mobile
IP protocols and our protocol has problem with routing efficiency.
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NDM
FF
ITP
Ours

Route Creator
MN
MN
system
FAi

Pre-Setting
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Hops No.
n
n
2
at least n

Table 4.2: Comparison of each approach related to the path Creation
Table 4.2 describes how each system establishes an overlay path, namely a path
creation or a route establishment. Three issues are considered: who selects all nodes
in the path; whether this path can be established at prior; and the number of hops
that are required in the overlay path. The overlay path is chosen by the mobile
node in the NDM and the FF systems whereas our system allows the path to be
generated on-the-fly by each intermediate foreign agent at each hop. A path in the
ITP system is always fixed. That is, the ITP node is situated between a mobile
node and its home agent. Hence, the overlay path in our system cannot be preset
where this can be done in the NDM, the FF and the ITP systems. The number of
hops between a mobile node’s home location, i.e. the home agent, and its current
location are n+1 hops in the NDM and the FF systems, two hops in the ITP system
and at least n + 1 hops in our system. Note that n represents a number of nodes in
the overlay path (excluding the home agent)3 .
Method
NDM
FF

Work with
whole packet
whole packet

ITP

some fields

Ours

some fields

Key Encryption Operation
n pub
route create packet- n pub
data packet- n sym
1 sym between MN and AIPentry
1 sym, HA to {HA}KMN−ITP
1 sym, MN to {MN}KMN−ITP
1 sym, CoA to {CoA}KMN−ITP
¯ - Universal
1 pub, HA to HA
¯ - any
1 sym or pub, MN to MN

Table 4.3: Comparison of each system for key operations processed at the mobile
node
Table 4.3 clarifies key operations that are processed at a mobile node by each
3
We have changed from n in [WSnS05] to n + 1 since a hop from the home agent to the first
overlay node must also be included.
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system. The NDM and the FF systems encrypt the whole packet where ours and
the ITP system only select some fields to encrypt. In particular, we only encrypt the
home agent’s field and the mobile node’s home address’s field. The NDM system
requires n public key encryptions. Each encryption is for each node on the overlay
path. Similar to the NDM system, the FF system requires n public key encryptions
to establish a route (path). In addition, when the route is already created, it requires
another n + 1 symmetric key encryptions. That is, n symmetric key encryptions for
data packets to travel on the route, i.e. one symmetric key encryption for each
hop, and one symmetric key encryption between the mobile node and the AIPentry .
The ITP system requires three symmetric key encryptions: one encryption for the
home agent’s address; one encryption for the mobile node’s home address; and one
encryption for the care-of-address. Our system requires one public key encryption for
the universal re-encryption scheme to encrypt the home agent’s address. Our system
also requires another encryption to encrypt the mobile node’s home address. Since
the latter encryption’s condition is that the home agent must be able to decrypt
this value, the system can simply uses the home agent’s public key or it can use a
symmetric key shared between the mobile node and the home agent generated by
mobile IP protocol. We leave this issue to be handled in the implementation stage.

4.4

Summary

In this Chapter, we proposed an extension of the Mobile IPv4 protocol aimed at
providing location privacy, in particular against the legitimate entity, namely the
home agent. Our scheme is based on the overlay network approach which is believed
to provide stronger security than the single trusted based approach.
We employ universal re-encryption as the encryption scheme so that all but one
participant in the overlay path can be chosen on the fly in the first protocol. In the
second protocol, the universal re-encryption scheme is extended to n-out-of-n partial
decryptions for universal re-encryption so that it enables the network to choose the
path independently from the mobile node. This property is applicable to use with
the mobile devices which are small and have resource constrains. The mobile node
is merely required to store the encrypted values of the home agent’s address and the
encrypted value of its home address which can be pre-computed.
We note that in this Chapter, the main concern is the establishment of the
overlay path between the foreign agent and the home agent. We are not interested
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in the route optimisation scenario. The correspondent node can communicate to
the away-mobile node through reverse tunneling mode.

Chapter 5
Location Privacy: A Formal Approach
In the previous Chapter, we proposed two protocols that aimed at providing location
privacy in Mobile IPv4. We observed that not only Mobile IP but also other IPbased mobility systems would face the same problem. Therefore, a need for a formal
approach as a security framework in designing an IP-based mobility system that
requires location privacy is crucial.
We start this Chapter by providing descriptions of the mobility system, the communication model, entities and processes, and proceed with our formal definitions
in Section 5.1. As described later in the Chapter, we shall show that an IP-based
mobility system with location privacy property has a very close relationship with an
anonymous communication system. The formal model of anonymous communication system is presented in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 models adversaries and the level
of location privacy that can be provided by the mobility system. This results in three
security games that will be presented in Section 5.4. A new proposed framework
for a system that provides location privacy is introduced in Section 5.5. Section 5.6
briefly discusses the route optimisation and its issue with location privacy. Finally Section 5.7 concludes this Chapter. Parts of this Chapter have appeared in
[WSSN07a].

5.1

Mobility

As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, in this thesis we are interested in the context
of ‘IP-based application mobility’. That is, the ability that a mobile user can move
freely from one location to another while his ongoing communications with the
Internet services such as his youtube connection are continuously maintained without
requiring to restart these applications. In other words, the services continue as if the
user has not moved. To be technically more specific, it is an ability that a mobile
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Figure 5.1: An illustration of an end-to-end model

host can move from one IP network to another IP network whilst still receiving the
upper layers’ services as if it was a fixed host.

5.1.1

Model of Communication

We assume that each user carries one mobile device and therefore, without losing generality, the terms mobile user, mobile device and mobile node can be used
interchangeably to represent the mobile device.
In modelling the communication channel, we will employ an end-to-end communication model, as illustrated in Figure 5.1. That is, a sender and a receiver
can exchange their information without concern about intermediate nodes between
them. The role of being the sender or the receiver in the communication depends
entirely on the flow of the messages. To illustrate this idea, we refer to a mobile
user as a sender and his communication partner as a receiver when a message is sent
from the mobile host to its partner. The roles are in opposite direction otherwise.
Without losing generality, our model is based on a direction that the mobile user
is the receiving side of the communication. Hence, there is a sender (Sam) that sends
his messages to a receiver (Rebecca). Rebecca is allowed to move where her endto-end communication with Sam seemingly continues as if she stays in her current
location. In an IP-based mobility system, Sam represents an IP-based application
server and Rebecca represents a mobile device such as a laptop that a mobile user
carries.
We note that the sender Sam can be a mobile server, that is the server is not
necessarily a fixed host and an extension from a fixed server to a mobile application
server is quite straightforward. Hence, the server is referred to in our scenario as a
fixed host.
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Entities

In the Entity Relationship Model (ER), entities and attributes are defined as follows.
Entities are “the principal data objects about which information is to be collected; they usually denote a person, place, thing, or event of informational interest” [Teo99].
Attributes are “characteristics of entities that provide descriptive detail about
them. In computing, an attribute is a specification that defines a property of an
object, element, or file” [Teo99].
In this model, we refer to an entity as a host or a mobile host or a mobility agent
which participates in our mobility protocol where each host location is referred to
as its attribute (since it provides location detail about the host).
Hence, there are three entities involved in the mobility system’s communication
model: Sam - the sender (S), Rebecca - the mobile receiver (R) and the point of
attachment node (POAT), as shown in Figure 5.2. The POAT is a node that is
responsible to route the communication to the mobile node at its current location.
In particular, it deals with the location of the mobile device.

5.1.3

Processes

When the mobile device enters any network, it is first assigned with an identity
known by that network i.e., an IP address. It also needs to obtain its new network
location so that it can update its home POAT1 . The location update process is
referred to as the registration process in Mobile IP. In other mobility systems such
as the GSM network, this process is known as the attachment procedure. After the
location update process has been accomplished, the sender and the receiver can
exchange packets/messages with each other. This process is referred to as the data
exchange.
We should stress that the mobile user’s location is not an entity in the system,
rather it is merely the mobile user’s attribute.
1

A home POAT (POATHome in short) is a POAT at the mobile node’s original network, namely
a home network.
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Figure 5.2: An illustration of the mobility model

5.1.4

Mobility Definition

Definition 5.1 Mobility: A mobility system is a system that allows Rebecca, the
receiver (R), to move to a different location while her communication with Sam, the
sender (S), can be maintained seamlessly as if she has stayed in her current location.
• Setup: A protocol between R and the system entity that is responsible to
assign an identifier to R (idR ). This identifier also implies her home location
(idR , LHR )2 .
• Attach: A location registration protocol between R and her POAT. At the
end of the protocol, POAT learns R’s current location (LCR ), at time T and
stores this information (idR , LCR , T ) in its database D. R’s current location
is secret information known only by R and the POAT. Note that if R has not
moved then LCR = LHR 3 .
• Send: An algorithm that comprises of four parameters, a sender (S ), a receiver
(R), a packet (P ) and a location (L). Send(S, R, P, L) algorithm denotes a
sender (S ) sending a packet (P ) to a receiver (R) at location L. Let L be ∅ to
2
3

In an IP network, idR and LHR are always the same value which is an IP address.
In an IP network, they are also the same value idR .
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denote a case when the sender sends a packet to the receiver’s setup location
(the location of the receiver at her home network).
– Send(S, R, P, ∅): An algorithm that is run by Sam aims at sending a
packet to Rebecca at her home location.
– If Rebecca is away, her POAT intercepts the packets destined to Rebecca.
Then, it splits the communication into two end-to-end communications
and run two Send algorithms in consecutive order.
∗ Send(S, POAT, P, ∅): The first Send algorithm, represents a communication from Sam to R’s POAT which corresponds to the
Send(S, R, P, ∅).
∗ Send(POAT, R, P̂, LCR ): Then, the POAT looks up its database D
to obtain Rebecca’s current location (LCR ). Next, it generates a new
packet P̂ that is “derived” from P 4 . Finally, it runs the second Send
algorithm that represents a communication from POAT to Rebecca
at her current location LCR .

5.2

Anonymous Communication System Model

We have observed that a system that provides location privacy requires quite similar
properties to a system that provides anonymous communication. Therefore, in this
section we will provide a formal approach in defining an anonymous communication
system.
The ultimate goal of anonymous communication systems is to ensure that an
adversary gains no information about the communication that is happening in the
communication channel [Jon04]. However, this system is unrealistic in a public
network such as in the Internet. It is therefore considered adequate if the system
satisfies some properties of the anonymous communication system, that include the
inability of the adversary to identify the sender or the receiver. We will describe
this possibility formally in the following paragraph.
Model of the Anonymous Communication Channel. We assume that there is a single
host that sends its message via a public untrusted network, and the recipient is
4

In practice, P̂ contains the information copied from P together with some additional routing
information, such as P’s header. For example, when encapsulation is used in Mobile IP tunneling
mode, P represents the inner IP packet’s payload and P̂ represents the outer IP packet’s payload.
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sitting at the other end of the network. In this scenario, we consider there exists an
observer (or an “adversary”) who can observe the communication in the network.
The main intention of the sender is to ensure that his identity is not revealed to the
observer (privacy of the sender). Additionally, the main intention of the receiver
is also to ensure that her identity will not be disclosed (privacy of the receiver).
From the observer’s point of view, his task is considered to be “successful”, if he
can observe the communication channel and figure out who the sender and/or the
receiver is. If the observer cannot be successful in this particular task, then we say
that the network ensures anonymity in the system.
Based on this setting, we follow Pfitzmann and Kuhntopp’s definitions in [PK01]
and further divide the notion of anonymity into three different properties, namely
i) sender anonymity, ii) receiver anonymity, and iii) unlinkability. A system that
satisfies these three properties is said to be an anonymous system [RR98]. These
properties are elaborated below.
Sender Anonymity. This property ensures that the observer (or the adversary) cannot identify who the sender is, given a stream of packets travelling through the
communication channel. Intuitively, the task of the adversary is to guess who the
sender is, given a transcript that could be produced by two different senders. Formally, this property is defined using the following interaction between an adversary
A and a challenger C. The adversary is given an access to the PacketReqSA oracle
that behaves as follows: given a message m, a particular sender S and a receiver R,
the oracle will return a correct transcript Ω that represents a transcript of a message
m that is sent by the sender to the receiver.
Sender Anonymity Interaction: Let C be the challenger and A be the adversary
who would like to break the sender anonymity.
1. Initialisation. Let k ∈ N be the security parameter. C is invoked with all the
condition and information known in the communication channel. The information is provided to C by A. In particular, the set of senders {S1 , S2 , · · · , S` } ∈ S
is provided to C together with a receiver R.
2. Attacking Phase.
(a) A can make the PacketReqSA queries as defined as follows.
• PacketReqSA . A can provide a message mi and select a sender Sj ∈ S
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and query PacketReqSA oracle to obtain a transcript Ω(mi , Sj , R) that
represents a message mi sent by Sj to R.
These queries can be invoked for at most qP RS times.
(b) A outputs (S0 , S1 ) and a target message m∗ ∈
/ M where M is a set of
messages that have been queried before. In return, C outputs a transcript
Ω(m∗ , Sk , R) where k is obtained from a coin toss.
(c) A can execute PacketReqSA queries for any message mj 6= m∗ for any
sender in S.
3. Output Phase. A outputs his guess k, where Sk is the sender who produces
Ω(m∗ , Sk , R).
The success probability of the adversary in attacking the sender anonymity is defined
by SuccPARS =

1
2

+ .

Definition 5.2 A system is said to provide sender anonymity if there is no polynomial time algorithm A that has a non-negligible probability in the Interaction
Sender Anonymity defined above.
Receiver Anonymity. This property ensures that the observer (or the adversary)
cannot identify who the receiver is, given a stream of packets traveling through the
communication channel. Intuitively, the task of the adversary is to correctly guess
whom the sender has sent her message to, given two possible receivers. Formally,
this property is defined using the following interaction between an adversary A and
a challenger C. The adversary is given an access to the oracle PacketReqRA that
accepts a message m, a particular receiver R and a sender S, to output the correct
transcript Ω that represents a transcript of a message m that is sent by the sender
to the receiver. The formal definition follows.
Receiver Anonymity Interaction: Let C be the challenger and A be the adversary who would like to break the receiver anonymity.
1. Initialisation. Let k ∈ N be the security parameter. C is invoked with all the
condition and information known in the communication channel. The information is provided to C by A. In particular, the set of receivers {R1 , R2 , · · · , R` } ∈
R is provided to A together with a sender S.
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2. Attacking Phase.
(a) A can make the PacketReqRA queries as defined as follows.
• PacketReqRA . A can provide a message mi and select a receiver
Rj ∈ R and query the PacketReqRA oracle to obtain a transcript
Ω(mi , S, Rj ) that represents a message mi sent by S to Rj .
These queries can be invoked for at most qP RR times.
(b) A outputs (R0 , R1 ) and a target message m∗ 6∈ M where M is a set of
messages that have been queried before. In return, C outputs a transcript
Ω(m∗ , S, Rk ) where k is obtained from a coin toss.
(c) A can execute PacketReqRA queries for any message mj 6= m∗ for any
receiver in R.
3. Output Phase. A outputs his guess k, where Rk is the receiver whom receives
Ω(m∗ , S, Rk ) sent by S in this transcript.
The success probability of the adversary in attacking the receiver anonymity is
defined by SuccPARR =

1
2

+ .

Definition 5.3 A system is said to provide receiver anonymity if there is no polynomial time algorithm A that has a non-negligible probability in the Interaction
Receiver Anonymity defined above.
Unlinkability. This property ensures that the observer (or the adversary) cannot
link two different transcripts whether they are coming from the same sender or not.
Intuitively, the task of the adversary is to guess whether two transcripts are related to
each other (i.e., they come from the same sender, or the same receiver). Formally,
this property is defined using the following interaction between an adversary A
and a challenger C. We note that in our definition, we assume that there exists a
single receiver R. However, without losing generality, our definition can be trivially
modified to include multiple receivers, but this setting has been captured by our
model. The adversary is given an access to the oracle PacketReqUL that accepts a
message m, a sender S and a receiver R, to output a transcript Ω representing a
transcript of a message m that is sent by the sender to the receiver.
Unlinkability Interaction: Let C be the challenger and A be the adversary who
would like to break the unlinkability anonymity.
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1. Initialisation. Let k ∈ N be the security parameter. C is invoked with all the
condition and information known in the communication channel. The information is provided to C by A. In particular, the set of senders {S1 , S2 , · · · , S` } ∈ S
is provided to A together with a receiver R.
2. Attacking Phase.
(a) A can make the PacketReqUL queries as defined as follows.
• PacketReqUL . A can provide a message mi and select a sender Sj ∈ S
and query the PacketReqUL oracle to obtain a transcript Ω(mi , Sj , R)
that represents a message mi sent by Sj to R.
These queries can be invoked for at most qP RS times.
(b) C outputs Sj , a transcript Ω1 (m∗1 , Sj , R), Ω2 (m∗2 , Sk , R), and two target
messages m∗1 , m∗2 6∈ M, m∗1 6= m∗2 where M is a set of messages that have
been queried before. In this output, j = k if the output of the coin toss
is 1, and j 6= k otherwise.
(c) A can execute PacketReqUL queries for any message mj 6= {m∗1 , m∗2 } for
any sender in S.
3. Output Phase. A outputs his guess 0/1 to indicate whether Ω1 and Ω2 have
been produced by the same sender Sj or not.
The success probability of the adversary in attacking the unlinkability is defined by
SuccUALS =

1
2

+ .

Definition 5.4 A system is said to provide unlinkability if there is no polynomial
time algorithm A that has a non-negligible probability in the Unlinkability Interaction defined above.
Definition 5.5 A communication channel is said to be anonymous if it satisfies
sender anonymity, receiver anonymity and unlinkability.

5.3

Location Privacy

Location Privacy (LP) is an add-on feature to the mobility system. This does
not imply that there is no necessity concerning the LP issue in a fixed network.
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However, location revelation in a fixed network does not provide more information
to an adversary5 .
When the network becomes mobile, the situation is more sophisticated, since
there are new processes involved. For instance, a process that describes how Rebecca’s mobile device acquires her new location and a process that describes how the
device reports Rebecca’s new location to her communication partners and a process
to route packets to a mobile host when it is away are needed. There are also new
issues to be considered. For example, when the mobility protocol is not carefully
designed, the location movement of the mobile host can be traced by the network
administrator, its communication partners or even by eavesdroppers so that these
people can use the location information to invade user privacy.
Not only does location information become more sensitive, these additional
processes and issues also result in a bigger set of adversaries. To illustrate this
idea, the introduction of a point-of-attachment node (POAT) means that there is
always another node (apart from Rebecca’s device itself) knowing where she is. An
observer who can wiretap the communication is able to know the location of the
mobile host if its location information is not carefully protected when being exchanged, an observer who can watch the incoming and outgoing packets from the
POAT can link them together and eventually obtain the mobile host’s location, and
when communication partners are allowed to directly connect with the mobile host,
the location information is also disclosed to them.
Therefore, we evaluate the location privacy of a mobility system in two stages,
namely by firstly distinguishing different types of adversary, and then, we proceed
with the attack goals.
We note that a location in our scenario is a logical location which can be acquired
from the IP address or the user’s identifier and it is not the exact physical location
e.g., with longitude or latitude.

5.3.1

Adversaries

Adversaries are all nodes that reside in the communication path between Rebecca
and her communication partner (Sam), including Sam himself, and everyone besides
Rebecca who knows Rebecca’s identity, as illustrated in Figure 5.3.
5

Especially, in typical IP network because IP address is used as both identifier and locator.
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Figure 5.3: An illustration of the mobility model with Location Privacy adversaries

5.3.2

Aims and Adversarial Models

The ultimate goal to provide location privacy in an end-to-end communication between Rebecca and Sam is that Rebecca’s location should not be revealed to anybody other than herself. A less secure but more practical system is a system that
allows only legitimate entities, such as POAT, to have information about Rebecca’s
location. Based on these possibilities, we classify location privacy according to the
adversary’s capabilities as follows:
• Generic Location Privacy: Rebecca’s location is transparent to the other
end hosts. An adversary in this system is only allowed to send a packet to
Rebecca, but without knowing how the packet traverses in the network.
• Semantic Location Privacy: Rebecca’s location is transparent to other
end hosts and the observers. The observer, who can observe the whole packet
exchange on the communication path between Sam and Rebecca, will not be
able to deduce the communication path between Sam and Rebecca at her
current location. It implies that an adversary is allowed to send a packet to
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Rebecca. The adversary also can observe how packets traverse in and out of
the POAT, however, he cannot find the relationship between them (“link”)
and obtain the correct path to conclude where Rebecca is.
• Total location Privacy: Only Rebecca knows where she is. Other nodes
in the network including Rebecca’s POAT do not have any knowledge about
Rebecca’s location. However, when the communication is required, packets
can always reach Rebecca. An adversary in this system is allowed to send a
packet to Rebecca. He is also allowed to see and “link” packets that traverse
in and out Rebecca’s POAT. Furthermore, he can access the POAT’s database.
An example of this adversary is the malicious POAT.

5.4

Security Games

According to the aims above, we divide the attacks into three security games as
follows:
• Game 1 (G1 ): Location Privacy against the corresponding node.
• Game 2 (G2 ): Location Privacy against the observer.
• Game 3 (G3 ): Location Privacy against the POAT node.
Definition 5.6 A system is said to provide Generic Location Privacy if the adversary cannot win G1 with the advantage 1 , where 1 is negligible.
Definition 5.7 A system is said to provide Semantic Location Privacy if the adversary cannot win G1 and G2 with the advantage 1 + 2 , where 1 and 2 are negligible.
Definition 5.8 A system is said to provide Total Location Privacy if the adversary
cannot win G1 ,G2 and G3 with the advantage 1 + 2 + 3 , where 1 and 2 and 3 are
negligible.

5.4.1

Interactions and Oracles

According to the algorithms used in the mobility system, to provide location privacy,
the following interactions are required.
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• PacketReqLP : This interaction accepts four default parameters: a sender S, a
receiver R, a packet P and the receiver location L. In this interaction, S sends
the packet P to R located in L. We allow PacketReqLP to accept an optional
parameter (O). This optional parameter varies depending on the scenario.
We denote the transcript produced by the interaction by
ΩPacketReqLP ← PacketReqLP (S, R, P, L[, O])
• AttachLocReq: This interaction accepts three parameters: a mobile user identifier idU , a location L and an auxiliary information time T . In this interaction,
the point-of-attachment node performs an attach procedure of the mobile host
idU and its location L during time T .
We denote the transcript produced by the interaction by
ΩAttachLocReq ← AttachLocReq(T, idU , L)
Based on the above interactions, we define the two oracles required. The purpose
of the oracles is to “help” the adversary during the learning stage in the attack.
LP

The oracles are defined as OPacketReq

and OAttachLocReq , to denote PacketReqLP and

AttachLocReq oracles, respectively.

5.4.2

G1 : Generic Location Privacy - Location Privacy against
the corresponding node

G1 : Scenario
This game applies to an adversary that only has knowledge of the mobile user’s
identity. The only location that it can acquire from the identity is the user’s home
network location. However, it does not know whether the user is at her home network
or not.
The adversary can be any node in the network that knows the mobile device’s
identity, namely the mobile device’s IP address in an IP-based network. Potential
adversaries are illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Intuitively, the notion of Generic Location Privacy is defined as follows. Given a
transcript of a packet sent from Sam (S) to Rebecca (R) in two possible locations
of Rebecca (L0 , L1 ), the task of the adversary in this game is to correctly guess
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Figure 5.4: G1 Scenario

where the location of Rebecca is. Formally, we will define location privacy using the
following interaction between an adversary A and a challenger C. The adversary
is given an access to the PacketReqLP oracle, that is, given a packet P , a receiver’s
location L and a pair of sender-receiver (S, R), the oracle is to output the correct
transcript of the communication, Ω, that represents a packet P sent by the sender
to the receiver in the location L. That is, the adversary is given the liberty to simulate the network himself with his own choice of messages. The oracle PacketReqLP
represents the capability of the adversary to request a message from a sender of his
choice to be sent to a receiver that located in L.
Location Privacy Interaction: Let C be the challenger and A be the adversary
who would like to break the location privacy.
1. Initialisation. Let k ∈ N be the security parameter. C is invoked with all the
condition and information known in the communication channel. The information is provided to C by A. In particular, the pair of sender S and receiver R is
provided to C together with the set of possible locations {L0 , L1 , L2 , · · · , L` } ∈
L which represent R’s location and the packets {P0 , P1 , P2 , · · · , Pp } ∈ P. Note
that L is R’s attribute and Pi 6= Pj if i 6= j.
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2. Attacking Phase.
(a) A can make the PacketReqLP queries as defined as follows.
• PacketReqLP . A can provide a packet Pi and select a location Li and
query the PacketReqLP oracle to obtain a transcript Ω(Pi , S, R, Li )
to denote a packet Pi sent by S to R, which is currently located at
Li .
These queries can be invoked for at most qP RL times.
(b) A outputs two distinct locations (L0 , L1 ) and a target message P ∗ ∈
/ P
where P is a set of packets that have been queried before. In return,
C outputs a transcript Ω∗ (P ∗ , S, R, Lk ) where k is obtained from a coin
toss.
(c) A can execute PacketReqLP queries for any message Pj 6= P ∗ for any
location in L.
3. Output Phase. A outputs his guess k, where Lk is the location of the receiver
who produces Ω∗ (P ∗ , S, R, Lk ).
The success probability of the adversary in attacking location privacy is defined
by SuccPARL =

1
2

+ 1 .

Experiment
Oracles
LP

From the definition above, there is merely one oracle involved, that is OPacketReq
denote PacketReq

LP

oracle.

Game Definition
The game is defined as follows.
Let {P0 , P1 , P2 , · · · , Pp } ∈ P denotes packets sent in the network and
{L0 , L1 , L2 , · · · , L` } ∈ L denotes the location of R.

Setup → {S, R, P, L}

to
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Figure 5.5: G2 Scenario

(L0 , L1 ) ← AOPacketReqLP (S,R,Pi ,Li ) (S, R, P, L)
Ω∗ ← PacketReqLP (S, R, P ∗ , Lk ); k = {0, 1}
∗

Lk ← AOPacketReqLP (S,R,Pi ,Li ;∀Pi 6=P ) (S, R, P, L, Ω∗ )
Success of A = Lk is the location of R in Ω∗

5.4.3

G2 : Location Privacy against the passive adversaries

G2 : Scenario
This game applies to an adversary who can wiretap the communication and see the
contents of the packets that traverse in and out of the POAT. This adversary can
link the incoming and the outgoing packets to acquire the location of the mobile
node. He knows that the mobile node is away, however he does not know where the
node is. Figure 5.5 illustrates this type of adversary.
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G2 : Model
Given two possible input locations of the receiver to the POAT, an output of a packet
sent from a sender to the POAT, a transcript that was sent from the POAT to the
receiver, the task of the adversary in this game is to correctly guess which location
has been selected. Formally, we will define location privacy using the following
interaction between an adversary A and a challenger C. The adversary is given
access to the PacketReqLP oracle.
Firstly, given a packet P, a sender Sam (S), the POAT, the POAT’s location, and
Rebecca - a receiver, the oracle PacketReqLP is to output the correct transcript of the
communication, Ω1 , that represents the capability of the observer (or the adversary)
to request a packet P sent by S to R via the POAT, the POAT also outputs a packet
Pj .
Secondly, given a packet Pj (an output of the first transcript), the POAT, Rebecca
(R), and her location L, the oracle PacketReqLP is to output the correct transcript
of the communication, Ω2 , that represents a packet Ph sent by the POAT to R at
the location L. The oracle PacketReqLP represents the capability of the observer
(or the adversary) to request a packet from a sender to the receiver at the receiver
location.
Note that in this model the adversary can listen to the communication in the
channel. The formal definition is as follows.
1. Initialisation. Let k ∈ N be the security parameter. C is invoked with all
the condition and information known in the communication channel. The
information is provided to C by A. In particular, the sender S, the set
of packets {P0 , P1 , P2 , · · · , Pp } ∈ P , a point-of-attachment POAT and the
receiver R are provided to A together with a set of the receiver’s location
{L0 , L1 , L2 , · · · , L` } ∈ L.
2. Attacking Phase.
(a) A can make two consecutive types of PacketReqLP queries as defined as
follows.
• Firstly, A can provide a packet Pi , a sender S, a POAT as a connection’s receiver, ∅ as the POAT’s location, and a receiver R. He then
queries the PacketReqLP oracle to obtain a transcript -
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Ω1 (S, POAT, Pi , ∅, R) that represents a packet Pi sent by S to R via
POAT and output Pj that represents a transformation of packet Pi .
• Secondly, A can provide a packet Pj (where Pj is an output of the
first transcript), a POAT as a sender, R as a receiver and L as the
receiver’s location and query the PacketReq oracle to obtain a transcript Ω2 (POAT, R, Pj , Li ) that represents a packet Pj sent by POAT
to R at R’s location Li and an output Pˆh that represents a transformation of packet Pj .
These two type of queries can be invoked together for at most qP RL times.
(b) A outputs two distinct locations (L0 , L1 ). In return, C first outputs a
transcript Ω∗1 (S, POAT, P ∗ , ∅, R) and a packet Pj ∗ . Then, C outputs a
transcript Ω∗2 (POAT, R, Pj ∗ , L∗ ).
(c) A can execute the two types of PacketReqLP queries for any message
Pi 6= P ∗ .
3. Output Phase. A outputs his guess Lk , where Lk is the location of the receiver
L∗ in Ω∗2 (POAT, R, Pj ∗ , L∗ ) and Pj∗ is an output of Ω∗1 .
The success probability of the adversary in attacking location privacy against
the observer is defined by SuccPARL =

1
2

+ 2 .

Experiment
Oracles
From the above intuitive definition, there is one oracle involved. That is
LP

OPacketReq

to denote PacketReqLP .

Game Definition
The game is defined as follows.
Let {P0 , P1 , P2 , · · · , Pp } ∈ P denotes packets sent in the network and
{L0 , L1 , L2 , · · · , L` } ∈ L denotes the location of R.
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Setup → {S, R, POAT, P, L}
(L0 , L1 ) ← AOPacketReqLP (S,POAT,Pi ,∅,R),OPacketReqLP (POAT,R,Pj ,Li ) (S, R, POAT, P, L)
(Ω1 ∗ , Pj ∗ ) ← PacketReqLP (S, POAT, P ∗ , ∅, R)
(Ω2 ∗ ) ← PacketReqLP (POAT, R, Pj ∗ , L∗ ) ; where L∗ = {L0 , L1 }
L∗ ← AOPacketReqLP (S,POAT,Pi ;∀Pi 6=P

∗ ,∅,R),O
(POAT,R,Pj ,Li )
PacketReqLP

(S, R, POAT, P, L, Pj ∗ , Ω∗2 )

Success of A = L∗ is the location of R in Ω2 ∗

5.4.4

G3 : Location Privacy against the POAT node

G3 : Scenario
Unlike the previous two games that involve adversaries during the communication
between a sender and a receiver (data packet exchanged), an adversary in this game
is a malicious POAT, which is responsible for the location of the mobile user (device).
Figure 5.6 illustrates this type of adversary. We note that the malicious POAT in
this scenario still behaves (routes the packet) correctly. In other words, it is an
honest-but-curious type of malicious behavior.
Given a transcript of a mobile user identifier idR , an auxiliary information (time
T ), and two possible locations, the task of the adversary in this game is to correctly
guess where the location of the mobile user is in this time period. Formally, we will
define location privacy using the following interaction between an adversary A and
a challenger C. The adversary is given access to the AttachLocReq oracle, that is,
given a mobile user id idR , her location L and an auxiliary information a period
of time T , the oracle is to output the correct transcript of the attach procedure,
Ω, that represents a mobile user, whose identifier is idR that located in location L
during the auxiliary information time T . The oracle AttachLocReq represents the
capability of the adversary to request an attach procedure of the mobile user that
is located in L during time T . In this game the adversary is an active adversary.
The formal definition is as follows.
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Figure 5.6: G3 Scenario

Location Privacy Interaction: Let C be the challenger and A be the adversary
who would like to break the location privacy.
1. Initialisation. Let k ∈ N be the security parameter. C is invoked with all the
condition and information known in the location system. The information is
provided to C by A. In particular, the mobile user identifier idR is provided to
C, together with all possible locations in the network {L0 , L1 , L2 , · · · , L` } ∈ L
and the auxiliary information, that is time {T0 , T1 , T2 , · · · , Tt } ∈ T , which
represents a mobile user’s location during a particular time period (note that
L is the mobile user’s attribute).
2. Attacking Phase.
(a) A can make the AttachLocReq queries as defined as follows.
• AttachLocReq A can provide a time Ti and select a location Li and
query the AttachLocReq oracle to obtain a transcript Ω(Ti , idR , Li ) to
denote at time Ti , the mobile user identifier idR is located at Li .
These queries can be invoked for at most qP RL times.
(b) A outputs two distinct locations (L0 , L1 ) and a target time T ∗ ∈
/ T where
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T is a set of times that have been queried before. In return, C outputs a
transcript Ω∗ (T ∗ , idR , Lk ) where k is obtained from a coin toss.
(c) A can execute AttachLocReq queries for any time Tj 6= T ∗ for any location
in L.
3. Output Phase. A outputs his guess k, where Lk is the location of the receiver
who produces Ω∗ (T ∗ , idR , Lk ).
The success probability of the adversary in attacking location privacy against
the POAT is defined by SuccPARL =

1
2

+ 3 .

Experiment
Oracles
From the above intuitive definition, there is merely one oracle involved, that is
OAttachLocReq to denote the AttachLocReq oracle.
Game Definition
The game is defined as follows.
Let {L0 , L1 , L2 , · · · , L` } ∈ L denote a set of locations of idR and
{T0 , T1 , T2 , · · · , Tt } ∈ T denote a set of period of time in the system.

Setup → {idR , L, T }
(L0 , L1 ) ← AOAttachLocReq (idR ,Li ,Ti ) (idR , L, T )
Ω∗ ← AttachLocReq(idR , L∗ , T ∗ ); where L∗ = {L0 , L1 }
∗

L∗ ← AOAttachLocReq (idR ,Li ,Ti ;∀Ti 6=T ) (idR , L, T ∗ , Ω∗ )
Success of A = L∗ is the location of idR in Ω∗
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Figure 5.7: An illustration of the problem with using one POAT for location information

5.5

A New Framework for LP System with An
Overlay POATs Architecture

In an IP-based network, the communication partner always knows whose IP address
it is communicating with. Since an IP address is used as both an identifier and a
locator, this address also implies the location of the host/device. When the network becomes mobile, location of the receiver becomes important as without it the
communication cannot be continued - i.e., the entity such as POAT is introduced to
perform as a location proxy when the mobile node is away. Most of the systems rely
on the POAT in the mobile device’s home network for this task. This implies that
the POAT has knowledge of the mobile node’s location i.e., the location information
is stored in the database. As shown in Figure 5.7, the problem is that when this
POAT is malicious, the location information is certainly disclosed. Hence, a better
system which does not rely on the only single POAT is needed for total location
privacy.
Returning to the initial requirement of the system, the aim of the communication
indeed is that messages/packets from a sender arrive at a receiver according to what
the sender wants to send. It does not require that the sender or any other nodes
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Figure 5.8: Multiple POATs scenario

Figure 5.9: A comparison between one POAT and multiple POATs architectures
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must know the location of the receiver (the receiver’s current IP address in an IPbased system) in order to achieve this task. Hence, it is not required that the POAT
must know the exact location of the receiver. It simply requires that the POAT can
assist the communication to achieve its goal above.
Therefore, rather than trusting merely on one POAT at which the real mobile
device’s location is stored, one of the solutions is to use multiple POATs as in Figure 5.8 so that a communication between the sender and the receiver can be perform
only when all POATs are participated in the communication path. Each POAT only
knows or stores its predecessor and its successor nodes and is responsible to route a
packet through these two nodes. Nonetheless, it does not know whether its predecessor is the real sender of the communication or whether or not the successor node
is the end host of the communication which represents the current location of the
receiver. Consequently, one POAT alone cannot derive the location information.
Hence, rather than attacking the database of the mobile node’s home POAT
POATHome to retrieve the location (as in a single POAT system) to win G3 , adversaries
in this location privacy system need to do more work to gain the equivalent result,
as shown in Figure 5.9. That is, to access all POATs’ databases in order to combine
them for the entire path. When the path is disclosed, the path’s destination can be
used to find the receiver’s location.
The security of this system, namely the location privacy, relies on the fact that
at least one POAT is honest6 . When at least one of the POATs does not share its
information with other POATs on the path, the adversary cannot have the entire
path. This implies that the location of the mobile node is preserved. In other words,
the collusion of all POATs on the path must not be allowed. The worst case scenario
is that there is only one honest POAT. The honest POAT (POATGood ) can be located
anywhere in the path. It can be the first POAT, or one of the middle POATs, or
the last POAT. In the worst case scenario, illustrated in Figure 5.10, wherever the
honest POAT (POATGood ) is, the communication path is always divided into two
parts: one from the sender to the POATGood and one from the POATGood to the
(mobile) receiver.
As long as the (POATGood ) keeps its information secret, the system is still secure.
Adversaries do not know whether or not the two subpaths belong to the same entire
path.
6

It is honest in the honest-but-curious model.
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Figure 5.10: An honest POAT at different poisitions in the path

5.5.1

Similarity to the Anonymous Communication System

The overlay architecture, that is, each node knows only its predecessor and its
successor but does not know whether or not they are the real sender and the real
receiver, is very similar to the architecture of an anonymous communication system
which is based on Chaum’s Mix network [Cha81] design. More specifically, systems
with low-latency networks such as Tor [DMS04].
This is because each mobile host can have two IP addresses: one for identity and
one for location. The anonymous communication system aims to protect either the
sender’s identity or the receiver’s identity or both identities, and the communication
between the sender and the receiver i.e., the communication between the two identities. In particular, they are, the sender’s IP address, the receiver’s IP address and
the communication between the hosts that owns these two IP addresses (relationship unlinkability)7 . Hence, the IP-based anonymous communication system mainly
aims to protect the IP address and the relationship between the two IP addresses.
Similarly, the location privacy system aims to protect the location of the mobile
7

As discussed in [PK01], it is defined as an untraceability of who is communicating with whom
or in other words the unlinkability between the sender and the recipient.
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Figure 5.11: The use of an anonymous communication system as the multiple
POATs’ building block

host and the overlay architecture is proposed to hide the relationship between the
mobile host’s identity and the mobile host’s location. In particular, the communication between the mobile host’s home address and the location of the mobile
host (that can be obtained from the away-mobile host’s IP address). Indeed, the
relationship between the mobile host’s identity and the mobile host’s location is the
relationship between the mobile host’s home IP-address and the mobile host’s IP
address at its visiting network, which can be found through the communication path
between the POATHome and the mobile host. Therefore, the LP system’s aim is also
to protect the IP address (but in the context of the mobile host’s location) and the
relationship between these two IP addresses.
As a result, the anonymous communication system that is equipped with sender
anonymity, receiver anonymity, and unlinkability properties can be used as a building
block of our overlay POATs. Considering the mobile host is a receiver of the communication, the anonymous communication’s sender’s IP address is the POATHome ’s
IP address, and the receiver’s IP address is the IP address that represents the mobile receiver’s location i.e., the IP address of the mobile receiver assigned from the
foreign network. The additional information from a typical anonymous communication system is that the POATHome has knowledge of which communication belongs
to which mobile receiver. In order words, it acts as a sender of the forwarding communications to all mobile nodes that are away from home. Figure 5.11 illustrates
this architecture.
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Note that the communication path is established during the registration process.
The mobile host has to notify its current location to its POATHome . Hence, during
this process the sender of communication is the mobile host and the receiver is the
POATHome . However, in data exchange mode, we consider the mobile host in the
opposite direction.
Theorem 5.1 Our multiple POATs framework provides total location privacy.
Proof of Theorem 5.1 (sketch). Our framework provides total location privacy when
the three following properties are given: location privacy against the corresponding
node, location privacy against the observers, and location privacy against malicious
POATs.
Location privacy against the corresponding node. Consider the following game between A and C. The purpose of C is to break the receiver anonymity of the anonymous communication system by using A’s capabilities to break location privacy
interaction against the corresponding node in G1 . In this setting, C provides all the
required system parameters to A and a set of locations {L1 , L2 , · · · , Ln } ∈ L. The
attacking phase can be done by A by querying PacketReqLP as defined in G1 for any
particular location Lj ∈ L for a particular packet Pj ∈ P. To answer this query, C
can issue PacketReqLP query. The transcript will be provided to A and hence, the
simulation runs completely. Finally, A outputs two locations L0 , L1 of his choice
and a target packet P ∗ that has not been queried before and C provides a transcript
Ωi for a coin toss i ∈ {0, 1}. Eventually, A can output the choice of i that C selected.
Note that this output means that A can break G1 . That is, A can successfully obtain the location of R - the IP address that R uses to represent its location. Note
that in an IP based network, in particular the mobile network, the IP address can
be used for two purposes: for a host’s identification and for a host’s logical location.
In our G1 scenario, the aim is to hide the mobile receiver’s IP address that is used
for location proposes. However, as the anonymous communication system is used
as the building block of the new framework, breaking G1 also enables C to use the
information obtained from A to break the anonymous system when the target IP
address is used for identification, that is receiver anonymity. Hence, this contradicts
the receiver anonymity assumption of the underlying anonymous system.
Location privacy against the observers. In the following attack, the purpose of C
is to break the unlinkability of the anonymous communication system by using A’s
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capability to break G2 . In this setting, A is being simulated by C. C provides all
the required system parameters to A and a set of location {L1 , L2 , · · · , Ln } ∈ L.
The attacking phase can be done by A by querying C two consecutive types of
PacketReqLP as defined in G2 for any particular location Lj ∈ L for a particular
packet Pj ∈ P. To answer these queries, C can issue PacketReqLP queries. The
transcripts will be provided to A and hence, the simulation runs completely. Finally, A outputs two locations L0 , L1 of his choice and a target packet P ∗ that has
not been queried before and C provides a PacketReqLP transcript Li for a coin toss
i ∈ {0, 1}. Then, A can output the choice of i that C selected. Note that this
output means that A has successfully broken G2 . Hence, A has successfully broken
the location privacy provided in G2 . Using this information, C can obtain the entire
communication path. This means that C has successfully broken the unlinkability
property of the underlining anonymous communication system. However, this contradicts the unlinkability assumption in the anonymous communication system. In
case encryption is also deployed between P and P̂, A also has to successfully break
this encryption scheme.
Location privacy against the malicious POATs. In the following attack, C’s intention
is to break the unlinkability of the anonymous communication system by using A’s
capability to break G3 . In this attack A, is being simulated by C. Firstly, C provides
all the required system parameters to A, a set of location {L1 , L2 , · · · , Ln } ∈ L
and the auxiliary information, that is time {T0 , T1 , T2 , · · · , Tt } ∈ T . The attacking
phase can be done by A by querying C for any particular location Lj ∈ L at a
particular time Tj ∈ T . To answer this query, C can issue the AttachLocReq query.
The transcript will be provided to A, hence, the simulation runs completely. Finally,
A outputs two locations L0 , L1 of his choice and a target time T ∗ that has not been
queried before and C provides a transcript Ωi for a coin toss i ∈ {0, 1}. Then, A can
output the correct choice of i. Note that this output means that A has successfully
broken G3 . Hence, A has successfully broken the location privacy provided in G3 .
Using this information, C can first obtains each hop in the entire communication
path that passes through the malicious POATs. C, then, can analyse the incoming
OUT
(POATGood IN
) paths at the POATGood up to the point
j ) and outgoing (POATGood k

where the two of them that belong to the same communication are found. This
means that C has successfully broken the unlinkability between POATGood , where
POATGood is honest. Hence, this contradicts the unlinkability assumption placed in
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Figure 5.12: An illustration of the mobility model with route optimisation

POATGood . That is, POATGood is an honest-but-curious POAT.

5.6

Route Optimisation

To optimise the performance of the communications, some mobility systems allow
Rebecca to have a direct connection with Sam when she is away. In Mobile IP,
this type of system is known as route optimisation. The scenario is illustrated in
Figure 5.12. In this scenario, Rebecca has to notify Sam her current location when
she has moved. Hence, Rebecca also runs an Attach algorithm with Sam after she
invokes it with POAT. Sam keeps Rebecca’s current location in his database. When
Sam wants to communicate with Rebecca, he obtains Rebecca location from his
database. Then, he sends his messages to Rebecca at her current location directly
without passing through POAT as the normal scenario by running the Send algorithm
by himself. This time he is able to specify the exact location of Rebecca.
• Attach: A location registration protocol between Rebecca (R) and Sam (S).
By the end of the protocol, Sam learns Rebecca’s current location (LCR ), at
time T and stores this information (idR , LCR , T ) in its database DS .
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• Send: When Sam wants to send a packet to Rebecca, he looks up his database
DS to find Rebecca’s location. Then, he runs Send algorithm with the following
parameter Send(S, R, P̄, LCR ), where P̄ denotes a packet that is copied from P
including some additional information regarding a route optimisation scenario
on a communication from S to R.

5.6.1

Location Privacy with Route Optimisation

Systems with route optimisation do not provide any level of location privacy, since
the mobile node’s communication partners always have knowledge of its whereabouts. That is every time she moves, Rebecca has to notify Sam of her current
location.
To provide location privacy to a route optimisation system, a similar approach
to Section 5.5 can be deployed. That incorporates multiple POATs between Sam
and Rebecca’s location.
It is important to note that the route optimisation’s aim is to reduce communication cost. This cost results from a redirection of the communication path to
POATHome . In particular, when the mobile node is far from its home network.
Nevertheless, a system equipped with location privacy property cannot avoid
redirection due to the IP protocol restriction. Hence, tradeoffs between the two
properties: location privacy and route optimisation are quite obvious. A system
designer must be aware of this fact whether or not this cost is reasonable, when
employing a location privacy equipped route optimisation system.

5.7

Summary

In this Chapter, we have proposed formal definitions for an IP-based mobility system
that provides application mobility and location privacy. By showing that different
types of adversaries incur different levels of location privacy, we have classified the
location privacy system into three levels: Generic Location Privacy, Semantic Location Privacy and Total Location Privacy. We also proposed a new framework for
a system that provides Total Location Privacy. By using an anonymous communication system as our building block, we have shown that our new framework can
be proven secure. We note that the formal definitions and models described in this
Chapter are to be applied in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6
Achieving Mobility and Anonymity in
IP-based Networks
Consider a situation where a businessman is on his holiday. Firstly, he does not
want his location to be known by his company when he is accessing the Internet.
Considering the nature of the businessman, he wants to have mobility. That means
during his movement, he wants to have a continuous connection to the Internet.
This requirement implies that if he is downloading streaming content on a train,
the process shall continue even if the train has enforced network movements. Additionally, he wants his anonymity to be ensured during his trip. For instance, from
time to time, the businessman would like to check the status of the stock market,
etc. and he wants his identity to be protected. In this scenario, we have seen that
mobility and anonymity is often desirable at the same time. Additionally, location
privacy is an additional feature that people would like to have since the support
from the Internet has made this possible.
Mobility and anonymity are two essential properties that are desirable in IPbased networks. At a glance, these two properties seem to be contradictory. This is
partly due to the fact that there exists no single definition that clearly defines these
notions. In the previous chapter, we have defined these properties formally. We
have also described how to build a mobility system with a location privacy property
by using the anonymous communication system as the building block between the
POATHome and the mobile receiver. However, we have not yet considered the case
when anonymity is also desirable between the sender and the mobile receiver in the
mobility system. Hence, in this Chapter, we aim to address the issue on how to
achieve mobility with location privacy and anonymity at the same time.
According to our motivating scenario, the businessman acts as a client of the
communication, which implies that he always initiates the conversation; he knows
which server he wants to connect to but he does not want the server to know that this
123
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communication is from him and furthermore, he does not want any other nodes to
have knowledge of his whereabouts. The mobile node is carried by the businessman.
Therefore, in the protocol level, the communication is always established by the
mobile node. In our formal model, we consider the mobile node as the receiver
side, hence, we also refer the mobile node as Rebecca. Therefore, in this scenario,
the mobile node, Rebecca and the businessman both represent the same entity.
Similarly, the server is also represented by Sam, i.e., the sender in our model.
We proceed with a concrete construction based on an existing IP-based network,
which is Tor [DMS04]. Without losing generality, our method can be applied to any
other existing anonymous communication network, such as Morphmix [RP02, RP04]
or Tarzan [FSCM, FM02]. We highlight the difficulty of achieving mobility and
anonymity concurrently although it seems trivial to merge these two properties
altogether. We note that essentially Mobile IP provides mobility and Tor provides
anonymity, but a combination between these two will not be sufficient to achieve
what is required in our scenario. We shall show later in this Chapter that these
requirements are contradictory to each other as adding mobility to an anonymous
network system means that location privacy is lost. We also propose our new design
that can achieve a desirable system as stated in the motivating scenario. Finally, we
evaluate our proposed construction based on the definition that we have developed
and we also show that our design satisfies all the formal definitions that we put
forward in the previous Chapter. Our work can be seen as the first attempt towards
formalising the notions of mobility, anonymity and location privacy. Parts of this
Chapter have appeared in [WSSN07a].

6.1

Towards Formalising Mobility and Anonymity
Notions

6.1.1

Related Works

To date, there are many works in the literature that have been proposed to provide
anonymity. This includes the works on low latency networks (e.g. Tor [DMS04],
Morphmix [RP02, RP04] and Tarzan [FSCM, FM02]) to name a few. Furthermore,
several works have also been proposed to provide mobility [Val99, Per02, JPA04,
KGN05]. As mobility always leaks the location of the host, some works including
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our work in Chapter 4 have been proposed to address this issue by adding location
privacy to the existing mobility systems [FKK96, CKK03].
Flying Freedom [EHH01] seems to be the only system to date that provides mobility, anonymity and location privacy at the same time. Nevertheless, this network
is built on top of the architecture of the Freedom Network [Gol00], that is no longer
available[Fre, Oni] and the network itself has ceased.
Therefore, the search for a system that provides mobility, location privacy and
anonymity at the same time remains an interesting research question. A combination of the two different systems, where each system provides either mobility or
anonymity, seems to be the candidate to provide the solution to this problem. Unfortunately, an inherent problem that will occur is the location privacy problem.
Enhancing the system with the existing location privacy mechanisms also results
in a lengthy communication path, which will lead to a very ineffective system. We
will elaborate this issue in a later section. We note that we are not interested in
building a new system from scratch. Instead, we will use available architectures as
our building blocks.

6.1.2

Mobility vs. Location Privacy

As described in the previous Chapter, adding mobility to the IP-based networks will
have an impact of losing the location privacy. The need of mobility will enforce the
need of the node attachment (POATHome ) to monitor the location of the mobile host
during its movement or the need of the specific route. Therefore, the location of the
mobile host is always exposed to the node attachment. Also, if messages exchanged
on the communication path between the mobile host and its correspondent node are
not carefully protected, an observer (one who can “listen” to the communication by
observing the packets travelling through the wire) can obtain location information
either from the content of the messages or the messages’ headers. Moreover, a system
that allows the mobile host to update its location with its recipients directly for the
sake of performance exposes the mobile host’s location further.
Entities
There are three entities involved in the IP-based mobility system: the mobile host,
its communication partner and the node attachment. The mobile host entity is
represented by its initial IP address that is provided from its home network e.g. from
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the home network’s DHCP server. We should stress that the location of the mobile
host is not an entity rather than the mobile host’s attribute, which is an IP address
provided by each network it visits. The role of being the sender or the receiver in
the communication path depends entirely on the message direction in the path. To
illustrate, we refer the mobile host as the sender and its communication partner
as the receiver when a message is sent from the mobile host to its communication
partner.
Mobile Host Movement to a Different Network
When the mobile host moves to a different network, it will firstly obtain a new
location in the new network e.g. from the DHCP server of the new network. Then,
it will establish a communication channel from this new location to its partner. This
can be done either by creating a channel directly to the partner or a channel through
the node of attachment.
Without losing generality, we assume that the same communication model as
in Chapter 5 is used. For anonymity purposes, the main intention of the sender is
to ensure that his identity is not revealed to the observer (privacy of the sender).
Additionally, the main intention of the receiver is also to ensure that her identity
will not be disclosed (privacy of the receiver). From the observer’s point of view, his
task is considered to be “successful”, if he can observe the communication channel
and figure out who the sender and/or the receiver is (adversarial goal). If the
observer cannot be successful in this particular task, then we say that the network
ensures anonymity in the system. See Chapter 5 for the formal notion of anonymous
communication and its three properties: sender anonymity, receiver anonymity and
unlinkability.

6.2
6.2.1

Existing systems for Mobility and Anonymity
Location Privacy in Mobile IP

It is clear that Mobile IP does not provide location privacy protection against the
observer when there is no encryption in the tunneling packets. In addition, the
location is also revealed to the corresponding node in case of route optimisation.
Moreover, the home agent also needs to monitor the location of the Mobile IP user.

6.2. Existing systems for Mobility and Anonymity

6.2.2

127

Tor - A Low Latency Network

Since we use Tor as our building block, we will elaborate in more details in the
following.
Cells in a Tor Network.
The size of cells in a Tor network is 512 bytes. Each cell is divided into two parts,
namely a header and a payload. The header consists of a circuit identifier and a cell’s
command that specifies how to treat the payload. Based on these commands, cells
are further divided into two groups, namely control cells and relay cells. Control cells
are always interpreted by the node that receives them. Their possible commands
are padding, create or created and destroy. Relay cells carry end-to-end stream
data. Their possible commands are relay data, relay begin, relay end, relay teardown,
relay connected, relay extend and relay extended, relay truncate and relay truncated,
sendme and relay drop.
Circuit Establishment in Tor.
As shown in Figure 6.1, Tor establishes and extends its circuit hop by hop until it
reaches the length of the circuit. The normal Tor circuit’s length is three hops, which
comprises the entry node, the second Tor server nodes and the exit node. Suppose
Alice wants to use Tor to anonymise her communication, then the description of how
a circuit is established can be outlined as follows. Firstly, Alice’s Tor client picks
three nodes as its Tor entry node, its second node and its exit node, respectively.
Without losing generality, let us assume that Alice picks TorA , TorB and TorExit for
a circuit path Alice → TorA → TorB → TorExit . To establish an onion encryption
within the circuit, the Tor client and each of the Tor servers in the circuit must be
equipped with a shared key. Tor uses Diffie-Hellman key exchange to accomplish this
purpose. In every hop-connection, there is a circuit id used to represent a connection
between any two consecutive nodes and this circuit id is known only between these
two consecutive nodes.
Essentially, the Tor client generates its part of the common key encryption with
its chosen Tor server’s public key. The Tor server replies with its part of the common
key and a hash of the computed common key. The hash value is used to ensure the
integrity of the common key (e.g. against man-in-the-middle attacks).
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Note that commands that are necessary are Create, Created, Extend and Extended. The first two commands are used to establish a connection between the
two consecutive nodes in the circuit. The last two commands are used when the
issuing node would like to request the receiving node to extend one more hop with
its specified node. In every hop-connection, there is a circuit id used to represent
a connection between any two consecutive nodes and this circuit id is known only
between these two consecutive nodes.
How to Establish the First Hop.
To establish the first-hop circuit connection with the entry node, the Tor client
needs to issue a Create command cell to TorA to specify the circuit id, c1 , between
the Tor client and the entry node. This is done by incorporating a Diffie-Hellman
key exchange. The Tor client’s partial key will be encrypted with TorA ’s public key
and be sent to TorA . Then, TorA decrypts the partial key, and computes the common
key and its hash. Furthermore, TorA issues the response command Created cell and
sends it to the Tor client. The cell consists of the command name (Created), a circuit
id c1 , TorA ’s partial key and the hash of the common key. Receiving this command,
the Tor client can compute the common key and verify it with the provided hash. If
everything is correct, then this part of the circuit has been established successfully.
That is, both the Tor client and the TorA have an encrypted (onion) connection that
shares the symmetric key (KTorclient,TorA ). Prior to this establishment, they only have
a TLS connection between them.
How to Establish the Subsequent Hops.
The subsequent hops in the circuit can be generated in a similar fashion. Once the
first circuit between the Tor node and TorA is established, the next task is to extend
this circuit to TorB . Initially, the Tor node needs to generate the Extend command
cell. The cell comprises of the command itself, the next node that will be included
in the circuit (TorB ) and the partial common key encrypted with TorB ’s public key.
Then, the Tor node makes a relay call between itself and TorA by wrapping the
Extend cell with a common key between the Tor node and TorA . The relay cell is
sent to TorA together with the circuit id c1 .
Receiving the relay cell, TorA can conceal the Extend cell for TorB . Thereafter,
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TorA constructs a Create command cell to TorB . The new cell consists of the command name (Create), a circuit id between TorA and TorB , c2 , a next node (TorB ) and
the partial common key encrypted with TorB ’s public key. The last two elements
are extracted from the Extend cell. Then, TorA forwards this Create command cell
to TorB . TorB executes the Create command cell in a similar way that TorA did. In
reply, it sends a Created cell to TorA , and hence the circuit between TorA and TorB
has been established. The connection to the exit node can be done similarly.

6.3

Anonymous Communication with Mobility in
IP-based Networks

Based on the definitions in Chapter 5, the required system can be defined as follow:
Definition 6.1 A communication channel is said to provide mobility and anonymity
if it provides mobility to its mobile hosts, is anonymous and ensures location privacy
according to the definitions in Chapter 5.
For clarity, we reiterate the ultimate goal in our scenario. Consider the situation
where Rebecca, who is the CEO of the company ABC, is having her holiday break
and she would like to make an anonymous communication for example downloading
a streaming content, such as movies or video clips. In addition to being anonymous,
Rebecca would like to have a continuous session during her trip on a train. Furthermore, she does not want her location to be revealed. We would like to provide
a solution to this problem to satisfy Rebecca’s requirements.
In summary, there are essentially three main properties required in this scenario,
namely mobility, anonymity and location privacy.
Rebecca would like to receive a continuous session during her trip on a train. This
requires mobility to be provided in an IP network. By allowing mobility, Rebecca will
be given a continuous connection to the Internet application regardless her location.
Rebecca’s mobile node has to change from one network connection to another, but
this movement (or also known as a hand-off) needs to be transparent to Rebecca.
Rebecca would also like to access the Internet applications anonymously. Rebecca does not want anyone to find out which services she has used. In short,
Rebecca would like to achieve sender anonymity, recipient anonymity and unlinkability. Firstly, Rebecca does not want anyone to know that she is the sender of the
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message requesting the Internet service (sender anonymity). Secondly, she also does
not want anyone to know to whom she is sending the message to (or which website
Rebecca is currently browsing - and hence, recipient anonymity). Finally, she does
not want anyone to be able to identify whom she is communicating to.
As described earlier, mobility implies exposing the location privacy. This means
that Rebecca’s location will need to be acquired by the system to allow the continuous session. Nonetheless, this will defeat Rebecca’s requirement as she is having her
holiday. Therefore, the final property that Rebecca would like to achieve is location
privacy. As mentioned earlier, these three requirements seem to be contradictory.
In this section, we will describe how to achieve anonymity and mobility concurrently using the existing networks. We incorporate the existing IP-based network
that can provide us with anonymity or mobility, and we adjust the system so that
it can satisfy our needs. We choose Mobile IP as our base system that will provide
mobility. Furthermore, we also choose Tor as our building block for our anonymous
system because of its rapid usage growth and availability.
Intuitively, by combining Mobile IP and Tor, we could achieve all the properties
that we would like to obtain. Unfortunately, as we shall show in the next section,
a trivial combination of these two systems will not provide us with a complete and
good solution. In particular, the new system will suffer from the location privacy
feature. Then, we also present our enhancement to Tor to provide a better system.
The new system represents a “better” network in terms of latency. Finally, we add
the location privacy system to our hybrid system to fully satisfy our requirements.

6.3.1

Architecture MA1: Achieving Mobility and Anonymity
via Trivial Combination of Mobile IP and Tor

Without losing generality, we discuss our design and implementation using Mobile
IP and Tor as our building blocks. Mobile IP is chosen to represent an IP network
that is equipped with mobility, whilst Tor is chosen due to its low latency anonymity
feature. Mobile IP works in network layer (layer 3) while Tor works in transport
layer (layer 4).
Basic Setting. The scenario that we would like to consider is as follows. A user
participates in a Mobile IP network. The user also installs a Tor client software
in his mobile node, and hence, the user is a Tor client in the Tor network. This
scenario is illustrated in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2: An Illustration when a Mobile IP node would like to have a Tor connection (MA1)

To illustrate our idea, we start by providing a mechanism of how the system works
when the mobile node is in its home network.
Phase 1. The mobile node resides in its network. In this phase, we start the scenario
with the situation where the mobile node resides in its home network and the mobile
node would like to make an anonymous communication to the remote destination (for
example http://www.cnn.com). This situation is analogous to a static IP network
that incorporates a Tor network. Suppose that a mobile node user, Alice, would like
to browse the network anonymously. She starts her Internet browser by pointing
its URL to http://www.cnn.com, and her Tor client will firstly select a circuit to
be used to route this particular Tor application. Without losing generality, suppose
the Tor client picks a circuit c1 that consists of TorA , TorB and TorC as an entry
node, the middle node and the exit node, respectively. The communication path
between Alice and the HTTP server appears as Alice → TorA → TorB → TorC →
http : //www.cnn.com. Alice’s IP address is used by TorA as her identity. In this
case, it is her home network’s address.
Phase 2. The mobile node is away. When Alice moves to a different network (i.e.
a foreign network) outside her home network, then her mobile node is away. In a
typical Mobile IP scenario, the mobile node is required to report its new point of attachment, namely its care-of address, to its home agent via the registration process.
This activity is assisted by the foreign agent in the foreign network in Mobile IPv4.
After this process is completed, all the IP connections destined to this mobile node
will be redirected to its home agent and the home agent is responsible to forward
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the packets to the mobile node’s current location. This movement is transparent
to Tor, since Tor works in the transport layer (layer 4). Hence, the communication
path is MN → FA → HA → TorA → TorB → TorC → http : //www.cnn.com. When
route optimisation is deployed, the mobile node is also required to update its location directly to its correspondent node (CN), which is TorA in this case. Hence, the
communication path is MN → FA → TorA → TorB → TorC → http : //www.cnn.com.
The Drawbacks of Architecture MA1. Firstly, we note that Mobile IP networks do
not provide location privacy [Koo07]. The home agent always knows the mobile
node whereabouts, a correspondent node has this knowledge when route optimisation is deployed, and an observer can obtain this knowledge from the content of
unprotected messages. Therefore, the architecture MA1 intrinsically inherits this
problem. In a typical Mobile IP system, a proposed solution is to use forward and
reverse tunneling to the home agent and then applies the ESP encryption in the inner IP packets [Koo07]. However, this could only protect the mobile node’s location
from an observer. It does not prevent the home agent from acquiring this knowledge (that is it does not provide total location privacy as defined in Chapter 5). See
Appendix B for the justification using of our model to capture this drawback.
An idea that comes to mind is to add location privacy to the underlying Mobile IP, using techniques like adding a set of multiple proxies as in the multiple
POATs framework or in [FKK96]. Nevertheless, this results in an extremely long
communication path between the mobile node and its recipient, in particular when
the length of the proxy nodes are quite long. To justify this argument, let us refer
to the communication path. Let LPi denote a location proxy node i. The whole
communication path consists of the following entities: MN → FA → LP1 → ... →
LPn → HA → TorA → TorB → TorC → http : //www.cnn.com. Furthermore, in this
communication path, the benefit given by the low latency network, such as Tor, will
be overridden by the lengthy and unnecessary communication path resulted by the
location-privacy-enabled mobile IP networks.
Providing location privacy when deploying route optimisation remains as an
open question in Mobile IP protocol [Koo07]. It seems odd to use the set of location
proxy’s technique, i.e. MN → FA → LP1 → ... → LPn → http : //www.cnn.com to
achieve this goal. Particularly, when route optimisation is proposed to increase the
system performance by allowing a direct connection between the mobile node and
the correspondent node instead of tunneling through the home agent. However, the
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Figure 6.3: Illustration of Mobile Node’s Movement with a Single Entry Node (MA2)

combined system benefits the Mobile IP route optimisation some degree of location
privacy. That is, the mobile node’s location is transparent to the Tor application’s
recipient (the CNN server in the above example). Nevertheless, a new problem
arises. The mobile node’s location is always exposed to the Tor entry node. Unlike
the home agent that can be trusted to some extent, Tor nodes are not designed be
trusted. Using two sets of proxies and combining them together at the Tor entry
node instead of the home agent, as in a typical Mobile IP scenario, also results in
the same problem, even though the path is one hop shorter.
In summary, by trivially combining a location-privacy-enabled mobility system
and anonymity system seems to be insufficient to achieve mobility and anonymity
concurrently. In a typical Mobile IP system scenario, when a high level of location
privacy is required, this combination appears as two mix networks that are “glued”
together. The first mix network aims at providing location privacy and mobility,
whilst the second mix network deals with anonymity. These networks are combined
by the point of attachment entity, such as the home agent. In a route optimisation
system scenario, the combined system seems to provide more location privacy as the
mobile node’s location is transparent to the Tor application’s correspondent node.
It instead shifts the problem to the Tor entry node and the seemingly available
solution also results in a long communication path.

6.3.2

Architecture MA2: Adding Mobility to Tor

Essentially, Tor does not support mobility. When there is a change of the client’s
point of attachment during a Tor connection, all connections in circuits from the Tor
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client to its application’s recipient will be required to be reset. Our architecture MA1
attempted to solve this problem by combining Mobile IP with Tor at the mobile node
to add Tor’s ability to provide mobility. Unfortunately, as we have shown earlier,
the location privacy problem, which is an inherent problem in Mobile IP networks,
will occur in the resulting architecture. Adding location privacy to the underlying
Mobile IP networks will result in a different problem. Therefore, in this section,
we are interested in taking a totally different approach, i.e. by adding the mobility
capabilities to Tor instead of relying on another type of network, like Mobile IP. We
will limit ourselves to the scenario that we are interested in and then describe the
technique that we used to design and implement the mobility for Tor networks.
Limited Scenario: Client-only Mobility. We are interested to add mobility to the
client in Tor networks. As inspired by our scenario mentioned earlier, the recipient
(for example http://www.cnn.com) can stay the same during the duration of the
movement, but we allow the client to move from one network to another. The
mobile node will always initiate the communication. Furthermore, without losing
generality, we assume that the recipient, a low-latency application server, is always
a fixed host.
Design Strategy 1. Maintaining TCP connection of the Exit Node. A Tor client does
not have a direct connection to its recipient. The Tor client requires a series of nodes
between itself and the application server, namely the Tor servers. We further note
that Tor generates its circuit hop-by-hop. To illustrate this idea, let us consider the
following Tor circuit that consists of four Tor connections:
• The first hop is between the Tor client and the Tor entry node
• The second hop is between the entry node and the middle node.
• The third hop is between the middle node and the exit node.
• The fourth hop is between the exit node and the recipient.
Each connection has its own underlying TCP connection. From the recipient’s point
of view, its “sender” is the exit node. Therefore, if a TCP connection between the
exit node and the recipient can be maintained during the mobile node (i.e. the Tor
client) movement, then we can preserve the sender-recipient indirect connection.
That is, the change of the mobile node’s point of attachment is transparent to its
applications server. Therefore, our main aim is to maintain this particular TCP
connection in the circuit during the mobile node movement.
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a mobile node home address.
the mobile node IP’s address before it moves.
the mobile node IP’s address at the new network.
a circuit id of the Tor connection between the
mobile node and the Tor entry node
a common key between the mobile node and the Tor entry.
a random number
Figure 6.4: Notations used in MA2 protocol

Design Strategy 2. Modification to The First-Hop Tor Connection. By investigating
the Tor circuit, we can observe that the mobile node’s movement has a direct implication to the first hop of the established circuit. We note that this first hop is
the TCP connection between the mobile node and the entry node. The movement
of the mobile node will result in the change of the mobile node’s IP address. This
change will imply the failure of the first-hop TCP connection. Furthermore, since
this TCP connection implies the whole Tor connection, the failure of the first hop
will eventually stop the whole Tor circuit.
In order to ensure that the Tor circuit is still established, the Tor servers must
provide a mechanism to allow the first-hop Tor connection to stay alive even though
its underlying TCP connection is turned down and changed to the new point of
attachment. For simplicity, we apply the known technique used in the TCP/IP
network to allow the mobile node to acquire its new IP address during its movement,
for example, DHCP [Dro97], and to change the point of attachment by using the
hands-off mechanism such as the one used in Mobile IP [Per02]. We do not aim to
improve this technique as this is out of the scope of this thesis. We illustrate our
idea in Figure 6.3. We note that in this design, in contrast to the previous design,
we modified the Tor server and client to handle mobility without relying on mobility
entities of other existing mechanisms (e.g. Mobile IP’s home agent).
The Detail of The Design. Now, we discuss the situation when the mobile node
moves to a new network from the above scenario. Once the mobile node obtains
a new IP address from the new network, it sends an additional Tor-command cell,
namely the Resume command cell, to the Tor entry node to request the Tor entry
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At the Mobile node
1. Acquire the new IP address newIP
2. Create a Resume command cell
2.1 A Resume command
2.2 Circuit ID (circID) of the circuit.
2.3 An encryption value (α)
α ← {oldIP, newIP, R}KM N −T orA
2.4 The keyed-hash value(β)
β ← HKM N −T orA (oldIP, R)
3. Send a Resume command to the Tor
entry node
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At the Tor Entry Node
1. Wait for t seconds

(Resume,circID,α,β)
−→
2. Receive Resume,circID,α̂, β̂
3. Use circID to retrieve KM N −T orA
from the MN’s database
ˆ , newIP
ˆ , R̂ ← Decrypt α̂
4. oldIP
ˆ , R̂) 6= β̂
5. Abort if HKM N −T orA (oldIP
6. Change IP address of MN’s database
to newIP
7. Resume the connection

Figure 6.5: MA2 procedure: When the mobile node moves to a new network
node to update its IP address with the newly acquired IP address. The cell must
be encrypted with the common key between the Tor entry node and the mobile
node. Tor servers need to be modified to allow a waiting period before closing its
connection while its communicating partner is unavailable. This allows the whole
circuit to stay alive when the mobile node moves.
To guarantee the authenticity of the Tor entry node, we employ a keyed hash
function with a random number. The Tor entry node stores the up-to-date IP
address of the mobile node as its sender address. We note that the initial IP address
of the mobile node can be the home address of the mobile node when the system is
just initialised. We also note that each Tor server must allow a longer waiting time
period when the host or network unavailability is detected.
The Resume command cell consists of the command Resume, the circuit id, an
encrypted value of the new IP address, the old IP address, a random number and
the hash value of the old IP address and the random value. Figure 6.5 illustrates

6.3. Anonymous Communication with Mobility in IP-based Networks

138

Figure 6.6: Illustration of Mobile Node’s Movement to achieve Location Privacy
(MA3)

the MA2’s procedure when the mobile node moves.
Existing Drawbacks: Location Privacy. As in other mobility systems, our system
also exposes the mobile node’s location to the Tor entry node. Therefore, the problem of location privacy seems to be inherent whenever mobility is added to the
network. See Appendix B for the justification of this drawback by using our formal
model in Chapter 5. The solution, like the set of proxies, is not appropriate as
previously described in MA1. One could propose that the Tor entry node must be
a trusted node. However, this is very unlikely to happen. Tor network itself does
not require the Tor entry node to be a trusted node. Also, if the circuit ID has
not changed and the IP-packets between the mobile node at different locations and
the Tor entry node are not encrypted, then the observer can trace the movement
of the mobile node from the unchanged circuit ID and hence can obtain its location. Therefore, a further extension is required to satisfy the requirement of location
privacy.

6.3.3

Architecture MA3: Enhancing Mobility-equipped Tor
with Location Privacy

The main problem with the architecture MA2 is the exposure of the mobile node’s
location to the Tor entry node, so that the movement of the mobile node will be
traceable. In this section, we present a further enhancement to this design, by
forcing the mobile node (i.e. the Tor client) to change its circuit every time it moves
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to a new network. By this enforcement, it will ensure that the Tor entry node will
always be different. The restriction is that all other circuits must have the same exit
node in order to ensure that the TCP connection between the exit node and the
server can continue functioning. Fortunately, the circuits are established a priori.
This mechanism will allow the mobile node to establish the circuits prior to its
movement and hence, the swapping between one circuit to another will not cost too
much delay. An additional data must be inserted into the cell’s component to allow
the exit node to concatenate the connection to the server between the old and the
new circuit. Figure 6.6 illustrates the MA3’s scenario. The detail of the design and
implementation is as follows.
Initialisation. Prior to the network activity (and network movement), the mobile
node (i.e. the Tor client) must establish several circuits that use the same exit node
and store them in its circuit pool. These circuits are inactive when they are not in
use.
Mobile Node Movements. When the mobile node moves to a new network, it will
firstly acquire a new IP address. Then, it selects a new circuit from the available
circuit pool. As the circuit has been established a priori with the mobile node’s
initial IP address, it also needs to be updated with the new IP address that has
just been acquired. Then, we employ the same mechanism as used in Architecture
MA2. That is, the mobile node sends a Resume command to the Tor entry node.
However, this time it is the Tor entry node of the new circuit.
Then, the mobile node sends a relay cell to the exit node through the new circuit’s
connection aiming at switching the circuit. As shown in Figure 6.7, the relay cell
consists of the following components: a command to notify the exit node to switch
the circuit (ResumeCon) and a connection identifier that the mobile node uses to
notify the exit node of the same destination (CID). Once the exit node receives the
relay cell, it decrypts the packet (aka onion layer). Then, it executes the command
by searching its database for the circuit that is currently used with the connection
to the server using CID, i.e. the old circuit. Finally, it deactivates the old circuit
(by removing CID from the old circuit’s record) and activates the new circuit with
the connection to the application server. Note that we name the relay cell’s circuit
as the new circuit.
Analysis. It is clear that the Tor entry node cannot trace the location of the mobile
node. This is due to the fact that the circuit ID and the Tor entry node are always
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Figure 6.7: How to switch to a new circuit in MA3

changed when the mobile node moves to a new network. Hence, there is no need to
encrypt the circuit ID between the mobile node and the Tor entry node to provide
location privacy against the observer. Moreover, even though the exit node can
obtain a list of its previous nodes of all circuits belonging to the connection from
the mobile node to the application server, it does not have enough information to
trace the movement of the mobile node, since there is more than a hop that connects
the exit node to the mobile node. We note that by allowing the number of hops in
a circuit to vary, we can achieve a better and efficient location privacy protection as
it is harder for the adversary to predict even the size of the circuit.
The assumption put in place in Tor networks includes the following. On one extreme, we note that the collusion of all nodes is not permitted, or else the anonymity
properties, i.e. sender anonymity, receiver anonymity and unlinkability cannot be
provided. On the other extreme, we also note that Tor does not require that all Tor
nodes must be trusted either. We note that these two assumptions are indeed valid
in practice.
Theorem 6.1 Our design MA3 provides mobility, anonymity and location privacy
according to the Definition 6.1.
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Justification. The mobility of our design MA3 is provided by the inherent Tor
networks. For the anonymity, we should consider the three properties, namely sender
anonymity, receiver anonymity and unlinkability. In the following, we briefly show
that the security of our design can be reduced to the security of Tor.
Sender Anonymity. Consider the following game between A and C. Assume that A
is an attacker that can break the sender anonymity interaction in our design. In this
setting, we set C as an observer to a Tor network in the real world. Firstly, C provides
all the required Tor parameters to A and a set of senders {S1 , S2 , · · · , Sn } ∈ S. The
attacking phase can be done by A by querying C for any particular sender Sj ∈ S
for a particular message mj ∈ M. To answer this query, C can invoke the real
world that contains the Tor networks and obtain the real transcript from the Tor
networks. The transcript will be provided to A and hence, the simulation runs
completely. The view of the simulated environment is identical to the real world,
and hence, the simulation is perfect. Finally, A outputs two senders S0 , S1 of his
choice and a target message m∗ that has not been queried before and C provides
a transcript Ωi for a coin toss i ∈ {0, 1}. Then, A can output the choice of i
that C selected. Note that this output means that A has successfully broken the
underlying sender anonymity of the Tor network in the real world, and hence we
obtain a contradiction.
Receiver Anonymity and Unlinkability. Receiver anonymity and unlinkability can
be done in similar fashion as above. The underlying idea is to show if there exists
an adversary A who can break the interaction, then this adversary will also break
the underlying Tor networks. Therefore, the contradiction is obtained.
Location Privacy. When we consider the mobile node as the receiver of the communication, location privacy interaction is similar to the receiver anonymity, except
the location of the receivers can vary. The attacker will not be able to break the
location privacy interaction since the circuit for each different location will also be
different. If the attacker can break the location privacy interaction in our design, it
means that the attacker is capable of observing the whole structure of the Tor networks, and hence, the adversary is in fact a global adversary. The fact that a global
adversary does not exist means that our design is secure with regards to location
privacy.
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Summary

In this Chapter, we presented a mechanism to achieve mobility and anonymity in IPbased networks concurrently. We started the chapter by firstly stating the required
properties, that include mobility, anonymity and location privacy. We presented
a concrete design and implementation based on the existing IP-based anonymous
communication network, that is Tor, to achieve both mobility and anonymity at
the same time. We note that our work can be considered as the first step towards
formalising mobility, anonymity and location privacy.

Chapter 7
Addressing Low Latency Anonymous
Network Systems Secure against Low
Cost Timing Attacks
Most of the works in this thesis focus on the location privacy and mobility issues.
We have shown in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 that anonymous communication systems, in
particular the systems with low latency network, play a significant role in a mobility
system with location privacy property. To provide total location privacy we need a
set of proxy nodes between the mobile device’s home point-of-attachment and its new
location. Each proxy node is merely allowed to have knowledge of its predecessor
and its successor. Unless all of the proxy nodes are compromised, the location of
the mobile device is preserved. This is very similar to anonymous communication
systems, in particular systems with low-latency network. Low latency is the must
because mobility requires seamlessly roaming; long delay is not acceptable.
In the previous Chapters, we focussed on a formal approach and gave examples
of how to build our system based on the existing low-latency anonymous networks,
that is Tor. By doing so, we have observed that due to the low latency constraints,
side channel attacks, namely timing attacks, become an important issue when the
attacks can be done inexpensively under a threat model that excludes a global passive
adversary, namely a weaker threat model.
Therefore, our aim in this Chapter is to derive design principles for building
secure low latency anonymous systems that do not suffer from these types of attacks.
Consequently, this can be applied to the IP-based location privacy system.
The Chapter is organised as follows. First, we describe the side channel attacks,
namely the timing attacks against the anonymous communication system. Then, we
elaborate in more details on three existing low latency anonymous network systems,
namely Tor, Tarzan and Morphmix and highlight the differences among them. Next,
we review the low cost attack on Tor as described by Murdoch and Danezis [MD05].
143

7.1. Timing Attacks in Anonymous Communication Systems

144

We note that the attack is claimed to be applicable in any low latency network systems. In contrast to this claim, we provide a counter example where the attack fails
to be conducted. In particular, we discuss the possibility of employing this attack in
Morphmix, and we show that the result does not provide the required information
as claimed. Finally, we derive some necessary conditions required when building a
secure low latency network system. By adhering to these necessary conditions, a
secure low latency network system can be built and the resulting system will not
suffer from low cost attacks. We also provide some related discussions to highlight
our results. Parts of this Chapter have appeared in [WSSN07b].

7.1

Timing Attacks in Anonymous Communication Systems

7.1.1

Network Traffic Attacks

Attacks using the network traffic can be classified into two main categories: traffic
confirmation attacks and traffic analysis attacks [MD05]. Each category consists of
both passive and active attacks. Traffic confirmation attacks are attacks where the
adversary uses a traffic pattern to confirm his guess. For example, the adversary
suspects that Alice is talking to Bob. Passively, he observes traffic at both Alice
and Bob’s ends and uses a pattern that obtained from timing or volume of packets
that enter and leave both ends to verify his suspicion; or actively he embeds timing
signatures into the traffic between these two nodes to force the distinct patterns that
can be recognised. However, traffic analysis attacks are attacks that the adversary
learns which points in the network he should attack by studying traffic patterns.
For example, the passive adversary can observe the network edges and then uses
relationships in timing or volume of packets to correlate traffic that enter or leave
the network; or the active adversary can insert a pattern into traffic that can be
detectable afterward.
Timing Attacks
Timing attacks can be as simple as comparing the difference between the time that
packets enter and leave a network, with the time for traversing a route. Timing
attacks can be more complex and include extracting traffic patterns of links and
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comparing them to determine a route.
Global Passive Adversaries
A global passive adversary is an adversary who is allowed to observe all network
traffic (link) but is not allowed to see inside the mixes or modify the traffic [Ser04,
Dan04a].

7.1.2

Timing Attacks versus Anonymous Communication
System under Global Passive Adversary Threat Model

Anonymous systems for low latency applications that ignore the mixing process that
includes batching and reordering would be susceptible to traffic analysis attacks and
in particular timing attacks. Examples are attacks proposed by Danezis [Dan04b]
and Levine et al. [LRWW04]. The attacks use the fact that each node in the network
introduces a different delay. The delay can be used to guess the correlation between
the input links and output links of a node. An adversary can observe links over
time and by comparing traffic patterns of all links, he can determine series of nodes
that have similar link patterns and are likely to form a route. By using statistical
methods, the adversary can obtain information about the sender and the receiver
of a path, or at least the path itself. The aforementioned timing attack assumes a
global adversary, who can observe all links in the networks.
The attack can be avoided by making the timing characteristic of each link indistinguishable. This, however, requires an unreasonable amount of mixing operations
and cover traffic and hence, long delays. Therefore, it is not a trivial task to find
the right balance between anonymity and delay in these networks.

7.1.3

Timing Attacks versus Anonymous Communication
System under the Weaker Threat Model

It is obvious that mounting the timing attacks under the global passive adversary
threat model requires huge amounts of resources and data [Dan04a]. This is because
he must be able to observe all network traffic. Hence, there is a weaker threat model
in which the global passive adversary is ignored. Under this weaker threat model,
the adversary is merely allowed to observe a fraction of the links (not all). This is
a plausible assumption considering the systems are operated over public networks,
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such as the Internet so there is no assurance that the timing attacks can achieve
more than finding parts of the routes with non-negligible success probability.
Low latency anonymous systems acknowledge that the global adversary threat
model does exist in their systems but they believe that the attack is too costly
to mount in the Internet. Hence, systems, such as Tor [DMS04] exclude the global
passive and active adversary from their threat models and claim that they are secure
(their anonymity is preserved) against timing attacks under the weaker threat model.
It is important to note that the soundness of the weaker threat model enables a
low latency system to discard the mixing operations and cover traffic.

7.1.4

Low Cost attacks

Nevertheless, a paper entitled Low-cost traffic analysis of Tor by Murdoch and
Danezis [MD05] disputed the claim. The author have shown a variant of timing
attacks that does not require a global passive adversary that can be applied with
Tor. They also believe that their attack would work on any low latency anonymous
network systems.
The attack is based on a traffic analysis attack proposed by Danezis [Dan04b]. In
their attack, Tor’s provided anonymity can be broken by an attacker that only has
a partial view of the network or is one of the Tor nodes. The attack works since Tor
removes the mixing operation that has been used in its earlier version, and instead
processes its input queues in a round robin fashion. The Tor node is responsible for
receiving and forwarding each stream’s packets.
A malicious Tor node can create connections to other Tor nodes and so indirectly estimates other nodes’ traffic volumes at each time. These estimates use the
difference in the latency of streams that are sent and received back using those connections. As the traffic volume or traffic load on each Tor node is a result of the traffic
load of all relayed connections on that Tor node, the technique in [Dan04b] can be
used to estimate the traffic pattern of each node and ultimately a good estimate of
the route. Authors noted that their scheme can be applied to any anonymous low
latency systems.
The threatening implication of the attack is that all low latency anonymous
networks would be vulnerable to this type of timing attacks even if there is no
global passive adversary. This significantly invalidates the threat model used in
many low latency anonymous systems.
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The impact to the location privacy system
Since we build our location privacy system on the low-latency anonymous communication systems, any attacks that are applicable to them are also applicable to
our system. If Murdoch and Danezis’s claim is true, our location privacy system
must be designed with the global adversary’s threat model in mind. This is a very
costly system. Hence, we would like to investigate their claim so that when we
deploy a low-latency anonymous system as our location privacy building block, we
would know in which aspects we would have to be concerned with in terms of traffic
analysis attacks, namely timing attacks.
Our Strategies
We notice that although all systems claim that they provide anonymity properties
as, they are different in details e.g. their architectures, their node discoveries process,
their route selection processes, their encryption/decryption schemes used and their
mix nodes’ functions. Tarzan [FSCM, FM02] and MorphMix [RP02, RP04], another
two prominent low-latency anonymous systems, work differently from Tor. In particular, Tarzan and MorphMix employ peer-to-peer architecture, whereas Tor relies
on dedicated servers. In addition, Tarzan includes some mixing operations and cover
traffic, which does not exist in Tor. Moreover, MorphMix allows an intermediate
node to select parts of the anonymous path, whereas a Tor client chooses the whole
path by himself.
Therefore, we examine Murdoch and Danezis’s attack [MD05] to find essential
properties that enable the attack. We, then, investigate whether or not Tarzan and
MorphMix also provide these properties. Vice versa, we also investigate Tarzan and
MorphMix for their individual properties whether or not the properties can distort
the attack.
Our analysis has two directions. Firstly, we focus on the latency of the system,
to verify whether it can be used to represent the traffic load of each node. Secondly,
we look at the effectiveness of the attack on different architectures and mechanisms.
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Tor, Tarzan and MorphMix Vs Traffic Analysis

7.2.1

Tor

Tor Threats Model
Like all other practical low latency anonymous systems, an adversary’s goal in Tor
is to observe both the initiator and the recipient of the communication. Tor does
not provide any mechanisms to protect against a global passive adversary. Instead,
Tor aims to prevent the system from an adversary that has the following capacities:
• the adversary who can observe some fractions of network traffic;
• the adversary who can generate, modify, delete or delay traffic;
• the adversary who can operate onion routers of his own;
• the adversary who can compromise some fractions of onion routers.
Tor and Traffic analysis
Tor considers traffic confirmation attacks, such as end-to-end timing correlation,
outside their design goal. The Tor designers focus their threat model merely on the
traffic analysis attacks [DMS04]. Since Tor does not include the global passive or
active adversary in its threat model, some traffic analysis attacks, such as observing
traffic pattern, can be discarded.
Examples of the traffic analysis attacks that could be mounted with Tor are as
follows. The passive adversary can use other externally visible user-selected options
such as timing of packets to correlate traffics. The active adversary can replay
traffic; or he can choose to deny service to trustworthy routers and move them
to compromised router; or he can deny services to users and see if traffic stops
elsewhere.

7.2.2

Tarzan

Tarzan is based on a peer-to-peer architecture. Anyone can join and leave the
network and all nodes can be potential initiators. Tarzan provides peer discovery
by using a protocol based on the gossip-based mechanism similar to the one in
[HBLL99].
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Figure 7.1: Tarzan Architecture with mimics

Tarzan reduces the chance of a malicious attacker that imitates as many Tarzan
nodes as he wishes by hashing the node’s IP address according to its subnet and
categorising its result into levels.
Tarzan and Traffic analysis
Each Tarzan node can be both a Tarzan client (the sender) or a Tarzan relay. This
enables Tarzan to avoid end-to-end timing analysis of an entry and exit nodes.
Tarzan claims that it is resistant to the global adversary’s attack, through its
cover traffic mechanism, known as mimic traffic. To prevent an overwhelming network consumption, Tarzan limits the mimic traffic of each Tarzan node to merely
with some of its peers.
MiMic
When joining the network, after discovering all other peers, the Tarzan node selects a number of nodes as its mimics (nodes that it will exchange the cover traffic
with). Then, when an anonymous connection is required, the next relay node must
be chosen from the node’s mimic list. When a Tarzan node a wants to have an
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Figure 7.2: MorphMix hop selections

anonymous connection with its recipient such as a web server svr, assuming that the
anonymous tunnel has l + 1 length where l is a number of the nodes in the tunnel,
a selects its first hop from its mimic list, say n1. Then, a asks n1 for n1’s mimic list
(ln1 ). a chooses the 2nd hop, from ln1 . a repeats this process until l hops. Finally, a
chooses the last node, namely PNAT randomly from a’s peer database. As a result,
the connections has the following path: a → n1 → n2 → ... → nl → PNAT → svr.
It is important to note that PNAT is selected randomly from a list of peers in the
database not from nl ’s mimic list, otherwise numbers of available paths are limited.
Figure 7.2.2 illustrates Tarzan network’s architecture and its tunnel connections. In
this example, each Tarzan node has approximately 6 mimics.

7.2.3

MorphMix

MorphMix is also based on a peer-to-peer architecture. Unlike Tor or Tarzan, the
intermediate nodes in MorphMix are not entirely chosen by the initiator. Rather,
MorphMix allows each intermediate node to select its successor. Figure 7.2.3 is
cited from [RP02]. It shows how MorphMix selects the next hop with the witness’s
help. Assuming that the connection between the initiator a and b has already been
established. The complete procedure is illustrated as follows.
When an initiator node a wants to establish an anonymous tunnel, it selects
the first intermediate nodes b from its current neighbour list. Then, it establishes
a symmetric key between them. The shared key is used for layered encryption.
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To extend the tunnel, a asks b for a selection of nodes that should be used as its
next hop. b sends a a set of its recommended nodes chosen from b’s neighbours.
a then chooses one of them, for example, node c. a appends c to b in the tunnel.
A symmetric key between a and c is created and then, sends to c through b. To
prevent b from being man-in-the-middle attack, MorphMix introduces a witness.
The witness’s duty is to act as a third party during the next hop selection process.
It allows the initiator a to establish a shared key with the appended node c through
b, without revealing c’s key information to b or without b being a malicious node.
1. a selects a witness w from the set of nodes it already knows. It then generates its
half of the key information DHa and encrypts it with W’s public key together
with the nonce({nonce1 , DHa }P uKw ). Note that a nonce is used against replay
attack and s is a number of nodes a wants b to offer. Due to DHa being
encrypted with the w’s public key. b has no idea what this information is.
2. After b receives the message, it sends the encrypted DHa ({nonce1 , DHa }P uKw )
to w with its selection of nodes and their public keys. That is, {ipc , P uKc ,
ipd , P uKd , ipe , P uKe }).
3. w has two tasks. First, it decrypts {nonce1 , DHa }P uKw to get DHa . Then, w
selects randomly node c as the next hop. Next, it sends a request for next hop
to c. This includes b’s information {ipb , P uKb } together with a’s secret to c.
4. c checks if it will accept the request. If so, it sends ok-message back to w.
5. w signs a set of nodes that b selects together with nonce1 and sends back to b
with its chosen node for the next hop put first after the nonce1 in the signature.
The signature is used as a receipt from w to a.
6. b receives the message from w. It knows that its next hop is c. It then generates
an identifier(id) that is used to identify the anonymous tunnel of this link
between b and c. Then, it sends this id with the new nonce (nonce2 ) to c.
7. c replies b with its DH-exchange part with id.
8. b sends to a c’s DH part and the signature of w that consists of list of chosen
nodes.
MorphMix Threat Model
MorphMix does not aim to guarantee the anonymity of every single transaction
but rather to provide good protection from long time profiling. This allows the
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adversaries to control a fraction of nodes or monitor a fraction of links. Thus,
MorphMix assumes the following adversaries:
• an external observer eavesdrops on both the link between initiator and first
intermediate node and on the route between final node and host(s),
• an adversary operating some nodes himself controls both the first intermediate
and the final node.
• an adversary that can observe a fractions of links
• an adversary that can control a subset of all nodes
MorphMix and Traffic Analysis
MorphMix makes use of its size and the dynamism of its system to defend passive
traffic analysis attacks.
In its original paper [RP02], MorphMix claims that it is difficult to mount the
end-to-end traffic analysis attacks since identifying the entry and the exit points is
no longer easy. There is no difference between the initiator and the intermediate
node due to its peer-to-peer architecture. Also, a large number of nodes result in
many possible exit paths. We note that in the following paper [RP04], MorphMix
admits that when the tunnel length is small, the first intermediate node should be
able to guess its position by analysing the timing pattern between itself and the
initiator. However, they argue that since other things are difficult to quantify e.g.
the exit paths, it is still not easy to compromise the tunnel.
MorphMix believes that it is not practical to mount global passive traffic analysis
attacks against its system due to its size and the dynamic nature of its system, that
is nodes will appear and disappear, thus change continuously.
Cover traffic is not employed by MorphMix, since it consumes a large amount of
data and its benefit is still in doubt [RP04]. The designers acknowledge that when
any efficient cover traffic mechanism for a low latency anonymous system is ever
developed, it should be easy to apply with MorphMix.
Note on MorphMix
We note that MorphMix concentrates on a mechanism to prevent attacks from an
internal active attackers, who can control a subset of nodes thus a fractions of links,
namely MorphMix nodes, rather than the outsiders, e.g. observers.
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Figure 7.3: Low Cost Attack Model in Tor

7.3

A Low Cost Attack in Low Latency Anonymous System

In this section, we review a low cost attack on Tor as described in [MD05]. The
term low cost comes from the fact that the adversary requires only a partial view of
the network, i.e. being one of the Tor nodes, to attack the Tor network. The attack
shows that the Tor system is vulnerable to a variant of timing analysis attack, even
though this attack was claimed to be prevented in the original Tor threats model.
That is, the claim that traffic analysis attacks on Tor cannot be done without a
global passive adversary is indeed false.
The attack, conceptually, takes advantage of a seemingly unavoidable limitation
of the low latency anonymous system; that is time. The goal of the attack is to infer
which nodes are being used to relay streams in the Tor circuit. This greatly decreases
the anonymity properties of Tor system. Experimental results are conducted and
presented to support the theoretical attack. In the end, the authors further claim
that this attack should be applicable to any low latency anonymous system, such as
Tarzan and MorphMix.
The Idea of The Attack
The idea comes from the known fact that delay cannot be induced much in the low
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latency systems. Hence, the timing pattern of packets should persist throughout a
circuit. Tor had survived the typical timing attack because its designers believed
that the global passive adversary is hardly possible. It does not consider this type of
attacks in their threats model. The low cost attack indeed disproves this argument
and shows that the initial design is still vulnerable to the timing attacks’ variants.
It is true that the adversary cannot observe all links in the network and mount
attacks as described in [Dan04b]. Nevertheless, being one of the Tor nodes does not
prohibit the adversary from measuring latencies between all the nodes and itself. In
particular, these latencies can be used to infer traffic volumes of the nodes that it
is communicating.
Since the traffic pattern of each node can be obtained from its traffic volume,
the adversary can use the techniques described in [Dan04b] to do further analysis.
Then, he is able to infer which nodes carry a similar traffic pattern. In other words,
they are the relay nodes in the same circuit.
The idea is supported by the Tor architecture. The Tor node has given each connection its own buffer and processes these buffers in a round robin fashion. When
the buffer has no stream, it simply ignores and moves to process the next buffer.
More importantly, the mixing process has been removed from Tor due to its designers’ doubts on capacity and practicality [DMS04]. Hence, when a new connection is
established; or when any existing connection is removed; or when the traffics of the
existing connections are changed, the traffic loads on the Tor node is changed. This
affects the responses that this Tor node would have on connections with other Tor
nodes that are previously established and are still currently working. Consequently,
due to this same reasons, the traffic loads of the other Tor nodes are changed as
well. Therefore, they can conclude that the change of the traffic load on one Tor
node affects other Tor nodes that have connections to it. Hence, for nodes that are
on the same circuit, their traffic loads should result in the same pattern of effects.
Note that a change of traffic load occurred from the Tor node’s environments, such
as its CPU load, is ignored.
Entities Involved
The adversary merely requires to be a member of the Tor system. That is, by being
one of the Tor clients. This node is referred to as a corrupt node, namely a corrupt
Tor node, or a probe node.
Attack Model
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Conceptually, the attack works as follows.
• A corrupted Tor node establishes connections to other Tor nodes in order to
measure these connections’ latencies.
• The corrupted Tor node keeps monitoring latencies of all these connections
during a reasonable time period.
• The latencies values are used to estimate traffic loads of the Tor nodes’ that
the corrupt node makes connection with.
• Traffic patterns are derived from the traffic loads.
• When the adversary has the traffic pattern of all nodes, he can further mount
an attack similar to ones in [Dan04b, LRWW04].
To make their attack more powerful, a variant of the attack is proposed. That is, a
network server to which a user is connected to, is corrupted. Thus, there is no need
to observe a connection to extract the traffic pattern. The adversary can choose
a traffic pattern that is easily detected and sends its streams through the corrupt
server. The aim of the attack is to find a path between a victim node and the
corrupt server. This greatly reduces the anonymity of the system to be at the same
level with a simple proxy. Finally, it is claimed that the attack would work with
other low latency network systems, including Tarzan and MorphMix.
In the next section, we will investigate this argument and show that the claim
made in Murdoch and Danezis’s paper is only valid under some restricted conditions.
Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 illustrate the low cost attack model and its procedure
respectively.

7.4

Analysis of the Low Cost Timing Attack against
Tarzan and Morphmix

To perform this attack with other systems, we employ the same model as the one
used by Tor. The adversary requires at least two entities: a corrupt node and a
corrupt server. A corrupt node is changed to a sender node in each particular
system. That is, a Tarzan client in Tarzan, and an initiator node in MorphMix.
Next, a corrupt node needs to acquire a list of all other nodes in the system.
Then, it establishes connections to these nodes so that it can monitor their connections’ latencies. Connections are monitored for a period of time. During that time,
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At a corrupt node
Preparation
Find a list of all other nodes
({1, 2, ..., N })
Action
1. for i = 1 to N
make connection to each nodei ;
2. for i = 1 to N
2.1 while t record
latency of each nodei (L(i));
2.2 derive → T (i)
traffic load of nodei
2.3 compare T (i)
with the server traffic S(t)
2.4 if T (i) ≈ S(t) then
nodei is a relay in the path.
3. Obtain a path, for example,
node1 → node3 → node6

At a corrupt server
Prepare target stream
(S(t))

send S(t)

Figure 7.4: Low cost attack’s procedure
the corrupt server keeps sending its traffic into the system. When the monitoring
period finishes, latency of each connection is used to estimate the traffic load of
that particular node. Then, the traffic load is compared with the server traffic. If it
results in similarity, the node is concluded as one of the intermediate nodes in the
path. When traffic of all nodes are compared, the possible path(s) is/are derived.
Thus, the attack would be successful under the following three conditions:
• Latencies received at the corrupt node indeed represent traffic loads of the
target nodes.
• The corrupt node must be able to know other participants in the network.
• The corrupt node must be able to establish a direct connection to all nodes it
wants to monitor.
The attack is successful in Tor because the Tor architecture satisfies these conditions. Firstly, due to the fact that Tor removes mixing operations and cover traffic,
its timing characteristic is retained. This is supported by the experiment result in
[MD05]. Secondly, Tor provides a directory service that a Tor client can acquire a
list of all other Tor servers. Third, there is no restriction to prohibit the Tor client
from establishing a connection to all Tor servers.
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7.4.1

Low Cost Attack in Tarzan

To investigate if the attack is applicable with Tarzan, we will analyse what influences
each condition has provided to the system.
Latency
There are two differences between Tarzan and Tor that should affect the latency. The
first one is Tor operates its queue in a round-robin fashion. Secondly, Tor does not
include mixing operations and cover traffic. The case is different for Tarzan. Tarzan
provides a mimic mechanism. That is, even though Tarzan does not mention how
each Tarzan node manages its incoming queues, Tarzan controls the rate of output
links according to the average rates of its input links. When each link does not
reach the rate it requires, Tarzan inserts dummy data. Also, prior to sending out
its streams to output links, the Tarzan node does some mixing and batching within
each link’s outgoing queue.
Then, the question is if this so-called mimic has enough influence to destroy the
timing characteristic of each traffic stream. At this stage, it seems that the only
way to prove this statement is to conduct an experiment in the same fashion as the
experiment conducted in Tor. Unfortunately, Tarzan does not provide the test-bed
that includes the mimic part. We leave this as an open research question. For the
purpose of this analysis, we would treat the Tarzan node operations as a black box
and assume that timing signature is not destroyed. Hence, the comparison between
the attack on Tor and Tarzan is still fair.
Node Discovering Ability
A Tarzan node discovers other peers through a mechanism based on a gossipprotocol. Thus, each Tarzan node can gather all information about all peers. What
seems to be a problem is Tarzan is based on peer-to-peer architecture so that the
number of nodes should be huge and the network should be dynamic. Then, whether
it is possible that the corrupt node can monitor all others’ node latency is dubious.
However, since we are merely concerned with the ability to know other peers in the
network, Tarzan is still considered to satisfy this condition.
Connection Establishment Ability
After recognising all other nodes in the network, if the corrupt node is able to
establish a direct connection with all nodes through an anonymous tunnel in Tarzan
network, then this will satisfy the third requirement. Unlike Tor, Tarzan restricts its
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traffic through merely its mimics. Therefore, when target nodes are not mimics of a
corrupt node, the corrupt Tarzan node may not be able to make a one-hop connection
to each target node. When the connections require more than one hop, the corrupt
Tarzan node cannot be assure about the correctness of the latency it measures. The
corrupt node’s traffic load may be interfered with other traffic load of the nodes in
between the connections. Up to this point, it seems that the low latency attack may
not work in Tarzan. Nevertheless, the adversary is fortunate. Tarzan employs PNAT,
which is the last node in the tunnel prior to the recipient. Unlike other intermediate
nodes in the tunnel that their successors and their predecessors are restricted to
their mimics, the PNAT can be any node in Tarzan network. Therefore, to measure
latency of other node in the network with a single hop connection, the corrupt node
can treat each target node as the PNAT of that connection. Then, there will be no
problem with mimic traffic.
In summary, the low cost attacks should be applicable with the Tarzan architecture, unless Tarzan’s mimic traffic can destroy timing characteristic of the streams or
the PNAT mechanism is modified to require the exit node to be part of the mimics.

7.4.2

Low Cost Attack in MorphMix

The major differences between MorphMix and Tor seems to be the architectures of
the systems and the method to select tunnels’ members and the exit node. MorphMix works in a peer-to-peer environment where Tor has dedicate servers acting as
Mix nodes. In Tor, a Tor client is the one who selects all participants in its anonymous tunnel by itself. However, a MorphMix node selects its participants through
suggestions of each intermediate node in the tunnel. Tor does have an exit node but
MorphMix does not. We conduct our investigation whether the low cost attack will
be applicable to MorphMix based on the same three criteria mentioned earlier.
Latency
MorphMix nodes appear to work in the similar fashion as Tor nodes, after tunnels
are established. That is, no cover traffic mechanism is included. Thus, in this aspect,
the attack should be applicable to MorphMix.
Node Discovering Ability
There is no requirement in MorphMix that each MorphMix node must have knowledge of all other MorphMix nodes in the system. Simply, each node requires a
handful of other nodes obtained locally such as from its neighbours. Then, when
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it wants to establish a tunnel, it continually asks each hop one at a time to recommend a set of possible next hop. This allows nodes in MorphMix system to create
anonymous tunnels without concerning the knowledge of all nodes in the system.
The implication is as follows. When the low cost attack is employed, the corrupt MorphMix node has a problem with acquiring a complete list of all running
MorphMix nodes. That is, it must discover all nodes first. This is not a trivial exercise, in particular, when the discovery can only be done through MorphMix tunnel
establishment mechanism. Therefore, an effective searching algorithm is required.
Nevertheless, this involves a lots of work. Hence, the so-called “low” cost attack will
now become “costly”. Also, by the time all nodes are discovered, the list may be
outdated, since some peers may have disappeared from the network. Moreover, due
to loose knowledge of other nodes’ presences, there is no assurance that all nodes
in the MorphMix network are connected. In this case, the attack cannot even be
conducted.
Connection Establishment Ability
There is no restriction in MorphMix connection. Hence, each MorphMix node can
have a one-hop connection to other MorphMix node directly.
In short, the current attack is not applicable to the MorphMix architecture because the corrupt node is lacking the knowledge of a complete list of all MorphMix
nodes.

7.5

Design Requirements for Secure Low Latency
Networks

There are two essential conditions required in mounting the low-cost attack. Firstly,
the knowledge of all other nodes in the system by a corrupt node is essential. Without this knowledge, this type of attacks cannot be performed. Secondly, the latency
being probed must genuinely represent the traffic load.
Based on these observations, we derive the following conclusions. There are two
alternative approaches that can be taken to prevent the low cost traffic analysis
attacks.
1. Preventing all nodes from gathering information of the whole network , i.e. a
list of all nodes. This implies that we only need to provide adequate information
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so that an anonymous tunnel can be created.
2. Inserting cover traffic into streams in the network in a way such that the network cannot find the streams’ signature.
Based on either of these two possible approaches, we can build a secure low
latency network that will not be susceptible against the low cost attacks.
It is important to note that all strategies suggested by [MD05] fall into the second
approach. However, as they introduce more latency to each connection and involve
a covert channel, there remains an open problem in what degree that cover traffic
should be employed. Hence, the first alternative sheds a new light in preventing this
attack.
Further Discussions
The significant part for anonymity preserving in a low latency anonymous system
appears to be in the second scenario, that is, the message flow or traffic flow. This
is due to the main restriction of the system, which is an intolerably long delay.
When enough delay is introduced, it distorts the relay node capability to mix or
make its incoming and outgoing streams indistinguishable. This leaves some “clue”
for the adversary to finally break the anonymity of the system. However, having
multiple nodes in the anonymous tunnel hardens the adversary in the sense that he
must be able to control all nodes or links. This group of adversary is called global
adversaries.
It seems rather difficult to provide anonymous low latency systems that are
both resistant to global adversaries and provide acceptable delay for applications.
Fortunately, it is not a trivial task to be the global adversary in the Internet as
the Internet hosts are distributed around the globe under different domains and
authorities. Therefore, it is considered to be reasonable to assume that a system is
secure under a weaker type of adversaries. These adversaries are allowed to do several
things both passively and actively, such as observing some fractions of network traffic
or generating, modifying, deleting or delaying traffic or operating some intermediate
nodes; except the requirement for observing all links.
Systems, such as Tor, claim that they provide enough countermeasures against
this type of attack. However, they have not considered that a variant of the attack
can be applied without having to involve a global adversary. By taking advantage
over the timing constraint and the removing of cover traffic, the low cost attack has
successfully attacked the weaker threat model in Tor, and therefore, this model is
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regarded as insufficient.
According to our investigation with other systems, which are Tarzan and Morphmix, the attack is considered to be valid to all low latency networks with the
requirement that the system must allow a node to obtain a list of all other nodes in
the network. Otherwise, if this capability is prohibited, the weaker threat model is
acceptable.
Hence, for any anonymous low latency system that wants to claim the weaker
threat model that secures against a timing attack, this condition must be enforced.
Under this condition, each node is only allowed to know a subset of neighbours, but
not all of them.
This can be used as another supportive reason to favor peer-to-peer based systems over dedicated-server based systems in designing a low latency anonymous
network. This is due to the fact that a number of nodes in the peer-to-peer system
is huge. Thus, if an adversary manages to find all the nodes, the list would be
outdated as it is hard to obtain the list of all nodes within a short time.

7.6

Summary

We investigated one of the attacks in low latency anonymous network systems,
namely the low cost traffic analysis attack. This attack is an important one, since
it has proven to be successful in attacking a system like Tor, which was believed
to be secure under the weaker threat model. Moreover, these types of attacks are
claimed to work with any low latency anonymous systems. We presented a case
where this attack is not applicable. We also investigate some important properties
that need to be ensured whilst building low latency network systems, so that they
will not be susceptible against these types of attacks. Hence, we provided some
necessary conditions that are important and need to be adhered to when designing
low latency anonymous networks. We note that cautions must be exercised upon
building this type of network. Also, since our location privacy system uses a lowlatency anonymous network as its building block, these conditions should be taken
into consideration.

Chapter 8
Conclusion
We discussed security issues in IP-based networks that are caused by mobility requirements, in particular the location privacy problems.
The first part of the thesis presented the real security threats that emerge due
to the deployment of the real system, that is the Mobile IPv4, together with our
proposed solutions. Two issues were encountered and addressed. The first issue
is to deal with the case when a device that has stored the private key of a secure
Mobile IP system is lost (e.g. stolen) and the protection must be provided against
unauthorised access of an adversary who acquired the device.
Since IP address can be used to derive the network location of the mobile device
and Mobile IP provides a mechanism to route packets to the device when it moves
around, the second issue dealt with the location privacy problem that particularly
occurred with this protocol. We solved this problem by presenting a scheme that was
inspired by an overlay network together with the universal re-encryption mechanism.
Furthermore, location privacy is a generic problem that can occur when mobility
is added to the existing IP based systems. In the second part of the thesis, we
provided formal notions to capture mobility, anonymity and location privacy. We
classified location privacy into three levels and proposed a framework for a system
that aims to provide total location privacy by incorporating a low latency anonymous
system as our building block.
We also demonstrated that even though the anonymous communication system
and our proposed location privacy system are closely related, the former does not
imply the latter. To illustrate, though we can adopt an approach used in the low
latency anonymous network for providing location privacy, the system does not
provide anonymity. Similarly, adding mobility to the existing low latency anonymous
communication system does not provide location privacy either. This is because lowlatency anonymous communication deals with the IP addresses that represent the
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identity of the sender and the receiver. Nonetheless, our location privacy system
deals with the IP addresses that represent the mobile user’s locations. To be more
specific, low-latency anonymous communication deals with the overlay path between
the sender and the receiver but our location privacy deals with the overlay path
between the mobile user at her current location and her home network point-ofattachment. Hence, it seems to be contradictory that both properties (mobility
with location privacy and anonymity) can co-exist concurrently. We found that in a
scenario when the connection is always initiated by the client, this requirement can
be satisfied.
We note that any attack to the low latency anonymous system is also applicable
to our location privacy system since we used the former system as our building block.
Therefore, we also provided some design restrictions for a low-latency anonymous
system secured against a low cost timing attack. A low cost attack [MD05] is an
attack that provides an adversary the global passive adversary’s power by merely
being one participant in the anonymous network.
The following provides a summary of each Chapter in detail.
In Chapter 1, we introduced Internet mobility and outlined the objectives and
the aims of this thesis.
In Chapter 2, we described the essential properties, cryptographic tools used
in this thesis and details of existing mobility systems, Mobile IP in particular, the
existing low latency anonymous systems and related works.
In Chapter 3, we dealt with the stolen mobile device that employed Mobile IP
and stored a private key for a secure connection between the firewall and itself.
We proposed to divide the private key into two parts and stored one part at the
device’s storage and another part at the firewall. The part that stored at the device
is encrypted by the user’s password. This enables reusability of the public key when
the device is stolen. We also proposed a verification mechanism whose necessary
information can be inserted into the SKIP header and can be performed in one
message. We also presented a security analysis and proof of our scheme.
In Chapter 4, we proposed an extension of the Mobile IPv4 aimed at providing
location privacy. Our scheme is based on the overlay network approach and employs
universal re-encryption as the encryption scheme. We also extended the universal
re-encryption scheme to n-out-of-n partial decryption for universal re-encryption.
Our scheme does not suffer from a single point of failure and works in the protocol
level.
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In Chapter 5, we provided the formal notions of anonymity, mobility and location
privacy and a formal approach for an IP-based mobility system with location privacy.
We classified location privacy into three levels, namely generic location privacy,
semantic location privacy and total privacy. We also proposed a new framework
for a system that requires total location privacy by using a low-latency anonymous
communication system as its building block including its security proof.
In Chapter 6, we presented a concrete design and implementation based on the
existing IP-based anonymous communication network, which is Tor, to achieve both
mobility and anonymity simultaneously. Our first design combines Mobile IP and
Tor trivially, and we showed that this design will provide location privacy but it
is not optimised and may eventually fail. Then, in our second design we approach
the problem differently by adding the mobility property into Tor, but the resulting
design does not provide location privacy. In our third design, we further modified Tor
so that it can support location privacy. We showed that our third design satisfies all
the required properties according to the notions of anonymity and location mobility
that we defined in Chapter 5.
In Chapter 7, we gave an overview of Tor’s low cost attack by Murdoch and
Danezis [MD05]. We incorporated this attack to other low latency anonymous systems, namely Tarzan and MorphMix to investigate whether the attack is still valid.
Finally, we proposed some design conditions to build a low latency anonymous network so that the system can avoid low cost attack under the weaker threat model.

8.1

Open Problem and Future Extension

Chapter 3 proposed schemes that are quite similar to any password authentication
scheme that is secure against offline dictionary attack. Hence, it maybe possible to
adopt other schemes. However, these schemes must be equipped with both device
and password authentication. That is, without the authorised mobile device, even
though the correct password is entered, it would not work. Also, the scheme is tied
to SKIP that is no longer popular. Therefore, it is interesting to modify the scheme
and make it compatible with the state-of-the-art IKE protocol.
The complexity of the routing mechanism used in our second protocol in the
worst case scenario is equivalent to the complexity of the Hamiltonian path problem [CLRS01]. The future work can be done to reduce this complexity.
Our proposed architecture in Chapter 6 is only limited for a scenario that the
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mobile device always initiates the communication first. The extension should focus
on the architecture in which the mobile device can be a mobile server as well.
We note that any system that provides anonymity and location privacy properties as defined in the model is a potential solution. The proposed scheme in the
thesis used the low-latency anonymous network, which is based on the Chaum’s mix
network architecture [Cha81], as its building block. Finding other schemes that are
also applicable in this model is a challenging task.
Furthermore, the term “location” in this thesis refers to a mobile device’s network
location according to the IP-based communication network topology and our security
model is merely designed for this particular type of location. It is interesting to see
whether our model would fit with other mobility systems such as the cellular network
or the mobility systems that include the spatial location information (e.g. latitude
and longitude). We note that this inclusion may result in the need to redefine our
model accordingly.

Appendix A
MicroMobility
Micromobility protocol operates in two modes: an idle mode and an active mode
so that power-limited mobile devices can live longer and the path update signaling
within the access network and over the wireless medium is reduced. When the
mobile device is engaging in communication with other host and the network needs
its location so that it can forward packets to it, that mobile device is considered in
an active mode. When the mobile device is not participating in any communication,
it is in an idle mode. The three main functions in any micromobility protocol are:
routing or path update, handover management and paging [Sal04].
Both path update and paging deal with the location management of the hosts
that move within the boundaries of their access network, however, in different modes.
Path update handles the active-mode mobile device where paging handles the idlemode mobile device. Location information in path update is more precise than in
paging.
The idea of paging is that there is no need for an idle-mode host to notify the
network for each movement it performs. Hence, paging areas, in which each area
consists of a set of base stations (BSs), are established for the hosts’ coarse location
so that the movement notification is required only when the paging area is changed.
When data packets for an idle host arrives, the network pages the host according
to its paging area. The host wakes up, becomes active, and informs the network
for its exact location. Paging operations consist of two procedures: registration and
paging [Sal04]. The mobile node performs the former to notify the coarse location
(paging area). The latter is performed by the network to reach the host.
Handover management deals with the maintenance of the host connectivity (active sessions) when it moves across different access points. To be more specific, it is
a process that transfers all information of the host from the old network to the new
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network1 .
Salkintzis [Sal04] categorises the existing micromobility protocols into two types
in regard to their forwarding mechanisms. That is those that use host-based forwarding entries and those that use hierarchical tunnelling techniques. Their differences
are the place at which the location information is maintained and the routing mechanism. The host-based forwarding stores the location information through all the
nodes on the downstream forwarding path. Routing is done to a specific routing
mechanism. However, the tunnelling technique stores location information in a hierarchical manner and uses standard IP routing to forward a packet. Examples
include Cellular IP [Cel, Val99] and HAWAII [RVS+ 02] for the former and Mobile
IPv4 Regional Registration [FJP07] and Hierarchical MIPv6 [MB05] for the latter.

1

Handoff is often used for analog systems where handover is used for digital systems.

Appendix B
The Justification of MA1 and MA2 based
on our formal model

B.1

MA1

MA1 Justification. The mobility of our design MA1 is provided by the Mobile IP
protocol. For the location privacy, we consider the total location privacy property.
Total Location Privacy. Consider the following game between A and C. We describe
an adversary A as an attacker that can break the total location privacy interaction
in our design. In this setting, we set C as a home agent in the Mobile IP network
in the real world. Firstly, C provides all the required Mobile IP parameters to A
and a set of locations {L1 , L2 , · · · , Ln } ∈ L. The attacking phase can be done by
A by querying C for any particular locations Lj ∈ L of the mobile node idR for
a particular time Tk ∈ T . To answer this query, C can invoke the real world that
contains the Mobile IP’s home agents and obtain the real transcript from the Mobile
IP’s home agents. The transcript will be provided to A and hence, the simulation
runs completely. Finally, A outputs two locations L0 , L1 of his choice and a target
time T ∗ that has not been queried before and C provides a transcript Ωi for a coin
toss i ∈ {0, 1}. By being a home agent that has access to the binding table, A
can output the choice of i that C selected. Therefore, A has successfully broken
the underlying total location privacy (G3 as described in Chapter 5) of the MA1
architecture.

B.2

MA2

MA2 Justification. The mobility of our design MA2 is provided by the modified Tor
network. For the location privacy, we consider the total location privacy property.
168
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Total Location Privacy. Consider the following game between A and C. We describe
an adversary A as an attacker that can break the total location privacy interaction
in our design. In this setting, we set C as the first Tor node in our modified Tor
networks in the real world. Firstly, C provides all the required modified Tor networks
parameters to A and a set of locations {L1 , L2 , · · · , Ln } ∈ L. The attacking phase
can be done by A by querying C for any particular locations Lj ∈ L of the mobile
node idR for a particular time Tk ∈ T . To answer this query, C can invoke the real
world that contains the first Tor nodes (in the modified networks) and obtain the
real transcript from the Mobile IP’s home agents. The transcript will be provided
to A and hence, the simulation runs completely. Finally, A outputs two locations
L0 , L1 of his choice and a target time T ∗ that has not been queried before and C
provides a transcript Ωi for a coin toss i ∈ {0, 1}. Then, A can output the choice
of i that C selected. Note that this output means that A has successfully broken
the underlying total location privacy of the MA2 architecture. That is, by being
the first Tor node, A must maintain the Tor connection, namely Tor circuit. This
enables A to have the mobile node’s location information.
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